THOUGHT -CULTURE 


or 


Praxitical  Mental  Trainini 


WILLIAM   WALKER  ATKINSON 


THE 

New  Psychology  Series 

By  WILLIAM  WALKER  ATKINSON 

IN  the  past  few  years  a  widespread  mental  and 
spiritual  awakening  has  taken  place  among  the 
people  of  this  country.  And  this  new  awakening 
has  been  very  aptly  called  THE  NEW  PSYCHOL- 
OGY MOVEMENT,  because  it  has  to  do  with  the 
development  and  expression  of  the  mind,  or  soul,  of 
both  the  individual  and  the  nation. 

The  New  Psychology  The  Art  of  Logical 

The  Will  Memory  Thinking 

Suggestion  and  Auto-  Thought-Culture 

Suggestion  The  Psychology  of  Sales- 

The   Subconscieus    and  manship 

Superconscious  Planes  ~..       *    ^    f  e- 
of  Mind  Expression 

The  Psychology  of  Sue      ^^^^  ^"'^  Bo'^y 
cess  Human  Nature 

Although  each  bookstands  alone  as  an  authority  on 
the  subject  treated,  yet  one  theme  runs  through  the  se- 
ries, binding  them  together  to  make  a  complete  whole. 

The  uniform  postpaid  price  of  each  volume  is  $1.00 
We  iure  making  a  special  price  of  $10.00  for  the  entire  set 

THE  PROGRESS  COMPANY       ::      CHICAGO 

\W.'-Z  li-.i-is  STOftH,  POiT'.AND,  OREQON, 
2S4  OAK  ST. 


THOUGHT-CULTURE 

OR  ^y 

PRACTICAL   MENTAL   TRAINING 


By  WILLIAM  WALKER  ATKINSON 


L.  N.  FOWLER  &  COMPANY 

7,  Imperial  Arcade.  Ludgate  Circus 

London,  E.  C,  England 


1909 

THE   PROGRESS   COMPANY 

CHICAGO,  ILL. 

»?»>«ES  BOOK  STORE,  PORTLAND,  OREQON. 
2  a*  OAK  ST. 


CopTRioHT,  leio 

By 
T«E  PROGRESS  COMPANY 


P.  K  Pettibonk  &  Co 

Printers  and  Binders 

Chicago 


CONTENTS 


I.     The  Power  of  Thought 9 

II.     The  Nature  of  Thought 19 

III.  Phases  of  Thought 27 

IV.  Thought  Culture  37 

V.    Attention 47 

VI.     Perception 57 

VII.    Representation 76 

VIII.    Abstraction  85 

IX.    Association  of  Ideas 95 

X.     Generalization    106 

XI.     Judgment 130 

XII.     Derived  Judgments 138 

XIII.  Reasoning   152 

XIV.  Constructive  Imagination  175 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  POWER  OF  THOUGHT 

In  other  volumes  of  this  series  we  have 
considered  the  operations  of  the  human  mind 
known  as  Will,  Memory,  etc.  We  now  ap- 
proach the  consideration  of  those  mental  ac- 
tivities which  are  concerned  with  the  phenom- 
ena of  thought— those  activities  which  we 
generally  speak  of  as  the  operation  of  the  in- 
tellect or  reason. 

What  is  thought?  The  answer  is  not  an 
easy  one,  although  we  use  the  term  familiarly 
almost  every  hour  of  our  waking  existence. 
The  dictionaries  define  the  term  ''Thought" 
as  follows;  ''The  act  of  thinking;  the  exer- 
cise of  the  mind  in  any  way  except  sense  and 
perception;  serious  consideration;  delibera- 
tion; reflection;  the  power  or  faculty  of 
thinking;  the  mental  faculty  of  the  mind; 
etc."  This  drives  us  back  upon  the  term,  "to 
think"  which  is  defined  as  follows:  "To  oc- 
cupy the  mind  on  some  subject;  to  have 
ideas;  to  revolve  ideas  in  the  mind;  to  cogi- 

9 


10  Thought  Cultuke 

tate;  to  reason;  to  exercise  the  power  of 
thought;  to  have  a  succession  of  ideas  or 
mental  states;  to  perform  any  mental  opera- 
tion, whether  of  apprehension,  judgment,  or 
illation;  to  judge;  to  form  a  conclusion,  to 
determine;  etc." 

Thought  is  an  operation  of  the  intellect. 
The  intellect  is:  *'that  faculty  of  the  human 
soul  or  mind  by  which  it  receives  or  compre- 
hends the  ideas  communicated  to  it  by  the 
senses  or  by  perception,  or  other  means,  as 
distinguished  from  the  power  to  feel  and  to 
will ;  the  power  or  faculty  to  perceive  objects 
in  their  relations;  the  power  to  judge  and 
comprehend;  also  the  capacity  for  higher 
forms  of  knowledge  as  distinguished  from 
the  power  to  perceive  and  imagine." 

When  we  say  what  we  ''think,"  we  mean 
that  we  exercise  the  faculties  whereby  we 
compare  and  contrast  certain  things  with 
other  things,  observing  and  noting  their 
points  of  difference  and  agreement,  then 
classifying  them  in  accordance  with  these 
observed  agreements  and  differences.  In 
thinking  we  tend  to  classify  the  multitude  of 
impressions  received  from  the  outside  world. 


Power  of  Thought  11 

arranging  thousands  of  objects  into  one  gen- 
eral class,  and  other  thousands  into  other  gen- 
eral classes,  and  then  sub-dividing  these 
classes,  until  finally  we  have  found  mental 
pigeon-holes  for  every  conceivable  idea  or  im- 
pression. We  then  begin  to  make  inferences 
and  deductions  regarding  these  ideas  or  im- 
pressions, working  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown,  from  particulars  to  generalities,  or 
from  generalities  to  particulars,  as  the  case 
may  be. 

It  is  this  faculty  or  power  of  thought— 
this  use  of  the  intellect,  that  has  brought  man 
to  his  present  high  position  in  the  world  of 
living  things.  In  his  early  days,  man  was  a 
much  weaker  animal  than  those  with  whom 
he  was  brought  into  contact.  The  tigers,  lions, 
bears,  mammoths,  and  other  ferocious  beasts 
were  much  stronger,  fiercer,  and  fleeter  than 
man,  and  he  was  placed  in  a  position  so  lack- 
ing of  apparent  equal  chance  of  survival, 
that  an  observer  would  have  unhesitatingly 
advanced  the  opinion  that  this  weak,  feeble, 
slow  animal  must  soon  surely  perish  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  and  that  the  ' '  survival 
of  the  fittest ' '  would  soon  cause  him  to  vanish 


12  Thought  Culture 

from  the  scene  of  the  world's  activities.  And, 
so  it  would  have  been  had  he  possessed  no 
equipment  other  than  those  of  the  other  ani- 
mals; viz.,  strength,  natural  weapons  and 
speed.  And  yet  man  not  only  survived  in 
spite  of  these  disadvantages,  but  he  has  actu- 
ally conquered,  mastered  and  enslaved  these 
other  animals  which  seemed  likely  to  work 
his  destruction.    Why?    How? 

This  feeble  animal  called  man  had  within 
him  the  elements  of  a  new  power— a  power 
manifested  in  but  a  slight  degree  in  the  other 
animals.  He  possessed  an  intellect  by  which 
he  was  able  to  deduce,  compare,  infer— rea- 
son. 

His  lack  of  natural  weapons  he  overcame 
by  borrowing  the  idea  of  the  tooth  and  claw 
of  the  other  animals,  imitating  them  in  flint 
and  shaping  them  into  spears ;  borrowing  the 
trunk  of  the  elephant  and  the  paw  of  the  tiger, 
and  reproducing  their  blow-striking  qualities 
in  his  wooden  club.  Not  only  this  but  he  took 
lessons  from  the  supple  limbs  and  branches 
of  the  trees,  and  copied  the  principle  in  his 
bow,  in  order  to  project  its  minature  spear, 
his  arrow.    He  sheltered  himself,  his  mate 


Power  of  Thought  13 

and  his  young,  from  the  fury  of  the  storm, 
first  by  caves  and  afterwards  by  rude  houses, 
built  in  inaccessible  places,  readied  only  by 
means  of  crude  ladders,  bridges,  or  climbing 
poles.  He  built  doors  for  his  habitations,  to 
protect  himself  from  the  attacks  of  these  wild 
enemies— he  heaped  stones  at  the  mouth  of  his 
caves  to  keep  them  out.  He  placed  great 
boulders  on  cliffs  that  he  might  topple  them 
down  on  the  approaching  foe.  He  learned  to 
hurl  rocks  with  sure  aim  with  his  strong  arm. 
He  copied  the  floating  log,  and  built  his  first 
rude  rafts,  and  then  evolved  the  hollowed 
canoe.  He  used  the  skins  of  animals  to  keep 
him  warm— their  tendons  for  his  bowstrings. 
He  learned  the  advantages  of  cooperation 
and  combined  effort,  and  thus  formed  the  first 
rudiments  of  society  and  social  life.  And 
finally— man's  first  great  discovery— he 
found  the  art  of  fire  making. 

As  a  writer  has  said :  ' '  For  some  hundreds 
of  years,  upon  the  general  plane  of  self-con- 
sciousness, an  ascent,  to  the  human  eye  grad- 
ual but  from  the  point  of  view  of  cosmic 
evolution  rapid,  has  been  made.  In  a  race 
large-brained,      walking-erect,      gregarious. 


14  Thought  Culture 

brutal,  but  king  of  all  other  brutes,  man  in 
appearance  but  not  in  fact,  was  from  the 
highest  simple-consciousness  born  the  basic 
human  faculty,  self-consciousness  and  its 
twin,  language.  From  these  and  what  went 
with  these,  through  suffering,  toil  and  war; 
through  bestiality,  savagery,  barbarism; 
through  slavery,  greed,  effort,  through  con- 
quests infinite,  through  defeats  overwhelm- 
ing, through  struggle  unending ;  through  ages 
of  aimless  semi-brutal  existence,  through  sub- 
sistence on  berries  and  roots ;  through  the  use 
of  the  casually  found  stone  or  stick;  through 
life  in  deep  forests,  with  nuts  and  seeds,  and 
on  the  shores  of  waters  with  mollusks,  crusta- 
ceans and  fish  for  food;  through  that  great- 
est, perhaps,  of  human  victories,  the  domesti- 
cation and  subjugation  of  fire;  through  the 
invention  and  art  of  bow  and  arrow ;  through 
the  training  of  animals  and  the  breaking  of 
them  to  labor;  through  the  long  learning 
which  led  to  the  cultivation  of  the  soil; 
through  the  adobe  brick  and  the  building  of 
houses  therefrom;  through  the  smelting  of 
metals  and  the  slow  birth  of  the  arts  which 
rest  upon  these ;  through  the  slow  making  of 


Power  of  Thought  15 

alphabets  and  the  evolution  of  the  written 
work;  in  short,  through  thousands  of  cen- 
turies of  human  life,  of  human  aspiration, 
of  human  growth,  sprang  the  world  of  men 
and  women  as  it  stands  before  us  and  within 
us  today  with  all  its  achievements  and  pos- 
sessions." 

The  great  difference  between  thought  as 
we  find  it  in  man,  and  its  forms  among  the 
lower  animals  lies  in  what  psychologists  have 
called  ''progressive  thought."  The  animals 
advance  but  little  in  their  thinking  processes 
but  rest  content  with  those  of  their  ancestors 
—their  thought  seems  to  have  become  set  or 
crystallized  during  the  process  of  their  evolu- 
tion. The  birds,  mammals  and  the  insects 
vary  but  little  in  their  mental  processes  from 
their  ancestors  of  many  thousand  years  ago. 
They  build  their  nests,  or  dens,  in  almost  pre- 
cisely the  same  manner  as  did  their  progen- 
itors in  the  stone-age.  But  man  has  slowly 
but  steadily  progressed,  in  spite  of  temporary 
set-backs  and  failures.  He  has  endeavored 
to  progress  and  improve.  Those  tribes  which 
fell  back  in  regard  to  mental  progress  and 
advancement,  have  been  left  behind  in  the 


16  Thought  Culture 

race,  and  in  many  cases  have  become  extinct. 
The  great  natural  law  of  the  ' '  survival  of  the 
fittest"  has  steadily  operated  in  the  life  of 
the  race.  The  ''fittest"  were  those  best 
adapted  to  grapple  with  and  overcome  the 
obstacles  of  their  environment,  and  these 
obstacles  were  best  overcome  by  the  use  of 
the  intellect.  Those  tribes  and  those  individ- 
uals whose  intellect  was  active,  tended  to  sur- 
vive where  others  perished,  and  consequently 
they  were  able  to  transmit  their  intellectual 
quality  to  their  descendants. 

Halleck  says :  ' '  Nature  is  constantly  using 
her  power  to  kill  off  the  thoughtless,  or  to 
cripple  them  in  life's  race.  She  is  determined 
that  only  the  fittest  and  the  descendants  of 
the  fittest  shall  survive.  By  the  'fittest'  she 
means  those  who  have  thought  and  whose  an- 
cestors have  thought  and  profited  thereby. 
Geologists  tell  us  that  ages  ago  there  lived  in 
England  bears,  tigers,  elephants,  lions  and 
many  other  powerful  and  fierce  animals. 
There  was  living  contemporaneous  with  them 
a  much  weaker  animal,  that  had  neither  the 
claws,  the  strength,  nor  the  speed  of  the 
tiger.     In   fact   this  human   being  was   al- 


Power  of  Thought  17 

most  defenceless.  Had  a  being  from  an- 
other planet  been  asked  to  prophesy,  he 
would  undoubtedly  have  said  that  this  help- 
less animal  would  be  the  first  to  be  extermi- 
nated. And  yet  every  one  of  those  fierce 
creatures  succumbed  either  to  the  change  of 
climate,  or  to  man's  inferior  strength.  The 
reason  was  that  man  had  one  resource  denied 
to  the  animals— the  power  of  progressive 
thought.  The  land  sank,  the  sea  cut  off  Eng- 
land from  the  mainland,  the  climate  changed, 
and  even  the  strongest  animals  were  helpless. 
But  man  changed  his  clothing  with  the  chang- 
ing climate.  He  made  fires ;  he  built  a  retreat 
to  keep  off  death  by  cold.  He  thought  out 
means  to  kill  or  to  subdue  the  strongest  ani- 
mals. Had  the  lions,  tigers  or  bears  the  power 
of  progressive  thought,  they  could  have  com- 
bined, and  it  would  have  been  possible  for 
them  to  exterminate  man  before  he  reached 
the  civilized  stage.  .  .  .  Man  no  longer 
sleeps  in  caves.  The  smoke  no  longer  fills  his 
home  or  finds  its  way  out  through  the  chinks 
in  the  walls  or  a  hole  in  the  roof.  In  traveling, 
he  is  no  longer  restricted  to  his  feet  or  even 
to  horses.    For  all  this  improvement  man  is 


18  Thought  Culture 

indebted  to  thought.  That  has  harnessed  the 
very  vibrations  of  the  ether  to  do  his  bid- 
ding.** 

And  thus  we  see  that  man  owes  his  present 
place  on  earth  to  his  Thought-Culture.  And, 
it  certainly  behooves  us  to  closely  consider 
and  study  the  methods  and  processes  whereby 
each  and  every  man  may  cultivate  and  de- 
velop the  wondrous  faculties  of  the  mind 
which  are  employed  in  the  processes  of 
Thought.  The  faculties  of  the  Mind,  like  the 
muscles  of  the  body,  may  be  developed,  trained 
and  cultivated.  The  process  of  such  mental 
development  is  called  ''Thought-Culture," 
and  forms  the  subject  of  this  book. 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE  NATUEE  OF  THOUGHT 

It  was  formerly  considered  necessary  for  all 
books  on  the  subject  of  thought  to  begin  by 
a  recital  of  the  metaphysical  conceptions  re- 
garding the  nature  and  "thingness"  of  Mind. 
The  student  was  led  through  many  pages  and 
endless  speculation  regarding  the  metaphys- 
ical theories  regarding  the  origin  and  inner 
nature  of  Mind  which,  so  far  from  establish- 
ing a  fixed  and  definite  explanation  in  his 
mind,  rather  tended  toward  confusing  him 
and  giving  him  the  idea  that  psychology  was 
of  necessity  a  speculative  science  lacking 
the  firm  practical  basis  possessed  by  other 
branches  of  science.  In  the  end,  in  the  words 
of  old  Omar,  he  ' '  came  out  the  door  through 
which  he  went. ' ' 

But  this  tendency  has  been  overcome  of  late 
years,  and  writers  on  the  subject  pass  by  all 
metaphysical  conceptions  regarding  the  na- 
ture of  Mind,  and  usually  begin  by  plunging 
at  once  into  the  real  business  of  psychology— 

19 


20  Thought  Culture 

the  business  of  the  practical  study  of  the 
mechanism  and  activities  of  the  mind  itself/ 
As  some  writer  has  said,  psychology  has  no 
more  concern  with  the  solution  of  the  eternal 
riddle  of  * '  What  is  Mind  ? ' '  than  physics  with 
the  twin-riddle  of  ''What  is  Matter?"  Both 
riddles,  and  their  answers,  belong  to  entirely 
different  branches  and  fields  of  thought  than 
those  concerned  with  their  laws  of  operation 
and  principles  of  activity.  As  Halleck  says : 
''Psychology  studies  the  phenomena  of  mind, 
just  as  physics  investigates  those  of  matter." 
And,  likewise,  just  as  the  science  of  physics 
holds  true  in  spite  of  the  varying  and  chang- 
ing conceptions  regarding  the  nature  of  mat- 
ter, so  does  the  science  of  psychology  hold 
true  in  spite  of  the  varying  and  changing  con- 
ceptions regarding  the  nature  of  Mind. 

Halleck  has  well  said:  "If  a  materialist 
should  hold  that  the  mind  was  nothing  but 
the  brain,  and  that  the  brain  was  a  vast  ag- 
gregation of  molecular  sheep  herding  to- 
gether in  various  ways,  his  hypothesis  would 
not  change  the  fact  that  sensation  must  pre- 
cede perception,  memory  and  thought;  nor 
would  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas  be 


Nature  of  Thought  21 

changed,  nor  would  the  fact  that  interest  and 
repetition  aid  memory  cease  to  hold  good. 
The  man  who  thought  his  mind  was  a  collec- 
tion of  little  cells  would  dream,  imagine,  think 
and  feel;  so  also  would  he  who  believed  his 
mind  to  be  immaterial.  It  is  very  fortunate 
that  the  same  mental  phenomena  occur,  no 
matter  what  theory  is  adopted.  Those  who 
like  to  study  the  puzzles  as  to  what  mind  and 
matter  really  are  must  go  to  metaphysics. 
Should  we  ever  find  that  salt,  arsenic  and  all 
things  else  are  the  same  substance  with  a  dif- 
ferent molecular  arrangement,  we  should  still 
not  use  them  interchangeably. ' ' 

For  the  purposes  of  the  study  of  practical 
psychology,  we  may  as  well  lay  aside,  if  even 
for  the  moment,  our  pet  metaphysical  con- 
ceptions and  act  as  if  we  knew  nothing  of  the 
essential  nature  of  Mind  (and  indeed  Science 
in  truth  does  not  know),  and  confine  our- 
selves to  the  phenomena  and  manifestations 
of  Mind  which,  after  all,  is  the  only  way  in 
which  and  by  which  we  can  know  anything  at 
all  about  it.  As  Brooks  says :  ' '  The  mind  can 
be  defined  only  by  its  activities  and  manifes- 
tations.   In  order  to  obtain  a  definition  of  the 


22  Thought  Culture 

mind,  therefore,  we  must  observe  and  de- 
termine its  various  forms  of  activity.  These 
activities,  classified  under  a  few  general  heads 
and  predicated  of  the  unseen  something  which 
manifests  them,  will  give  us  a  definition  of 
mind." 

The  act  of  consciousness  determines  the 
existence  of  Mind  in  the  person  experiencing 
it.  No  one  can  be  conscious  of  thought  and, 
at  the  same  time,  deny  the  existence  of  mind 
within  himself.  For  the  very  act  of  denial,  in 
itself,  is  a  manifestation  of  thought  and  con- 
sequently an  assertion  of  the  existence  of 
mind.  One  may  assert  the  axiom:  ''I  think, 
therefore,  I  have  a  mind;"  but  he  is  denied 
the  privilege  of  arguing:  '*I  think,  therefore, 
I  have  no  mind."  The  mind  has  an  ultimate 
and  final  knowledge  of  its  own  existence. 

The  older  view  of  Mind  is  that  it  is  a  some- 
thing higher  than  matter  which  it  uses  for  its 
manifestation.  It  was  held  to  be  unknowable 
in  itself  and  to  be  studied  only  through  its 
manifestations.  It  was  supposed  to  involve 
itself,  to  become  involved,  in  some  way  in 
matter  and  to  there  manifest  itself  in  an  in- 
finitude  of  forms,  degrees,   and  variations. 


Nature  of  Thought  23 

The  materialistic  view,  which  arose  into  prom- 
inence in  the  middle  of  the  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury, held,  on  the  contrary,  that  Mind  was 
merely  an  activity  or  property  of  Matter— a 
function  of  matter  akin  to  extension  and  mo- 
tion. Huxley,  voicing  this  conception  said: 
*  *  We  have  no  knowledge  of  any  thinking  sub- 
stance apart  from  an  extended  substance.  .  . 
We  shall,  sooner  or  later,  arrive  at  a  me- 
chanical equivalent  of  consciousness,  just  as 
we  have  arrived  at  a  mechanical  equivalent  of 
heat."  But,  Huxley,  himself,  was  afterwards 
constrained  to  acknowledge  that:  "How  it  is 
that  anything  so  remarkable  as  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness comes  about  by  the  result  of  irritat- 
ing nei^ous  tissue,  is  just  as  unaccountable  as 
the  appearance  of  the  jinnee  when  Aladdin 
rubbed  his  lamp." 

The  most  advanced  authorities  of  the  day, 
are  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  both  Matter 
and  Mind  are  both  differing  aspects  of  some 
one  fundamental  Something;  or,  as  some  of 
the  closest  thinkers  state  it,  both  are  probably 
two  apparently  differing  manifestations  or 
emanations  of  an  Underlying  Something 
which,  as  Spencer  says:  ** transcends  not  only 


24  Thought  Culture 

our  reason  but  also  our  imagination."  The 
study  of  philosophy  and  metaphysics  serves 
an  important  purpose  in  showing  us  how  much 
we  do  not  know,  and  why  we  do  not  know- 
also  in  showing  us  the  fallacy  of  many  things 
we  had  thought  we  did  know— but  when  it 
comes  to  telling  us  the  real  ''why,'*  actual 
cause,  or  essential  nature  of  anything,  it  is 
largely  a  disappointment  to  those  who  seek 
fundamental  truths  and  ultimate  reasons.  It 
is  much  more  comfortable  to  ''abjure  the 
'Why'  and  seek  the  'How'  "—if  we  can. 

Many  psychologists  classify  the  activities 
of  the  mind  into  three  general  divisions ;  viz., 
(1)  Thinking;  (2)  Willing;  (3)  Feeling. 
These  divisions,  which  result  from  what  is 
known  as  "the  tri-logical  classification,"  were 
first  distinctly  enunciated  by  Upham  although 
Kant  had  intimated  it  very  plainly.  For  many 
years  before  the  favored  division  was  but  two- 
fold the  line  of  division  being  between  the  cog- 
nitive, or  knowing,  activities,  and  the  conative, 
or  acting,  activities,  generally  known  as  the 
Understanding  and  the  Will,  respectively.  It 
took  a  long  time  before  the  authorities  would 
formally  recognize  the  great  field  of  the  Feel- 


Nature  of  Thought  25 

ings  as  forming  a  class  by  tliemselves  and 
ranking  with  the  Understanding  and  the  Will. 
There  are  certain  sub-divisions  and  shadings, 
which  we  shall  notice  as  we  proceed,  some  of 
which  are  more  or  less  complex,  and  which 
seem  to  shade  into  others.  The  student  is  cau- 
tioned against  conceiving  of  the  mind  as  a 
thing  having  several  compartments  or  distinct 
divisions.  The  classification  does  not  indicate 
this  and  is  only  intended  as  a  convenience  in 
analyzing  and  studying  the  mental  activities 
and  operations.  The  ''I"  which  feels,  thinks 
and  acts  is  the  same— one  entity. 

As  Brooks  well  says:  "The  mind  is  a  self- 
conscious  activity  and  not  a  mere  passivity; 
it  is  a  centre  of  spiritual  forces,  all  resting  in 
the  background  of  the  ego.  As  a  centre  of 
forces,  it  stands  related  to  the  forces  of  the 
material  and  spiritual  universe  and  is  acted 
upon  through  its  susceptibilities  by  those 
forces.  As  a  spiritual  activity,  it  takes  the  im- 
pressions derived  from  those  forces,  works 
them  up  into  the  organic  growth  of  itself,  con- 
verts them  into  conscious  knowledge  and  uses 
these  products  as  means  to  set  other  forces 
into  activity  and  produce  new  results.    Stand- 


26  Thought  Culture 

ing  above  nature  and  superior  to  its  surround- 
ings, it  nevertheless  feeds  upon  nature,  as  we 
may  say,  and  transforms  material  influences 
into  spiritual  facts  akin  to  its  own  nature. 
Related  to  tlie  natural  world  and  apparently 
originating  from  it,  it  yet  rises  above  this  nat- 
ural world  and,  with  the  crown  of  freedom 
upon  its  brow,  rules  the  natural  obedient  to  its 
will." 

In  this  book,  while  we  shall  fully  and  un- 
questionably recognize  the  "tri-logical  classi- 
fication" of  the  activities  of  the  Mind  into  the 
divisions  of  Thinking,  Willing  and  Feeling, 
respectively,  nevertheless,  we  shall,  for  con- 
venience, use  the  term  "Thought"  in  its 
broadest,  widest  and  most  general  sense, 
as:  ''The  power  or  faculty  of  thinking;  the 
mental  faculty;  the  mind,"  rather  than  in  its 
narrower  and  particular  sense  of:  ''the  un- 
derstanding or  cognitive  faculty  of  the 
mind."  Accordingly,  we  shall  include  the 
cultivation  of  the  mental  activities  known  as 
Attention,  Perception,  Imagination,  etc.,  to- 
gether with  the  strictly  cognitive  faculties, 
under  the  general  term  of  Thought-Culture. 


CHAPTER  III. 

PHASES  OF  THOUGHT 

We  have  seen  that  the  Mind  is  that  some- 
thing within  us  which  Thinks,  Feels  and 
Wills.  There  are  various  phases  of  these 
three  forms  of  activity.  These  phases  have 
often  been  called  * '  the  faculties  of  the  mind, ' ' 
although  many  authorities  decry  the  use  of 
this  term,  holding  that  it  gives  an  impression 
of  several  parts  or  divisions  of  the  mind,  sep- 
arate and  distinct  from  each  other,  whereas 
these  phases  are  merely  the  several  powers  or 
forms  of  activity  of  the  Mind.  Every  mani- 
festation of  mental  activity  falls  under  one  of 
the  three  before-mentioned  general  forms, 
i.  e..  Thinking,  Feeling  and  Willing,  respect- 
ively. Every  manifestation  of  mental  activity 
is  either  that  of  the  Intellect,  the  Feelings,  or 
the  Will.  Let  us  consider  the  first  of  these 
three  general  forms  of  mental  activity— the 
Intellect. 

The  Intellect  is  defined  as:   ''That  faculty 

or  phase  of  the  human  mind  by  which  it  re- 

27 


28  Thought  Culture 

ceives  or  comprehends  the  ideas  communi- 
oated  to  it  by  the  senses  or  by  perception,  or 
oth-er  means,  as  distinguished  from  the  power 
to  feel  and  to  will ;  the  power  or  faculty  to  per- 
ceive objects  in  their  relations;  the  power  to 
judge  and  comprehend;  also  the  capacity  for 
higher  forms  of  knowledge  as  distinguished 
from  the  power  to  perceive  and  imagine.'* 
The  term  itself  is  derived  from  the  Latin  term 
intellectus,  the  primary  meaning  of  which  is 
*'to  choose  between,"  which  primary  mean- 
ing will  give  the  true  essential  meaning  of  the 
term  in  its  present  usage ;  namely,  the  faculty 
or  phase  of  the  mind  by  which  we  ''choose  be- 
tween" things  or  by  which  we  decide. 

The  phase  or  faculty  of  Intellect  concerns 
itself  with  Thinking,  in  the  particular  and 
narrower  sense  of  that  term.  Its  products  are 
thoughts,  mental  images  and  ideas.  An  idea 
or  oriental  image  is  a  mental  conception  of  any- 
thing, as  for  instance  our  conception  which  we 
express  by  the  terms,  mkin,  animal,  house,  etc. 
Sometimes  the  word  idea  is  used  to  express 
merely  the  abstract  or  generalized  conception 
of  the  thing,  as,  for  instance,  Man  in  the  sense 
of  "all  men;"  while  mental  image  is  used  in 


Phases  of  Thought  29 

tlie  sense  of  the  mental  conception  of  some  one 
particular  thing,  as  a,  "a  man;"  it  being  held 
that  no  mental  image  can  be  had  of  a  generali- 
zation. A  thought  is  held  to  be  a  mental  prod- 
uct arising  from  a  combination  of  two  or  more 
ideas  or  mental  images,  as  for  instance:  "A 
horse  is  an  animal ; "  "  a  man  is  a  biped ; ' '  etc. 

The  Intellect  is  held  to  embrace  and  include 
a  number  of  minor  phases  or  faculties,  such 
as  Perception,  Understanding,  Imagination, 
Memory,  Eeason  and  Intuition,  which  are  ex- 
plained as  follows : 

Perception  is  that  faculty  of  the  Mind  which 
interprets  the  material  presented  to  it  by  the 
senses.  It  is  the  power  whereby  we  gain  our 
knowledge  of  the  external  world,  as  reported 
to  us  by  the  channels  of  sense.  Through  Per- 
ception we  are  able  to  form  ideas  and  mental 
images,  which  in  turn  lead  to  thoughts.  The 
objects  of  which  we  become  conscious  through 
Perception  are  called  percepts,  which  form  the 
bases  of  what  we  call  concepts,  or  ideas. 

Understanding  is  that  faculty  of  the  Mind 
by  the  means  of  which  we  are  able  intelli- 
gently to  compare  the  objects  presented  to  it 
by  Perception,  and  by  which  we  separate  them 


30  Thought  Culture 

into  parts  by  analysis,  or  to  combine  them  into 
greater  classes,  or  wholes,  by  synthesis.  It 
produces  ideas,  both  abstract  and  general; 
also  concepts  of  truths,  laws,  principles, 
causes,  etc.  There  are  several  sub-phases  of 
Understanding,  which  are  known  as :  Abstrac- 
tion, Conception  or  Generalization,  or  Judg- 
ment and  Reasoning,  respectively,  which  are 
explained  as  follows: 

Abstraction  is  that  faculty  of  the  Mind 
which  enables  it  to  abstract,  or  draw  off,  and 
consider  apart  from  an  object,  a  particular 
quality  or  property  of  an  object,  thus  making 
of  the  quality  or  property  a  distinct  object  of 
thought  apart  from  the  original  object.  Thus 
are  the  abstract  ideas  of  siveetness,  color, 
hardness,  courage,  beauty,  etc.,  which  we  have 
abstracted  or  draivn  off  from  their  original 
associations,  either  for  the  purpose  of  putting 
them  out  of  sight  and  consideration,  or  else  to 
view  and  consider  them  by  themselves.  No 
one  ever  tasted  ''sweetness"  although  one 
may  have  tasted  sweet  things;  no  one  ever 
saw  ''red,"  although  one  may  have  seen  red 
things;  no  one  ever  saw,  heard,  tasted  or  felt 
"courage"  in  another,  although  one  may  have 


Phases  of  Thought  31 

seen  courageous  people.  Abstract  ideas  are 
merely  the  mental  concei^tion  of  qualities  or 
properties  divorced  from  tlieir  associated  ob- 
jects by  Abstraction. 

Conception  or  Generalization  is  that  faculty 
of  the  Mind  by  which  it  forms  and  groups  to- 
gether several  particular  ideas  in  the  form  of 
a  general  idea.  By  the  processes  of  Concep- 
tion we  foiTB  classes  or  generalizations  from 
particular  ideas  arising  from  our  percepts. 
First,  we  perceive  things;  then  we  compare 
them  with  each  other ;  then  we  abstract  their 
particular  qualities,  which  are  not  common 
to  the  several  objects;  then  we  generalize 
them  according  to  their  resemblances;  then 
we  name  the  generalized  concept.  From  these 
combined  processes  we  form  a  Concept,  or 
general  idea  of  the  class  of  things  to  which 
the  particular  things  belong.  Thus  from  sub- 
jecting a  number  of  cows  to  this  process,  we 
arrive  at  the  general  Concept  of ' '  Cow. ' '  This 
general  Concept  includes  all  the  qualities  and 
properties  common  to  all  cows,  while  omitting 
those  which  are  not  common  to  the  class.  Or, 
we  may  form  a  concept  of  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte, by  combining  his  several  qualities  and 


32  Thought  Culture 

properties  and  thus  form  a  general  idea  of  the 
man. 

Judgment  is  that  faculty  of  the  Mind  where- 
by we  determine  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment between  two  concepts,  ideas,  or  objects 
of  thought,  by  comparing  them  with  each 
other.  From  this  comparison  arises  the  judg- 
ment, which  is  expressed  in  the  shape  of  a 
logical  'proposition:  ''The  horse  is  an  ani- 
mal ; "  or ' '  the  horse  is  not  a  cow. ' '  Judgment 
is  also  used  in  forming  a  concept,  in  the  first 
place,  for  we  must  compare  qualities  before 
we  can  form  a  general  idea. 

Reasoning  is  that  faculty  of  the  Mind 
whereby  we  compare  two  Judgments,  one  with 
the  other,  and  from  the  comparison  deduce  a 
third  Judgment.  This  is  a  form  of  indirect  or 
mediate  comparison,  whereas  the  Judgment  is 
a  form  of  immediate  or  direct  comparison. 
From  this  process  of  Reasoning  arises  a  re- 
sult which  is  expressed  in  what  is  called  a 
Syllogism,  as  for  instance:  ''All  dogs  are  ani- 
mals; Carlo  is  a  dog;  therefore,  Carlo  is  an 
animal. ' '  Or  expressed  in  symbols :  "  A  equals 
C ;  and  B  equals  C ; "  therefore, ' '  A  equals  B. ' ' 
Reasoning  is  of  two  kinds  or  classes ;  viz.^  In- 


Phases  of  Thought  33 

ductive  and  Deductive,  respectively.  We 
have  explained  these  forms  of  Reasoning  in 
detail  in  another  volume  of  this  series. 

The  Feelings  are  the  mental  faculties 
whereby  we  experience  emotions  or  feelings. 
Feelings  are  the  experiencing  of  the  agreeable 
or  disagreeable  nature  of  our  mental  states. 
They  can  be  defined  only  in  their  own  terms. 
If  we  have  never  experienced  a  feeling,  we 
cannot  understand  the  words  expressing  it. 
Feelings  result  in  what  are  called  emotion,  af- 
fection and  desire.  An  emotion  is  the  simple 
feeling,  such  as  joy,  sorrow,  etc.  An  affection 
is  an  emotion  reaching  out  toward  another  and 
outside  object,  such  as  envy,  jealousy,  love,  etc. 
A  desire  is  an  emotion  arising  from  the  want 
of  some  lacking  quality  or  thing,  and  the  in- 
clination to  possess  it. 

Memory  is  the  faculty  of  the  Mind  whereby 
we  retain  and  reproduce,  or  consciously  revive 
any  kind  of  past  mental  experience.  It  has 
two  sub-phases ;  viz.,  Retention  and  Recollec- 
tion, respectively.  It  manifests  in  the  storing 
away  of  mental  images  and  ideas,  and  in  the 
reproduction  of  them  at  a  later  period  of  time. 


34  Thought  Cultuke 

and  also  of  the  recognition  of  them  as  objects 
of  past  experience. 

Imagination  is  the  faculty  of  the  Mind 
whereby  we  represent  (re-present)  as  a 
mental  image  some  previously  experienced 
idea7  concept  or  image.  Its  activities  are 
closely  allied  and  blended  with  those  of  the 
Memory.  It  has  the  power  not  only  of  repro- 
ducing objects  already  perceived  but  also  an- 
other power  of  ideal  creation  whereby  it 
creates  new  combinations  from  the  materials 
of  past  experience.  It  is  a  faculty,  the  im- 
portance of  which  is  but  little  understood  by 
the  majority  of  men.  Inasmuch  as  the  mental 
image  must  always  precede  the  material  mani- 
festation, the  cultivation  of  the  Imagination 
becomes  a  matter  of  great  importance  and 
worthy  of  the  closest  study. 

Intuition  is  the  faculty  of  the  Mind  whereby 
it  evolves  what  have  been  called  Primary 
Truths  or  Primary  Ideas.  By  Primary  Ideas 
are  meant  the  ideas  of  Space,  Time,  Cause, 
Identity,  etc.  By  Primary  Truths  are  meant 
the  so-called  ''Self-Evident  Truths"  of  geom- 
etry, miathematics  and  logic.  Under  the  head 
of  Intuition  are  also  sometimes  included  the 


Phases  of  Thought  35 

activities  of  the  Subconscious  or  Supercon- 
soious  regions  of  the  mind,  of  which  we  have 
spoken  in  detail  in  a  volume  under  that  name 
of  this  series.  Some  authorities  hold  to  the 
older  idea  of  *' Innate  Ideas"  by  which  is 
meant  that  every  hiunan  being  is  born  with  the 
knowledge  of  certain  fundamental  truths,  un- 
connected with  any  experience.  Others  hold 
that  these  ideas  are  simply  the  result  of  the 
experience  of  the  race,  transmitted  to  us  as 
*'germ  ideas"  which  must  grow  by  experience 
and  exercise. 

That  each  and  every  faculty  of  the  Mind 
may  be  strengthened  and  developed  by  Cul- 
ture and  Exercise  is  now  held  to  be  a  fact  by 
nearly  every  authority  worthy  of  that  name. 
Just  as  the  physical  muscle  may  be  cultivated 
by  the  proper  methods,  so  may  the  mental 
faculties  be  strengthened  and  cultivated  by 
the  appropriate  methods  and  means.  Inas- 
much as  the  majority  of  the  race  are  deficient 
in  the  development  of  one  or  more  of  the  lead- 
ing mental  faculties,  it  becomes  a  matter  of 
great  interest  and  importance  that  all  should 
acquaint  themselves  with  the  means  whereby 


36  Thought  Culture 

their  deficiencies  may  be  corrected  and  rem- 
edied. We  shall  now  proceed  to  the  consid- 
eration of  Thought-Culture  in  general,  and 
then  to  the  consideration  of  the  culture  of  each 
particular  general  faculty,  in  detail. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THOUGHT-CULTURE 

Thought-Culture  is  based  upon  two  general 
scientific  facts  which  may  be  stated  as  follows : 

I.  The  brain  centres  of  thought  may  be 
developed  by  exercise.  While  we  do  not  as- 
sert that  the  brain  and  the  mind  are  identical, 
it  is  nevertheless  a  scientific  truth  that  *'the 
brain  is  the  organ  of  the  mind"  and  that  one 
of  the  first  requisites  for  a  good  mind  is  a  good 
brain.  It  has  been  proven  by  experiment  that 
the  brain-cells  concerned  in  special  mental  ac- 
tivities multiply  in  proportion  to  the  active  use 
of  the  special  faculties  employed  in  the  mental 
operation.  It  has  also  been  ascertained  that 
disuse  of  special  faculties  of  the  mind  tends  to 
cause  a  process  akin  to  atrophy  in  the  brain- 
cells  concerned  in  the  particular  activity,  so 
that  it  becomes  difficult  to  think  clearly  along 
those  particular  lines  after  a  long  period  of 
disuse.  Moreover,  it  is  known  that  the  educa- 
tion and  mental  culture  of  a  child  is  accom- 
panied by  an  increase  and  development  of  the 

37 


38  Thought  Culture 

brain-cells  connected  witli  the  particular  fields 
of  thought  in  which  the  child  is  exercised. 

There  is  a  close  analogy  between  the  exer- 
cise of  the  brain-cells  and  the  exercise  of  the 
muscles  of  the  body.  Both  respond  to  reason- 
able exercise ;  both  are  injured  by  overwork ; 
both  degenerate  by  disuse.  As  Brooks  says : 
''The  mind  grows  by  its  own  inherent  ener- 
gies. Mental  exercise  is  thus  the  law  of  men- 
tal development.  As  a  muscle  grows  strong 
by  use,  so  any  faculty  of  the  mind  is  developed 
by  its  proper  use  and  exercise.  An  inactive 
mind,  like  an  unused  muscle,  becomes  weak 
and  unskilful.  Hang  the  arm  in  a  sling  and 
the  muscle  becomes  flabby  and  loses  its  vigor 
and  skill ;  let  the  mind  remain  inactive  and  it 
acquires  a  mental  flabbiness  that  unfits  it  for 
any  severe  or  prolonged  activity.  An  idle 
mind  loses  its  tone  and  strength  like  an  un- 
used muscle;  the  mental  powers  go  to  rust 
through  idleness  and  inaction.  To  develop 
the  faculties  of  the  mind  and  secure  their  high- 
est activity  and  efficiency,  there  must  be  a  con- 
stant and  judicious  exercise  of  these  faculties. 
The  object  of  culture  is  to  stimulate  and  direct 
.the  activity  of  the  mind." 


Thought  Culture  39 

Experiments  conducted  by  scientists  upon 
dogs  liave  shown  that  in  the  case  of  dogs  spe- 
cially trained  to  unusual  mental  activity,  there 
has  been  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  num- 
ber of  active  brain-cells  in  the  particular  parts 
of  the  brain  concerned  with  those  mental  ac- 
tivities.   Microscopic  examination  of  the  brain 
tissues   showed  the   greatest  difference  be- 
tween the  brain  structure  of  the  trained  dogs 
and  untrained  ones  of  the  same  brood.     So 
carefully  were  the  experiments  conducted  that 
it  was  possible  to  distinguish  between  the 
dogs  trained  in  one  set  of  activities  from  those 
trained  in  another.    Biologists  have  demon- 
strated the  correctness  of  the  brain-cell  de- 
velopment theory  beyond  reasonable  doubt, 
and  ordinary  human  experience  also  adds  its 
testimony  in  its  favor. 

In  view  of  the  above,  it  will  be  seen  that  by 
intelligent  exercise  and  use  any  and  all  facul- 
ties of  the  mind  may  be  developed  and  culti- 
vated, just  as  may  any  special  muscle  of  the 
body.  And  this  exercise  can  come  only  from 
actual  use  of  the  faculties  themselves.  De- 
velopment must  come  from  within  and  not 
from  without.  No  system  of  outward  stimula- 


40  Thought  Culture 

tion  will  develop  the  faculties  of  the  mind— 
they  may  be  cultivated  only  by  an  exercise  in 
their  own  particular  field  of  work.  The  only 
way  to  exercise  any  particular  faculty  of 
thought  is  to  think  through  that  faculty. 

II.  Not  only  are  the  brain-cells  developed 
by  exercise,  but  it  also  appears  to  be  a  fact 
that  the  mind  appears  actually  to  be  nourished 
by  knowledge  of  the  outside  world  of  things. 
The  raw  material  of  thought  is  taken  into  the 
mind  and  there  is  digested  by  the  thought- 
processes,  and  is  afterward  actually  assimi- 
lated by  the  mind  in  a  manner  strikingly  sim- 
ilar to  the  processes  of  the  physical  organs  of 
nutrition.  A  mind  to  be  at  its  best  must  be 
supplied  with  a  normal  amount  of  mental 
nourishment.  Lacking  this,  it  tends  to  become 
weak  and  inefficient.  And,  likewise,  if  its 
owner  is  a  mental  glutton  and  furnishes  too 
much  nourishment,  particularly  of  a  rich  kind, 
there  is  a  tendency  toward  "mental  dyspep- 
sia" and  indigestion— the  mind,  unable  to  as- 
similate the  mental  food  furnished  it,  is  in- 
clined to  rebel.  Moreover,  if  the  mind  be  sup- 
plied with  mental  food  of  only  one  kind— if  the 
mind  is  confined  to  one  narrow  field  of  thought 


Thought  Culture  41 

—it  weakens  and  the  mental  processes  become 
impaired.  In  many  ways  is  this  curious  anal- 
ogy apparent. 

Not  only  does  the  mind  need  development, 
but  it  also  needs  intelligent  cultivation.  For 
it  may  be  developed  by  improper  objects  of 
thought  just  as  well  as  by  the  proper  ones.  A 
rich  field  will  grow  tares  and  weeds  as  well  as 
good  grain  or  fruit.  Thought-culture  should 
not  be  confined  to  the  development  of  a  strong 
and  active  mind,  but  should  be  also  extended 
to  the  cultivation  of  a  luise  and  intelligent 
mind.  Strength  and  Wisdom  should  be  com- 
bined. Moreover  there  should  be  sought  a 
harmonious  and  normal  development.  A  one- 
sided mental  development  is  apt  to  produce 
a  ' '  crank, ' '  while  a  development  in  unhealthy 
mental  fields  will  produce  an  abnormal  thinker 
tending  dangerously  near  to  the  line  of  insan- 
ity. Some  ' '  one-idea ' '  men  have  great  mental 
power  and  development,  but  are  nevertheless 
unbalanced  and  impractical.  And  insane  per- 
sons often  have  strongly  developed  minds— 
developed  abnormally. 

Some  authorities,  holding  special  theories 
regarding    the   nature    of   mind,    hold    that 


42  Thought  Culture 

Thought-Culture  is  merely  a  training  of  tlie 
faculties  rather  than  a  creation  of  new  mental 
power,  inasmuch  as  the  mind  cannot  be  built 
up  from  the  outside.  This  is  a  curious  com- 
bination of  truth  and  error.  It  is  true  that  the 
mind  cannot  be  built  up  from  outside  material, 
in  the  sense  of  creating  neiv  mind,  but  it  is  also 
true  that  in  every  mind  there  is  the  potential- 
ity of  growth  and  development.  Just  as  the 
future  oak  is  said  to  be  in  the  acorn,  so  are  the 
potentialities  of  mind-growth  in  every  mind 
waiting  for  nourishment  from  outside  and  the 
proper  cultivation.  Brooks  has  well  stated 
this,  as  follows:  ''The  culture  of  the  mind  is 
not  creative  in  its  character ;  its  object  is  to  de- 
velop existing  possibilities  into  realities.  The 
mind  possesses  innate  powers  which  may  be 
awakened  into  a  natural  activity.  The  design 
of  culture  is  to  aid  nature  in  improving  the 
powers  she  has  given.  No  new  power  can  be 
created  by  culture;  we  can  increase  the  activ- 
ity of  these  powers,  but  cannot  develop  any 
new  activities.  Through  these  activities  new 
ideas  and  thoughts  may  be  developed,  and  the 
sum  of  human  knowledge  increased ;  but  this 
is  accomplished  by  a  high  activity  of  the  nat- 


Thought  Culture  43 

nral  powers  witli  wliieli  the  mind  is  endowed, 
and  not  by  the  culture  of  new  powers.  The 
profound  philosopher  uses  the  same  faculties 
that  the  little  child  is  developing  in  the  games 
of  the  nursery.  The  object  of  culture  is  to 
arouse  the  powers  which  nature  has  given  us 
into  a  normal  activity  and  to  stimulate  and 
guide  them  in  their  unfolding." 

In  connection  with  the  objection  above  men- 
tioned, it  may  be  said  that  while  the  develop- 
ment of  the  mind  must  come  from  within  it- 
self, rather  than  from  without,  nevertheless, 
in  order  to  develop,  it  must  have  the  nourish- 
ing material  from  the  outside  world  in  order 
to  grow.  Just  as  the  body  can  grow  from 
within  only  by  the  aid  of  nourishment  from 
outside,  so  the  mind,  while  growing  from 
within,  needs  the  material  for  thought  which 
can  come  only  from  without  itself.  Thought 
requires  ''things"  upon  which  to  exercise  it- 
self—and upon  which  it  is  nourished.  With- 
out these  outside  objects,  it  can  have  no  exer- 
cise and  can  receive  no  nourishment.  Thought 
consists  in  the  perception,  examination  and 
comparison  of  things,  and  the  consequent 
building  up  new  combinations,  arrangements 


44  Thought  Culture 

and  syntheses.  Therefore,  the  perceptive  fac- 
ulties are  most  necessary  to  Thought,  and 
their  culture  is  most  necessary  in  the  general 
work  of  Thought-Culture. 

It  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  in  Thought- 
Culture  there  is  necessary  a  variety  of  exer- 
cises and  forms  of  nourishment.  What  will 
develop  one  faculty  will  exert  but  a  faint  ef- 
fect upon  others.  Each  needs  its  own  particu- 
lar kind  of  exercise— each  its  particular  kind 
of  mental  nourishment.  While  it  is  true  that 
there  is  a  certain  benefit  gained  by  the  entire 
mind  from  an  exercise  of  any  of  its  parts,  this 
effect  is  but  secondary  in  importance.  A  man 
well  developed  mentally  has  been  developed  in 
each  faculty,  each  in  its  own  way.  The  faculty 
of  perception  requires  objects  of  perception; 
the  faculty  of  unagination  requires  objects  of 
imagination;  the  faculty  of  reasoning  re- 
quires objects  of  reasoning;  and  so  on,  each 
requiring  objects  of  exercise  and  nourishment 
of  its  own  kind— in  its  own  class.  In  some 
persons  some  of  the  faculties  are  well  devel- 
oped while  others  are  deficient.  It  follows 
that  in  such  a  case  the  weak  faculties  should 
be  developed  first,  that  they  be  brought  up  to 


Thought  Culture  45 

the  general  standard.  Then  a  further  general 
development  may  be  midertaken  if  desired. 
Moreover,  in  general  development,  it  will  be 
found  that  certain  faculties  will  respond  more 
readily  to  the  cultivation  given,  while  others 
will  be  slow  to  respond.  In  such  cases  wisdom 
dictates  that  a  greater  degree  of  exercise  and 
nourishment  be  given  to  the  slower  and  less 
responsible  faculties,  while  the  more  respon- 
sive be  given  but  a  lighter  development.  In 
Thought-Culture  as  in  physical  culture,  the 
less  developed  and  slower  responding  parts 
should  be  given  special  attention. 

In  the  following  chapters  we  shall  point  out 
the  methods  and  exercises  calculated  to  de- 
velop the  several  faculties  of  the  mind  to  the 
best  advantage,  in  each  case  giving  general 
advice  along  the  lines  of  the  cultivation  of  the 
particular  faculty  which  will  serve  as  general 
instruction  regarding  its  culture.  The  stu- 
dent should  carefully  study  the  entire  work 
before  he  attempts  to  specialize  in  the  devel- 
opment of  any  particular  faculty.  The  par- 
ticular work  may  be  aided  by  an  acquaintance 
with  the  entire  field  of  Thought-Culture  for 


46  Thought  Culture 

many  of  the  faculties  shade  into  eaeli  other  in 
their  activities  and  are  always  more  or  less 
interdependent.  For,  be  it  remembered,  the 
mind  is  a  ivhole,  and  not  a  mere  aggregation 
of  many  parts.  To  understand  the  parts,  one 
must  study  the  whole— to  understand  the 
whole,  one  must  study  the  parts. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ATTENTION 

Attention  is  not  a  faculty  of  the  mind  in  the 
same  sense  as  perception,  abstraction,  judg- 
ment, etc.,  but  is  rather  in  the  nature  of  an  act 
of  will  concerned  in  the  focusing  of  the  con- 
sciousness upon  some  object  of  thought  pre- 
sented or  represented  to  the  mind.  In  some 
respects  it  bears  a  resemblance  to  Abstrac- 
tion, inasmuch  as  it  sets  aside  some  particular 
object  for  the  consideration  of  the  conscious- 
ness, to  the  exclusion  of  other  objects.  Way- 
land  explains  attention  as  a  condition  of  mind 
in  which  the  consciousness  is  excited  and  di- 
rected by  an  act  of  the  will.  Hamilton  says : 
**  Consciousness  may  be  compared  to  a  tele- 
scope; Attention  is  the  pulling  out  and  press- 
ing in  of  the  tubes  in  accommodating  the  focus 
of  the  eye;"  and  also  that:  "An  act  of  atten- 
tion, that  is  an  act  of  concentration,  seems 
thus  necessary  to  every  exertion  of  conscious- 
ness, as  a  certain  contraction  of  the  pupil  is 
requisite  to  every  exertion  of  vision.    .    .    . 

47 


48  Thought  Cultuke 

Attention  then  is  to  consciousness  what  the 
contraction  of  the  pupil  is  to  sight,  or  to  the 
eye  of  the  mind  what  the  microscope  or  tele- 
scope is  to  the  bodily  eye.  ...  It  consti- 
tutes the  better  half  of  all  intellectual  power. " 

Brodie  says  that:  *'It  is  Attention,  much 
more  than  any  difference  in  the  abstract  power 
of  reasoning,  which  constitutes  the  vast  dif- 
ference which  exists  between  minds  of  differ- 
ent individuals."  Butler  says:  ''The  most 
important  intellectual  habit  that  I  know  of  is 
the  habit  of  attending  exclusively  to  the  mat- 
ter in  hand.  .  .  .  It  is  commonly  said  that 
genius  cannot  be  infused  by  education,  yet 
this  power  of  concentrated  attention,  which 
belongs  as  a  part  of  his  gift  to  every  great  dis- 
coverer, is  unquestionably  capable  of  almost 
indefinite  augmentation  by  resolute  practice. ' ' 
And  Beattie  says : ' '  The  force  wherewith  any- 
thing strikes  the  mind  is  generally  in  propor- 
tion to  the  degree  of  attention  bestowed  upon 
it." 

Realizing  the  importance  of  attention,  the 
student  will  naturally  wish  to  cultivate  the 
power  of  bestowing  it  when  necessary.  The 
first  role  in  the  cultivation  of  the  attention  is 


Attention  49 

that  the  student  shall  carefully  acquire  the 
habit  of  thinking  of  or  doing  but  one  thing  at 
a  time.  This  first  rule  may  seem  easy,  but  in 
practice  it  will  be  found  very  difficult  of  ob- 
servance, so  careless  are  the  majority  of  us  in 
our  actions  and  thinking.  Not  only  will  the 
trouble  and  care  bestowed  upon  the  acquiring 
of  this  habit  of  thought  and  action  be  well  re- 
paid by  the  development  of  the  attention,  but 
the  student  will  also  acquire  a  facility  for  ac- 
complishing his  tasks  quickly  and  thoroughly. 
As  Kay  says : ' '  There  is  nothing  that  contrib- 
utes more  to  success  in  any  pursuit  than  that 
of  having  the  attention  concentrated  on  the 
matter  in  hand ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  nothing 
is  more  detrimental  than  when  doing  one  thing 
to  have  the  mind  taken  up  with  something 
else."  And  as  Granville  says:  '*A  frequent 
cause  of  failure  in  the  faculty  of  attention  is 
striving  to  think  of  more  than  one  thing  at  a 
time."  Kay  also  well  says:  ''If  we  would 
possess  the  power  of  attention  in  a  high  de- 
gree, we  must  cultivate  the  habit  of  attending 
to  what  is  directly  before  the  mind,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  else.  All  distracting  thoughts 
and  feelings  that  tend  to  withdraw  the  mind 


50  Thought  Culture 

from  what  is  immediately  before  it  are  there- 
fore to  be  carefully  avoided.  This  is  a  matter 
of  great  importance,  and  of  no  little  difficulty. 
Frequently  the  mind,  in  place  of  being  con- 
centrated on  what  is  immediately  before  it,  is 
thinking  of  something  else— something,  it  may 
be,  that  went  before  or  that  may  come  after, 
or  something  quite  alien  to  the  subject." 

The  following  principles  of  the  application 
of  the  attention  have  been  stated  by  the  au- 
thorities : 

I.  The  attention  attaches  more  readily  to 
interesting  than  to  uninteresting  things. 

II.  The  attention  will  decline  in  strengfh 
unless  there  is  a  variation  in  the  stimulus, 
either  by  a  change  of  object  or  the  developing 
of  some  new  attribute  in  the  object. 

III.  The  attention,  when  tired  by  continu- 
ous direction  toward  some  unvarying  object, 
may  be  revived  by  directing  it  toward  some 
new  object  or  in  allowing  it  to  be  attracted  and 
held  by  some  passing  object. 

IV.  The  attention  manifests  in  a  two-fold 
activity;  viz.  (1)  the  concentration  upon  some 
one  object  of  thought;  and  (2)  the  shutting  out 
of  outside  objects.  Thus,  it  has  its  positive  and 


Attention  51 

negative  sides.  Thus,  when  a  man  wishes  to 
give  his  undivided  attention  to  one  speaker  in 
a  crowd  of  speaking  individuals,  he  acts  posi- 
tively in  focusing  his  consciousness  upon  the 
selected  individual,  and  negatively  by  refus- 
ing to  listen  to  the  others. 

V.  The  attention  is  not  a  faculty,  but  a 
means  of  using  any  faculty  with  an  increased 
degree  of  efficiency. 

VI.  The  degree  of  attention  possessed  by 
an  individual  is  an  indication  of  his  power  of 
using  his  intellect.  Many  authorities  have 
held  that,  in  cases  of  genius,  the  power  of  con- 
centrated attention  is  usually  greatly  devel- 
oped. Brooks  says :  * '  Attention  is  one  of  the 
principal  elements  of  genius."  Hamilton 
says :  ' '  G-enius  is  a  higher  capacity  of  atten- 
tion." Helvetius  says:  '^ Genius  is  nothing 
but  protracted  attention."  Chesterfield  says : 
'  *  The  power  of  applying  our  attention,  steady 
and  undissipated,  to  a  single  object  is  a  sure 
mark  of  superior  genius." 

The  attention  may  be  cultivated,  just  as 
may  be  the  various  faculties  of  the  mind,  by 
the  two-fold  method  of  Exercise  and  Nourish- 


52  Thought  Culture 

ment;  that  is,  by  using  and  employing  it  ac- 
tively and  by  furnishing  it  with  the  proper 
materials  with  which  to  feed  its  strength.  The 
way  to  exercise  the  attention  is  to  use  it  fre- 
quently in  every-day  life.  If  you  are  listening 
to  a  man  speaking,  endeavor  to  give  to  him 
your  undivided  attention,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  shut  out  from  your  consciousness 
every  other  object.  In  working,  we  should 
endeavor  to  use  the  attention  by  concentrating 
our  interest  upon  the  particular  task  before 
us  to  the  exclusion  of  all  else.  In  reading,  we 
should  endeavor  to  hold  our  minds  closely  to 
the  text  instead  of  hastily  glancing  over  the 
page  as  so  many  do. 

Those  who  wish  to  cultivate  their  attention 
should  take  up  some  line  of  study  in  which  it  is 
necessary  to  fasten  the  attention  firmly  for  a 
time.  A  half-hour's  study  in  this  way  is  worth 
more  than  hours  of  careless  reading  so  far  as 
the  cultivation  of  the  attention  is  concerned. 
Mathematics  is  most  valuable  in  the  direction 
of  developing  the  power  of  attention.  Gib- 
bon says :  ''After  a  rapid  glance  on  the  subject 
and  distribution  of  a  new  book,  I  suspend  the 
reading  of  it  which  I  only  resume  after  having 


Attention  53 

myself  examined  tlie  subject  in  all  its 
relations." 

Some  writers  have  held  that  the  attention 
may  be  developed  by  the  practice  of  selecting 
the  voice  of  one  person  speaking  among  a 
crowd  of  speakers,  and  deliberately  shutting 
out  the  other  sounds,  giving  the  whole  atten- 
tion to  the  particular  speaker ;  or,  in  the  same 
manner,  selecting  one  singer  in  a  church  choir 
or  band  of  singers ;  or  one  musical  instrument 
in  an  orchestra;  or  one  piece  of  machinery 
making  sounds  in  a  room  filled  with  various 
machines,  etc.  The  practice  of  so  doing  is 
held  to  strengthen  one's  powers  of  concentra- 
tion and  attention. 

Draper  says:  "Although  many  images  may 
be  simultaneously  existing  upon  the  retina, 
the  mind  possesses  the  power  of  singling  out 
any  one  of  them  and  fastening  attention  upon 
it,  just  as  among  a  number  of  musical  instru- 
ments simultaneously  played,  one,  and  that 
perhaps  the  feeblest,  may  be  selected  and  its 
notes  exclusively  followed."  And  as  Taylor 
says:  ''In  a  concert  of  several  voices,  the 
voices  being  of  nearly  equal  intensity,  re- 
garded merely  as  organic  impressions  on  the 


54  Thought  Culture 

auditory  nerve,  we  select  one,  and  at  will  we 
lift  out  and  disjoin  it  from  the  general  volume 
of  sound;  we  shut  off  the  other  voices— five, 
ten  and  more— and  follow  this  one  alone. 
When  we  have  done  so  for  a  time,  we  freely 
cast  it  off  and  take  up  another."  Carpenter 
says:  "The  more  completely  the  mental  en- 
ergy can  be  brought  into  one  focus  and  all  dis- 
tracting objects  excluded,  the  more  powerful 
will  be  the  volitional  effort. "  ' 

Many  authorities  hold  that  the  attention 
may  be  best  applied  and  exercised  by  analyz- 
ing an  object  mentally,  and  then  considering 
its  parts  one  by  one  by  a  process  of  abstrac- 
tidn.  Thus,  as  Kays  says:  ''An  apple  pre- 
sents to  us  form,  color,  taste,  smell,  etc.,  and  if 
we  would  obtain  a  clear  idea  of  any  one  of 
these,  we  must  contemplate  it  by  itself  and 
compare  it  with  other  impressions  of  the  same 
kind  we  have  previously  experienced.  So  in 
viewing  a  landscape,  it  is  not  enough  to  re- 
gard it  merely  as  a  whole,  but  we  must  regard 
each  of  its  different  parts  individually  by  it- 
self if  we  would  obtain  a  clear  idea  of  it.  We 
can  only  obtain  a  full  and  complete  knowledge 
of  an  object  hy  analyzing  it  and  concentraiing 


Attention  55 

the  attention  upon  its  different  parts,  one  hy 
one.''  Reid  says :  "It  is  not  by  the  senses  im- 
mediately, but  rather  by  the  power  of  analyz- 
ing and  abstraction,  that  we  get  the  most  sim- 
ple and  the  most  distinct  notions  of  objects  of 
sense."  And,  as  Brown  says :  *'It  is  scarcely 
possible  to  advance  even  a  single  step  in  in- 
tellectual physics  without  the  necessity  of  per- 
forming some  sort  of  analysis."  In  all  pro- 
cesses requiring  analysis  and  examination  of 
parts,  properties  or  qualities,  the  attention  is 
actively  employed.  Accordingly,  it  follows 
that  such  exercises  are  best  adapted  to  the 
work  of  developing  and  cultivating  the  atten- 
tion itself.  Therefore,  as  a  parting  word  we 
may  say:  To  develop  and  cultivate  the  power 
of  attention  and  concentration,  (1)  Analyse; 
(2)  Analyze;  and  (3)  Analyze.  Analyze 
everything  and  everybody  with  ivhich  or  whom 
you  come  in  contact.  There  is  no  better  or 
shorter  rule. 

The  student  will  also  find  that  the  various 
directions  and  the  advice  which  we  shall  give 
in  the  succeeding  chapters,  regarding  the  cul- 
tivation of  the  various  faculties,  are  also 
adapted  to  the  development  of  the  attention, 


56  Thought  Culture 

for  the  latter  is  brought  into  active  play  in 
them.  And,  likewise,  by  developing  the  atten- 
tion, one  may  practice  the  future  exercises 
with  greater  effect. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PERCEPTION 

In  preceding  chapters  we  liave  seen  that  in 
the  phase  of  mental  activity  in  which  the  In- 
tellect is  concerned,  the  processes  of  which 
are  known  as  ''Thought"  in  the  narrower 
sense  of  the  term,  there  are  several  stages  or 
steps  involving  the  use  of  several  faculties  of 
the  mind.  The  first  of  these  steps  or  stages  is 
called  Perception. 

Many  persons  confuse  the  idea  of  Sensation 
and  Perception,  but  there  is  a  clear  distinction 
between  them.  Sensations  arise  from  nerve 
action— from  the  stimulation  of  nerve  sub- 
stance—which gives  rise  to  a  peculiar  effect 
upon  the  brain,  which  results  in  an  elementary 
form  of  consciousness.  An  authority  says: 
"Sensation  is  the  peculiar  property  of  the 
nervous  system  in  a  state  of  activity,  by  which 
impressions  are  conveyed  to  the  brain  or  sen- 
sorium.  When  an  impression  is  made  upon 
any  portion  of  the  bodily  surface  by  contact, 
heat,  electricity,  light,  or  any  other  agent,  the 

57 


58  Thought  Culture 

mind  is  rendered  conscious  of  this  by  sensa- 
tion. In  the  process  there  are  three  stages- 
reception  of  the  impression  at  the  end  of  the 
sensory  nerve,  the  conduction  of  it  along  the 
nerve  trunk  to  the  sensorium,  and  the  change 
it  excites  in  the  sensorium  itself,  through 
which  is  produced  sensation. 

Just  why  and  how  this  nerve  action  is  trans- 
lated into  consciousness  of  an  elementary 
kind,  science  is  unable  to  explain.  Our  knowl- 
edge is  based  in  a  great  part,  or  entirely,  upon 
impressions  which  have  been  received  over 
the  channel  of  the  senses— sensations  of  sight, 
hearing,  tasting,  smelling  and  touch.  Many 
authorities  hold  that  all  of  the  five  senses  are 
modifications  of  the  sense  of  touch,  or  feeling ; 
as  for  instance,  the  impression  upon  the  or- 
gans of  sight  is  really  in  the  nature  of  a  deli- 
cate touch  or  feeling  of  the  light-waves  as 
they  come  in  contact  with  the  nerves  of  vision, 
etc.  But,  although  sensations  give  us  the 
raw  materials  of  thought,  so  to  speak,  they  are 
not  knowledge  in  themselves.  Knowledge 
arises  from  the  operation  of  Perception  upon 
this  raw  material  of  Sensation. 

But  yet.  Sensation  plays  a  most  active  part 


Perception  59 

in  the  presentation  of  the  raw  material  for  the 
Perceptive  faculties,  and  must  not  be  re- 
garded as  merely  a  physiological  process.  It 
may  be  said  to  be  the  connecting  link  between 
the  physical  and  the  mental  activities.  As 
Ziehen  says:  ''It  follows  that  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  nervous  system  is  an  essential  fac- 
tor in  determining  the  quality  of  sensation. 
This  fact  reveals  the  obvious  error  of  former 
centuries,  first  refuted  by  Locke,  though  still 
shared  by  naive  thought  today,  that  the  ob- 
jects about  us  themselves  are  colored,  warm, 
cold,  etc.  As  external  to  our  consciousness, 
we  can  only  assume  matter,  vibrating  with 
molecular  motion  and  permeated  by  vibrating 
particles  of  ether.  The  nervous  apparatus 
selects  only  certain  motions  of  matter  or  of 
ether,  which  they  transform  into  that  form  of 
nerve  excitation  with  which  they  are  fa- 
miliar. It  is  only  this  nerve  excitation  that  we 
perceive  as  red,  warm  or  hard." 

Passing  from  Sensation  to  Perception,  we 
see  that  the  latter  interprets  the  reports  of 
the  former.  Perception  translates  into  con- 
sciousness the  impressions  of  Sensation.  Per- 
ception, acting  through  one  or  more  of  the 


60  Thought  Culture 

mental  faculties,  gives  us  our  first  hit  of  real 
knowledge.  Sensation  may  give  us  the  im- 
pression of  a  small  moving  thing— Perception 
translates  this  into  the  thought  of  a  cat.  Sen- 
sation is  a  mere  /eeZm^— Perception  is  the 
thought  arising  from  that  feeling.  A  Percept 
is  the  product  of  Perception,  or  in  other  words, 
our  idea  gained  through  Perception.  The  ma- 
jority of  our  percepts  are  complex,  being  built 
up  from  a  number  of  minor  percepts ;  as  for 
instance,  our  percept  of  a  peach  is  built  up 
from  our  minor  percepts  of  the  form,  shape, 
color,  weight,  degree  of  hardness,  smell,  taste, 
etc.,  of  the  peach,  each  sense  employed  giving 
minor  percepts,  the  whole  being  combined  in 
the  conscious  as  the  whole  percept  of  that  par- 
ticular peach. 

Brooks  says:  "All  knowledge  does  not 
come  directly  from  perception  through  the 
senses,  however.  We  have  a  knowledge  of  ex- 
ternal objects,  and  we  have  a  knowledge  that 
transcends  this  knowledge  of  external  objects. 
Perception  is  the  immediate  source  of  the  first 
kind  of  knowledge,  and  the  indirect  source  of 
the  second  kind  of  knowledge.  This  distinc- 
tion is  often  expressed  by  the  terms  cause 


Perception  61 

and  occasion.  Thus  perception  is  said  to  be 
the  cause  of  our  knowledge  of  objects,  since  it 
is  the  immediate  source  of  such  knowledge. 
Perception  is  also  said  to  be  the  occasion  of 
the  ideas  and  truths  of  intuition ;  for,  though 
in  a  sense  necessary  to  these  ideas,  it  is  not  the 
source  of  them.  Perception  also  furnishes 
the  understanding  with  materials  out  of  which 
it  derives  ideas  and  truths  beyond  the  field  of 
sense.  As  thus  attaining  a  knowledge  of  ex- 
ternal objects,  affording  material  for  the  op- 
erations of  the  understanding,  and  furnishing 
the  occasion  for  the  activity  of  the  intuitive 
power,  perception  may  he  said  to  lie  at  the 
basis  of  all  knoivledge." 

Perception  is  of  course  manifest  in  all  per- 
sons. But  it  varies  greatly  in  degree  and 
power.  Moreover,  it  may  be  developed  and 
cultivated  to  a  great  degree.  As  Perception 
is  an  interpretation  of  the  impression  of  the 
senses,  we  often  confuse  the  cultivation  of 
Perception  with  the  development  of  the  senses 
themselves.  Two  persons  of  equally  perfect 
sense  of  sight  may  vary  greatly  in  their  degree 
of  Perception  of  sight  impressions.  One  may 
be  a  most  careless  observer,  while  the  other 


62  Thought  Culture 

may  be  a  very  close  observer  and  able  to  dis- 
tinguish many  points  of  interest  and  import- 
ance in  the  object  viewed  which  are  not  ap- 
parent to  the  first  observer.  Cultivation  of 
Perception  is  cultivation  of  the  mental  back- 
ground of  the  senses,  rather  than  of  the  sense 
organs  themselves.  The  Perception  accom- 
panying each  sense  may  be  developed  and  cul- 
tivated separately  from  that  accompanying 
the  others. 

The  majority  of  persons  are  very  careless 
observers.  They  will  see  things  without  per- 
ceiving the  qualities,  properties,  character- 
istics, or  parts  which  together  make  up  those 
things.  Two  persons,  possessed  of  equal  de- 
grees of  eyesight,  will  walk  through  a  forest. 
Both  of  them  will  see  trees.  To  one  of  them 
there  will  be  but  trees  perceived ;  while  to  the 
other  there  will  be  a  perception  of  the  differ- 
ent species  of  trees,  with  their  varying  bark, 
leaves,  shape,  etc.  One  perceives  simply  a 
**pile  of  stone,"  which  to  the  perception  of 
another  will  be  recognized  as  granite,  marble, 
etc.  Brooks  says:  ''Very  few  persons  can 
tell  the  difference  between  the  number  of  legs 
of  a  fly  and  of  a  spider;  and  I  have  known 


Perception  63 

farmers'  boys  and  girls  who  could  not  tell 
whether  the  ears  of  a  cow  are  in  front  of  her 
horns,  above  her  horns,  below  her  horns,  or 
behind  her  horns."  Halleck  says  of  a  test  in 
a  schoolroom:  *' Fifteen  pupils  were  sure 
that  they  had  seen  cats  climb  trees  and  de- 
scend them.  There  was  a  unanimity  of  opinion 
that  the  cats  went  up  head  first.  When  asked 
whether  the  cats  came  down  head  or  tail  first, 
the  majority  were  sure  that  the  cats  descended 
as  they  were  never  known  to  do.  Anyone  who 
had  ever  noticed  the  shape  of  the  claws  of  any 
beast  of  prey  could  have  answered  that  ques- 
tion without  seeing  an  actual  descent.  Farm- 
ers' boys,  who  have  often  seen  cows  and  horses 
lie  down  and  rise,  are  seldom  sure  whether  the 
animals  rise  with  their  fore  or  hind  feet  first, 
or  whether  the  habit  of  the  horse  agrees  with 
that  of  the  cow  in  this  respect." 

Brooks  well  says:  "Modern  education 
tends  to  the  neglect  of  the  culture  of  the  per- 
ceptive powers.  In  ancient  times  people 
studied  nature  much  more  than  at  present. 
Being  without  books,  they  were  compelled  to 
depend  upon  their  eyes  and  ears  for  knowl- 
edge;  and   this   made   their   senses   active, 


64  Thought  Culture 

searching  and  exact.  At  the  present  day,  we 
study  books  for  a  knowledge  of  external 
things ;  and  we  study  them  too  much  or  too  ex- 
clusively, and  thus  neglect  the  cultivation  of 
the  senses.  We  get  our  knowledge  of  the  ma- 
terial world  second-hand,  instead  of  fresh 
from  the  open  pages  of  the  book  of  nature.  Is 
it  not  a  great  mistake  to  spend  so  much  time  in 
school  and  yet  not  know  the  difference  be- 
tween the  leaf  of  a  beech  and  of  an  oak;  or 
not  be  able  to  distinguish  between  specimens 
of  marble,  quartz,  and  granite?  The  neglect 
of  the  culture  of  the  perceptive  powers  is 
shown  by  the  scholars  of  the  present  time. 
Very  few  educated  men  are  good  observers; 
indeed,  the  most  of  them  are  sadly  deficient 
in  this  respect.  .  .  .  They  were  taught  to 
think  and  remember ;  but  were  not  taught  to 
use  their  eyes  and  ears.  In  modern  education, 
books  are  used  too  much  like  spectacles,  and 
the  result  is  the  blunting  of  the  natural  powers 
of  perception." 

The  first  principle  in  the  Cultivation  of  Per- 
ception is  the  correct  use  of  the  Attention. 
The  intelligent  control  of  voluntary  attention 
is  a  prerequisite  to  clear  and  distinct  percep- 


Perception  65 

tion.  We  have  called  your  attention  to  this 
matter  in  the  preceding  chapter.  Halleck 
says:  *'A  body  may  be  imaged  on  the  retina 
without  insuring  perception.  There  must  be 
an  effort  to  concentrate  the  attention  upon  the 
many  things  which  the  world  presents  to  our 
senses.  .  .  .  Perception,  to  achieve  satis- 
factory results,  must  summon  the  will  to  its 
aid  to  concentrate  the  attention.  Only  the 
smallest  part  of  what  falls  upon  our  senses 
at  any  time  is  actually  perceived. ' ' 

The  sense  of  sight  is  perhaps  the  one  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  us,  and  accordingly  the 
cultivation  of  Perception  with  regard  to  im- 
pressions received  through  the  eye  is  the  most 
important  for  the  ordinary  individual.  As 
Kay  says :  "To  see  clearly  is  a  valuable  aid 
even  to  thinking  clearly.  In  all  our  mental 
operations  we  owe  much  to  sight.  To  recol- 
lect, to  think,  to  imagine,  is  to  see  internally,— 
to  call  up  more  or  less  visual  images  of  things 
before  the  mind.  In  order  to  understand  a 
thing  it  is  generally  necessary  to  see  it,  and 
what  a  man  has  not  seen  he  cannot  properly 
realize  or  image  distinctly  to  his  mind.  .  .  . 
It  is  by  the  habitual  direction  of  our  attention 


66  Thought  Culture 

to  the  effects  produced  upon  our  conscious- 
ness by  the  impressions  made  upon  the  eye 
and  transmitted  to  the  sensorium  that  our 
sight,  like  our  other  senses,  is  trained."  Bain 
says:  ''Cohering  trains  and  aggregates  of 
the  sensations  of  sight  make  more  than  any 
other  thing,  perhaps  more  than  all  other  things 
put  together,  the  material  of  thought,  memory 
and  imagination. ' '  Vinet  says :  ' '  The  child, 
and  perhaps  the  man  as  well,  only  knows  well 
what  is  shown  him,  and  the  image  of  things 
is  the  true  medium  between  their  abstract  idea 
and  his  personal  experience."  This  being 
the  case,  advice  concerning  the  Cultivation  of 
Perception  must  needs  be  directed  mainly  to 
the  cultivation  of  the  perception  of  sight- 
impressions. 

Brooks  says:  "We  should  acquire  the 
habit  of  observi.i:ig  with  attention.  Many  per- 
sons look  at  objects  with  a  careless,  inattentive 
eye.  We  should  guard  against  the  habit  of 
careless  looking.  We  should  fix  the  mind 
upon  the  object  before  us ;  we  should  concen- 
trate the  attention  upon  that  upon  which  we 
are  looking.  Attention,  in  respect  to  Percep- 
tion, has  been  compared  to  a  burning  glass; 


Perception"  67 

hold  the  sun-glass  between  the  snn  and  a 
board  and  the  concentrated  rays  will  burn  a 
hole  through  the  latter.  So  attention  concen- 
trates the  rays  of  perceptive  power  and  en- 
ables the  mind  to  penetrate  below  the  surface 
of  things." 

The  best  authorities  agree  in  the  idea  that 
the  Perception  may  be  best  cultivated  by  ac- 
quiring the  habit  of  examining  things  in  detail. 
And,  that  this  examination  in  detail  is  best 
manifested  by  examining  the  parts  going  to 
make  up  a  complex  thing,  separately,  rather 
than  examining  the  thing  as  a  whole.  Halleck 
says  regarding  this  point :  ' '  To  look  at  things 
intelligently  is  the  most  difficult  of  all  arts. 
The  first  rule  for  the  cultivation  of  accurate 
perception  is:  Do  not  try  to  perceive  the 
whole  of  a  complex  object  at  once.  Take  the 
human  face  for  example.  A  man  holding  an 
important  position  to  which  he  had  been 
elected  offended  many  people  because  he  could 
not  remember  faces,  and  hence  failed  to  recog- 
nize individuals  the  second  time  he  met  them. 
His  trouble  was  in  looking  at  the  countenance 
as  a  whole.  When  he  changed  his  method  of 
observation,  and  noticed  carefully  the  nose, 


^8  Thought  Cultuke 

mouth,  eyes,  chin  and  color  of  hair,  he  at  once 
began  to  find  recognition  easier.  He  was  no 
longer  in  danger  of  mistaking  A  for  B,  since 
he  remembered  that  the  shape  of  B  's  nose  was 
different,  or  the  color  of  his  hair  at  least  three 
shades  lighter.  This  example  shows  that  an- 
other rule  can  be  formulated:  Pay  careful 
attention  to  details.  ...  To  see  an  object 
merely  as  an  undiscriminated  mass  of  some- 
thing in  a  certain  place  is  to  do  no  more  than 
a  donkey  accomplishes  as  he  trots  along." 

Brooks  says  regarding  the  same  point :  ' '  To 
train  the  powers  of  observation  we  should 
practice  observing  minutely.  We  should  an- 
alyze the  objects  which  we  look  at  into  their 
parts,  and  notice  these  parts.  Objects  present 
themselves  to  us  as  wholes ;  our  definite  knowl- 
edge of  them  is  gained  by  analysis,  by  separat- 
ing them  into  the  elements  which  compose 
them.  We  should  therefore  give  attention  to 
the  details  of  whatever  we  are  considering; 
and  thus  cultivate  the  habit  of  observing  with 
minuteness.  ...  It  is  related  of  a  teacher 
that  if,  when  hearing  a  class,  some  one  rapped 
at  the  door,  he  would  look  up  as  the  visitor 
entered  and  from  a  single  glance  could  tell 


Perception  69 

his  appearance  and  dress,  the  kind  of  hat  he 
wore,  kind  of  necktie,  collar,  vest,  coat,  shoes, 
etc.  The  skillful  banker,  also,  in  counting 
money  with  wondrous  rapidity,  will  detect  and 
throw  from  his  pile  of  bills  the  counterfeits 
which,  to  the  ordinary  eye,  seem  to  be  without 
spot  or  blemish. ' ' 

One  of  the  best  methods  of  developing  and 
cultivating  the  faculty  of  Perception  is  to  take 
up  some  study  in  which  the  perceptive  facul- 
ties must  be  employed.  Botany,  physics,  ge- 
ology, natural  history  give  splendid  exercise 
in  Perception,  providing  the  student  engages 
in  actual  experimental  work,  and  actual  obser- 
vation, instead  of  confining  himself  to  the  text- 
books. A  careful  scientific  study  and  examin- 
ation of  any  kind  of  objects,  in  a  manner  cal- 
culated to  bring  out  the  various  points  of  re- 
semblance and  difference,  will  do  most  to  de- 
velop the  Perception.  Training  of  this  kind 
will  develop  these  powers  to  a  high  degree,  in 
the  case  of  small  children.  , 

Drawing  is  also  a  great  help  to  the  develop- 
ment of  Perception.  In  order  to  draw  a  thing 
correctly  we  must  of  necessity  examine  it  in 
detail ;  otherwise  we  will  not  be  able  to  draw 


70  Thought  Culture 

it  correctly.  In  fact,  many  authorities  use  the 
test  of  drawing  to  prove  the  degree  of  atten- 
tion and  Perception  that  the  student  has  be- 
stowed upon  an  object  which  he  has  been 
studying.  Others  place  an  object  before  the 
pupil  for  a  few  minutes,  and  then  withdraw 
it,  the  pupil  then  being  required  to  draw  the 
object  roughly  but  with  attention  to  its  lead- 
ing peculiarities  and  features.  Then  the  ob- 
ject is  again  placed  before  the  pupil  for  study, 
and  he  is  then  again  required  to  draw  from 
memory  the  additional  details  he  has  noticed 
in  it.  This  process  is  repeated  over  and  over 
again,  until  the  pupil  has  proved  that  he  has 
observed  every  possible  detail  of  interest  in 
the  object.  This  exercise  has  resulted  in  the 
cultivation  of  a  high  degree  of  perception  in 
many  students,  and  its  simplicity  should  not 
detract  from  its  importance.  Any  person  may 
practice  this  exercise  by  himself;  or,  better 
still,  two  or  more  students  may  combine  and 
endeavor  to  excel  each  other  in  friendly  riv- 
alry, each  endeavoring  to  discover  the  great- 
est number  of  details  in  the  object  considered. 
So  rapidly  do  students  improve  under  this 
exercise,  that  a  daily  record  will  show  a  steady 


Perception  71 

advance.  Simple  exercises  in  drawing  are 
found  in  the  reproduction,  from  memory,  of 
geography  maps,  leaves  of  trees,  etc. 

Similar  exercises  may  be  found  in  the  prac- 
tice of  taking  a  hasty  look  at  a  person,  animal 
or  building,  and  then  endeavoring  to  repro- 
duce in  writing  the  particular  points  about  the 
person  or  thing  observed.  This  exercise  will 
reveal  rapid  progress  if  persisted  in.  Or,  it 
may  be  varied  by  endeavoring  to  write  out 
the  contents  of  a  room  through  which  one  has 
walked. 

The  majority  of  our  readers  remember  the 
familiar  story  of  Houdin,  who  so  cultivated 
the  faculty  of  Perception  that  he  was  able  to 
pass  by  a  shop-window  and  afterward  state 
in  detail  every  object  in  the  window.  He  ac- 
quired this  power  by  gradual  development, 
beginning  with  the  observation  of  a  single 
article  in  the  window,  then  two,  then  three 
and  so  on.  Others  have  followed  his  method 
with  great  success.  Speaking  of  Houdin 's 
wonderful  Perception,  Halleck  says:  ''A 
wide-awake  eagle  would  probably  see  more 
of  a  thing  at  one  glance  than  would  a  drowsy 
lizard  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour.  Extreme  rapid- 


72  Thought  Culture 

ity  of  Perception,  due  to  careful  training,  was 
one  of  the  factors  enabling  Houdin  and  his  son 
to  astonish  everybody  and  to  amass  a  fortune. 
He  placed  a  domino  before  the  boy,  and  in- 
stead of  allowing  him  to  count  the  spots,  re- 
quired him  to  give  the  sum  total  at  once.  This 
exercise  was  continued  until  each  could  give 
instantaneously  the  sum  of  the  spots  on  a 
dozen  dominoes.  The  sum  was  given  just  as 
accurately  as  if  five  minutes  had  been  con- 
sumed in  adding."  Houdin,  in  his  Memoirs 
relating  the  above  facts  regarding  his  own 
methods,  states  with  due  modesty,  that  many 
women  far  excel  him  in  this  respect.  He  says : 
**I  can  safely  assert  that  a  lady  seeing  an- 
other pass  at  full  speed  in  a  carriage  will  have 
had  time  to  analyze  her  toilette  from  her  bon- 
net to  her  shoes,  and  be  able  to  describe  not 
only  the  fashion  and  quality  of  the  stuffs,  but 
also  say  if  the  lace  be  real  or  only  machine 
made. '  * 

There  are  a  number  of  games  played  by 
children  which  tend  to  the  cultivation  of  the 
Perception,  and  which  might  well  be  adapted 
for  the  use  of  older  people.  These  games  are 
based  on  the  general  principle  of  the  various 


Perception  73 

participants  taking  a  brief  view  of  a  number 
of  objects  displayed  in  one's  hand,  on  a  table, 
in  a  box,  etc.,  and  then  stating  what  he  or  she 
has  seen.  There  will  be  noticed  a  wonderful 
difference  in  the  degree  of  Perception  mani- 
fested by  the  various  participants.  And, 
equally  interesting  will  be  the  degrees  of  prog- 
ress noted  after  playing  this  game  over  sev- 
eral times,  allowing  time  for  rest  between  the 
series  of  games.  It  is  a  fact  well  known  in 
police  circles  that  thieves  often  train  boys  in 
this  way,  following  this  course  by  another  in 
which  the  lads  are  expected  to  take  in  the  con- 
tents of  a  room,  the  windows,  locks,  etc.,  at  a 
glance.  They  are  then  graduated  into  spies 
looking  out  the  details  of  the  scenes  of  future 
robberies. 

In  our  volume  of  this  series,  devoted  to  the 
consideration  of  the  Memory,  we  have  related 
a  number  of  exercises  and  methods,  similar  to 
those  given  above,  by  which  the  Perception 
may  be  cultivated.  Perception  plays  a  most 
important  place  in  memory,  for  upon  the  clear- 
ness of  the  percepts  depends  to  a  great  degree 
the  clearness  of  the  impressions  made  upon 
the  memory.    So  close  is  the  connection  be- 


74  Thought  Culture 

tween  Memory  and  Perception  that  the  culti- 
vation of  one  tends  to  develop  tlie  other.  For 
instance,  the  cultivation  of  the  Memory  neces- 
sitates the  sharpening  of  the  Perception  in  the 
direction  of  obtaining  clear  original  impres- 
sions ;  while  the  cultivation  of  Perception  nat- 
urally develops  the  Memory  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  the  latter  is  used  in  testing  and  prov- 
ing the  clearness  and  degree  of  Perception. 
This  being  the  case,  those  who  find  that  the  ex- 
ercises and  methods  given  above  are  too  ar- 
duous may  substitute  the  simple  exercise  of 
remembering  as  many  details  as  possible  of 
things  they  see.  This  effort  to  impress  the 
memory  will  involuntarily  bring  into  action 
the  perceptive  faculties  in  the  acquirement  of 
the  original  impressions,  so  that  in  the  end 
the  Perception  will  be  found  to  have  devel- 
oped. 

Teachers  and  those  having  to  do  with  chil- 
dren should  realize  the  great  value  of  the  cul- 
tivation of  Perception  in  the  young,  and  thus 
establishing  valuable  habits  of  observation 
among  them.  The  experience  and  culture  thus 
acquired  will  prove  of  great  value  in  their 
after  life.    As  Brooks  well  says  on  this  sub- 


Perception  75 

ject :  ' '  Teachers  should  appreciate  the  value 
of  the  culture  of  the  perceptive  powers,  and 
endeavor  to  do  something  to  afford  this  cul- 
ture. Let  it  be  remembered  that  by  training 
the  powers  of  observation  of  pupils,  we  lead 
them  to  acquire  definite  ideas  of  things,  en- 
able them  to  store  their  minds  with  fresh  and 
interesting  knowledge,  lay  the  foundation  for 
literary  or  business  success,  and  thus  do  much 
to  enhance  their  happiness  in  life  and  add  to 
the  sum  of  human  knowledge. ' ' 


CHAPTER  VII. 

REPRESENTATION 

Sensation  and  Perception,  as  considered  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  are  what  are  called  by 
psychologists  ''Processes  of  Presentation." 
By  Presentation  is  meant  the  direct  oif ering 
to  the  consciousness  of  mental  images  or  ob- 
jects of  thought.  If  there  were  no  faculty  of 
the  mind  capable  of  retaining  and  re-present- 
ing to  the  consciousness  the  impression  or 
record  of  Perception,  we  could  never  progress 
in  knowledge,  for  each  percept  would  be  new 
each  time  it  was  presented  and  there  would 
be  no  recognition  of  it  as  having  been  previ- 
ously perceived,  nor  would  there  be  any  power 
to  voluntarily  recall  any  percept  previously 
acquired.  In  short,  we  would  be  without  that 
power  of  the  mind  called  Memory. 

But,  fortunately  for  us  as  thinkers,  we  pos- 
sess the  power  of  Representation;  that  is,  of 
reproducing  past  perceptions  and  experiences 
in  the  shape  of  mental  images  or  pictures,  "in 
the  mind's  eye,"  so  to  speak,  which  relieves 

76 


Representation  77 

us  of  the  necessity  of  directly  and  immedi- 
ately perceiving  an  object  each  time  we  desire 
or  are  required  to  think  of  it.  The  processes 
whereby  this  becomes  possible  are  called  the 
processes  of  Representation,  for  the  reason 
that  by  them  past  experiences  of  Perception 
are  re-presented  to  the  consciousness. 

The  subject  of  Representation  is  closely 
bound  up  with  that  of  Memory.  Strictly 
speaking,  Representation  may  be  said  to  be 
one  phase  of  Memory;  Association  of  Ideas 
another;  and  the  authorities  prefer  to  treat 
the  whole  subject  under  the  general  head  of 
Memory.  We  have  written  a  work  on  ' '  Mem- 
ory" which  forms  one  of  the  volumes  of  the 
present  series,  and  we  have  no  intention,  or 
desire,  to  repeat  here  the  information  given  in 
that  work.  But  we  must  consider  the  subject 
of  Representation  at  this  point  in  order  to 
maintain  the  logical  unity  of  the  present  gen- 
eral subject  of  Thought-Culture.  The  student 
will  also  notice,  of  course,  the  close  relation 
between  the  processes  of  Representation  and 
those  of  the  Imagination,  which  we  shall  con- 
sider in  other  chapters  of  this  work. 

Memory  has  several  phases,  the  usual  classi- 


78  Thought  Culture 

fication  of  which  is  as  follows:  (1)  Impres- 
sion; (2)  Retention;  (3)  Recollection;  (4) 
Representation,  and  (5)  Recognition.  Each 
phase  requires  the  operation  of  special  mental 
processes.  Impression  is  the  process  whereby 
the  impressions  of  Perception  are  recorded  or 
stamped  upon  the  subconscious  field  of  men- 
tality, as  the  impress  of  the  die  upon  the  wax. 
Retention  is  the  process  whereby  the  subcon- 
sciousness retains  or  holds  the  impressions 
so  received.  Recollection  is  the  process  by 
which  the  mind  re-collects  the  impressions  re- 
tained in  the  subconsciousness,  bringing  them 
again  into  consciousness  as  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. Representation  is  the  process  whereby 
the  impressions  so  re-collected  are  pictured 
or  imaged  in  the  mind.  Recogniton  is  the 
process  whereby  the  mind  recognizes  the  men- 
tal image  or  picture  so  re-presented  to  it  as 
connected  with  its  past  experience. 

As  we  have  stated,  we  have  considered  the 
general  subject  of  Memory  in  another  volume 
of  this  series  and,  therefore,  shall  not  attempt 
to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  its  general  sub- 
ject at  this  place.    We  shall,  accordingly,  limit 


Kepresentation  79 

ourselves  here  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the 
phase  of  Representation  and  its  cultivation. 

Representation,  of  course,  depends  upon 
the  preceding  phases  of  Memory  known  as 
Impression,  Retention  and  Recollection.  Un- 
less the  Impression  is  clear;  unless  the  Reten- 
tion is  normal,  there  can  be  no  Representation. 
And  unless  one  recollects  there  can  be  no  Rep- 
resentation. Recollection  (which  is  really  a 
re-collection  of  percepts)  must  precede  Rep- 
resentation in  the  shape  of  mental  images  or 
pictures.  Recollection  re-collects  the  mental 
materials  out  of  which  the  image  is  to  be  con- 
structed. But,  as  Brooks  says :  ''Itisnotto 
be  assumed  that  knowledge  is  retained  as  a 
picture ;  but  that  it  is  recreated  in  the  form  of 
a  picture  or  some  other  mental  product  when 
it  is  recalled."  The  process  is  analogous  to 
the  transmutation  of  the  sound-waves  enter- 
ing the  receiver  of  a  telephone,  into  electrical- 
waves  which  are  transmitted  to  the  receiver, 
where  they  are  in  turn  re-transmuted  to 
sound-waves  which  enter  the  ear  of  the 
listener.  It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  there  is 
the  closest  possible  relation  between  the  proc- 
esses of  Representation  and  those  of  Memory 


80  Thought  Culture 

—in  fact,  it  is  quite  difficult  to  draw  a  clear 
line  of  division  between  them.  Some  make  the 
distinction  that  Representation  furnishes  us 
with  an  exact  reproduction  of  the  past ;  while 
Imagination  combines  our  mental  images  into 
new  products.  That  is,  Representation  merely 
reproduces;  while  Imagination  creates  by 
forming  new  combinations ;  or  Representation 
deals  with  a  reproduction  of  the  Actual ;  while 
Imagination  deals  with  the  Ideal. 

Wundt  speaking  of  this  difficult  distinc- 
tion says:  "Psychologists  are  accustomed 
to  define  memory  images  as  ideas  which  ex- 
actly reproduce  some  previous  perception, 
and  fancy  images  as  ideas  consisting  of  a  com- 
bination of  elements  taken  from  a  whole  num- 
ber of  perceptions.  Now  memory  images  in 
the  sense  of  this  definition  simply  do  not  exist. 
.  .  .  Try,  for  instance,  to  draw  from  mem- 
ory some  landscape  picture  which  you  have 
only  once  seen,  and  then  compare  your  copy 
with  the  original.  You  will  expect  to  find 
plenty  of  mistakes  and  omissions;  but  you 
will  also  invariably  find  that  you  have  put  in 
a  great  deal  which  was  not  in  the  original,  but 


Representation  81 

which  comes  from  landscape  pictures  which 
you  have  seen  somewhere  else." 

While  we  generally  speak  of  Representa- 
tion picturing  the  recollected  percepts,  still, 
we  must  not  make  the  mistake  of  supposing 
that  it  is  concerned  with,  or  limited  to,  only 
mental  pictures.  We  are  able  to  represent 
not  only  visual  percepts  but  also  sounds, 
smells,  tastes  or  feelings,  often  so  vividly  that 
they  appear  as  almost  actually  existent.  We 
may  also  even  represent,  symbolically  the 
processes  of  reasoning,  mathematical  opera- 
tions, etc.  In  short  nearly,  if  not  all  experi- 
ences which  are  possible  in  Presentation  are 
also  possible  in  Representation. 

The  phase  of  Representation,  in  the  proc- 
esses of  Memory,  is  of  course  subject  to  the 
general  laws  of  the  Cultivation  of  Memory 
which  we  have  stated  in  detail  in  our  previous 
volume  on  that  subject.  But  there  are  some 
special  points  of  development  and  cultivation 
which  may  be  considered  briefly  in  this  place. 
In  the  first  place  the  importance  of  Attention 
and  clear  Perception,  as  necessary  precedents 
for  clear  Representation,  may  be  emphasized. 
In  order  to  form  clear  mental  images  of  a 


82  Thought  Culture 

thing  we  must  have  perceived  it  clearly  in  the 
first  place.  The  advice  regarding  the  use  of 
the  Attention  and  Perception  given  in  preced- 
ing chapters  need  not  be  repeated  here,  but 
special  attention  should  be  directed  toward 
them  in  connection  with  the  processes  of  Eep- 
resentation.  If  we  wish  to  cultivate  the  Eep- 
resentative  faculties,  we  must  begin  by  culti- 
vating the  Presentative  faculties. 

Then  again  we  must  remember  what  we 
have  said  elsewhere  about  the  facts  of  de- 
velopment through  (1)  Use;  and  (2)  Nourish- 
ment, in  all  mental  faculties.  We  must  begin 
to  use  the  faculties  of  Representation  in  order 
to  exercise  them.  We  must  give  them  nour- 
ishment in  the  shape  of  objects  of  mental  food. 
That  is  to  say  we  must  furnish  these  faculties 
with  materials  with  which  they  may  grow  and 
develop,  and  with  exercise  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  mental-muscle  and  also  to  give 
the  faculties  the  opportunity  to  "acquire  the 
knack."  The  exercises  and  methods  recom- 
mended in  our  chapter  on  Perception  will  fur- 
nish good  material  for  the  Representative 
faculties '  growing  requirements.  By  perceiv- 
ing the  details  of  things,  one  is  able  to  repro- 


Representation  83 

duce  clear  mental  images  of  them.  In  studying 
an  object,  always  carry  in  your  mind  the  fact 
that  you  wish  to  reproduce  it  in  your  mind 
later.  In  fact,  if  you  have  the  opportunity, 
let  your  mind  ''repeat  it  to  itself"  as  soon  as 
possible  after  the  actual  occurrence  and  ex- 
perience. Just  as  you  often  murmur  to  your- 
self, or  else  write  down,  the  name  of  a  person 
or  place  which  you  have  just  heard,  in  order 
that  you  may  recollect  it  the  better  thereafter, 
so  it  will  be  well  for  you  to  ''mentally  repeat" 
to  yourself  the  experiences  upon  which  you 
wish  to  exercise  your  Representative  facul- 
ties. 

As  to  the  matter  of  development  and  culti- 
vation by  Use,  we  would  advise  that  you  begin 
gradually  to  train  your  mind  to  reproduce  the 
experiences  of  the  day  or  week  or  month,  at 
intervals,  until  you  feel  that  you  are  develop- 
ing a  new  power  in  that  direction.  Tonight, 
if  you  try  you  will  find  that  you  can  reproduce 
but  a  very  small  part  of  today's  happenings 
with  any  degree  of  clearness.  How  clearly 
can  you  image  the  places  you  have  been,  the 
appearances  of  the  people  you  have  met,  the 
various  details  of  persons  and  things  which 


84  Thought  Culture 

you  perceived  during  the  experiences  of  the 
day?  Not  very  clearly,  we  dare  say.  Try 
again,  and  you  will  find  that  you  will  be  able 
to  add  new  details.  Keep  it  up  until  you  feel 
tired  or  think  that  you  have  exhausted  all  the 
possibilities  of  the  task.  Tomorrow,  try  it 
again,  and  you  will  find  that  the  second  day's 
experiences  are  more  clearly  reproduced  in 
your  mind.  Each  day  should  find  you  a  little 
more  advanced,  until  you  get  to  a  place  where 
the  normal  degree  of  power  is  attained,  when 
the  advance  will  be  slower. 

Then,  at  the  end  of  the  week,  review  its  ex- 
periences. Do  the  same  the  following  week. 
At  the  end  of  the  month,  take  a  hasty  mental 
trip  over  the  month's  experiences.  And  so 
on.  Exercise,  in  moderation,  along  these  lines 
will  work  wonders  for  you.  Not  only  will  it 
develop  the  Representation,  but  your  powers 
of  observation  and  your  general  memory  will 
be  found  to  be  improved.  And,  moreover,  in 
*' chewing  the  mental  cud"  you  will  think  of 
many  things  of  interest  and  importance  in  con- 
nection with  your  work,  etc.,  and  your  general 
mental  efficiency  will  be  increased  for  the  fac- 
ulties of  the  mind  are  interdependent  and 
share  benefits  with  each  other. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ABSTRACTION 

As  we  have  seen,  the  first  stage  or  step  in 
the  process  of  Thought  is  that  called  Percep- 
tion, which  we  have  considered  in  the  preced- 
ing chapter.  Perception,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
the  process  by  which  we  gain  our  first  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  world  as  reported  to  us  by 
the  channels  of  sense.  The  Perceptive  facul- 
ties interpret  the  material  which  is  presented 
to  us  by  the  senses.  Following  upon  Percep- 
tion we  find  the  processes  resulting  from  the 
exercise  of  the  group  of  faculties  which  are 
classified  under  the  general  head  of  Under- 
standing. 

Understanding  is  the  faculty,  or  faculties, 
of  the  mind  by  means  of  which  we  intelligently 
examine  and  compare  the  various  percepts, 
either  separating  them  by  analysis,  or  else 
combining  them  by  synthesis,  or  both,  and 
thus  securing  our  general  ideas,  principles, 
laws,  classes,  etc.  There  are  several  sub- 
phases  of  Understanding  which  are  known  to 

85 


86  Thought  Culture 

psychologists  and  logicians  as:  (1)  Abstrac- 
tion; (2)  Conception  or  Generalization;  (3) 
Judgment,  and  (4)  Reasoning,  respectively. 
In  this  chapter  we  shall  consider  the  first  of 
these  sub-phases  or  steps  of  Understanding, 
which  is  known  as  *' Abstraction." 

Abstraction  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by 
which  we  abstract  or  "draw  off,"  and  then 
consider  apart,  the  particular  qualities,  prop- 
erties, or  attributes  of  an  object,  and  thus  are 
able  to  consider  them  as  "things"  or  objects 
of  thought  In  order  to  form  concepts  or  gen- 
eral ideas,  from  our  percepts  or  particular 
ideas,  we  must  consider  and  examine  two  com- 
mon points  or  qualities  which  go  to  make  up 
differences  and  resemblances.  The  special 
examination  or  consideration  of  these  com- 
mon points  or  qualities  result  in  the  exercise 
of  Abstraction.  In  the  process  of  Abstraction 
we  mentally  "draw  away"  a  quality  of  an 
object  and  then  consider  it  as  a  distinct  object 
of  thought.  Thus  in  considering  a  flower  we 
may  abstract  its  qualities  of  fragrance,  color, 
shape,  etc.,  and  think  of  these  as  things  inde- 
pendent of  the  flower  itself  from  which  they 
were  derived.  We  think  of  redness,  fragrance, 


Abstraction  87 

etc.,  not  only  in  connection  with  the  particular 
flower  but  as  general  qualities.  Thus  the  qual- 
ities of  redness,  sweetness,  hardness,  softness, 
etc.,  lead  us  to  the  abstract  terms,  red,  siveet, 
hard,  soft,  etc.  In  the  same  way  courage, 
cowardice,  virtue,  vice,  love,  hate,  etc.,  are 
abstract  terms.  No  one  ever  saw  one  of  these 
things— they  are  known  only  in  connection 
with  objects,  or  else  as  ''abstract  terms"  in 
the  processes  of  Thought.  They  may  be 
known  as  qualities,  and  expressed  as  predi- 
cates ;  or  they  may  be  considered  as  abstract 
things  and  expressed  as  nouns. 

In  the  general  process  of  Abstraction  we 
first  draw  off  and  set  aside  all  the  qualities 
which  are  not  common  to  the  general  class 
under  consideration,  for  the  concept  or  gen- 
eral idea  must  comprise  only  the  qualities 
common  to  its  class.  Thus  in  the  case  of  the 
general  idea  of  horse,  size  and  color  must  be 
abstracted  as  non-essentials,  for  horses  are  of 
various  colors  and  sizes.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  there  are  certain  qualities  which  are 
common  to  all  horses,  and  these  must  be  ab- 
stracted and  used  in  making  up  the  concept  or 
general  idea. 


88  Thought  Culture 

So,  you  see,  in  general  Abstraction  we  form 
two  classes:  (1)  the  unlike  and  not-general 
qualities;  and  (2)  the  like  or  common  quali- 
ties. As  Halleck  says:  *'In  the  process  of 
Abstraction,  we  draw  our  attention  away  from 
a  mass  of  confusing  details,  unimportant  at 
the  time,  and  attend  only  to  qualities  common 
to  the  class.  Abstraction  is  little  else  than 
centering  the  power  of  attention  on  some  qual- 
ities to  the  exclusion  of  others.  .  .  .  While 
we  are  forming  concepts,  we  abstract  or  draw 
off  certain  qualities,  either  to  leave  them  out 
of  view  or  to  consider  them  by  themselves. 
Our  dictionaries  contain  such  words  as  pur- 
ity, whiteness,  sweetness,  industry,  courage, 
etc.  No  one  ever  touched,  tasted,  smelled, 
heard,  or  saw  purity  or  courage.  We  do  not, 
therefore,  gain  our  knowledge  of  these 
through  the  senses.  We  have  seen  pure  per- 
sons, pure  snow,  pure  honey;  we  have 
breathed  pure  air,  tasted  pure  coffee.  From 
all  these  different  objects  we  have  abstracted 
the  only  like  quality,  the  quality  of  being  pure. 
We  then  say  we  have  an  idea  of  purity,  and 
that  idea  is  an  abstract  one.  It  exists  only  in 
the  mind  which  formed  it.    No  one  ever  saw 


Abstraction  89 

ivhiteness.  He  may  have  seen  white  clouds, 
snow,  cloth,  blossoms,  houses,  paper,  horses, 
but  he  never  saw  ivhiteness  by  itself.  He  sim- 
ply abstracted  that  quality  from  various  white 
objects." 

In  Abstraction  we  may  either  (1)  abstract 
a  quality  and  set  it  aside  and  apart  from  the 
other  qualities  under  consideration,  as  being 
non-essential  and  not  necessary;  or  we  may 
(2)  abstract  a  quality  and  hold  it  in  the  mind 
as  essential  and  necessary  for  the  concept 
which  we  are  forming.  Likewise,  we  may  ab- 
stract (1)  all  the  qualities  of  an  object  except 
one,  and  set  them  aside  that  we  may  consider 
the  one  quality  by  itself;  or  we  may  (2)  ab- 
stract the  one  particular  quality  and  consider 
it  to  the  exclusion  of  all  its  associated  quali- 
ties. In  all  of  these  aspects  we  have  the  same 
underlying  process  of  considering  a  quality 
apart  from  its  object,  and  apart  from  its  as- 
sociated qualities.  The  mind  more  commonly 
operates  in  the  direction  of  abstracting  one 
quality  and  viewing  it  apart  from  object  and 
associated  qualities. 

The  importance  of  correct  powers  of  Ab- 
straction is  seen  when  we  realize  that  all  con- 


90  Thought  Culture 

cepts  or  general  ideas  are  but  combinations  of 
abstract  qualities  or  ideas.  As  Halleck  says : 
*  *  The  difference  between  an  abstract  idea  and 
a  concept  is  that  a  concept  may  consist  of  a 
bundle  of  abstract  ideas.  If  the  class  contains 
more  than  one  common  quality,  so  must  the 
concept ;  it  must  contain  as  many  of  these  ab- 
stracted qualities  as  are  common  to  the  class. 
The  concept  of  the  class  ivhale  would  embody 
a  large  number  of  such  qualities. ' '  As  Brooks 
says :  * '  If  we  could  not  abstract,  we  could  not 
generalize,  for  abstraction  is  a  condition  of 
generalization."  The  last-mentioned  author- 
ity also  cleverly  states  the  idea  as  follows: 
''The  products  of  Abstraction  are  abstract 
ideas,  that  is,  ideas  of  qualities  in  the  abstract. 
Such  ideas  are  called  Abstracts.  Thus  my  idea 
of  some  particular  color,  or  hardness,  or  soft- 
ness, is  an  abstract.  Abstract  ideas  have  been 
wittily  called  'the  ghosts  of  departed  quali- 
ties.' They  may  more  appropriately  be  re- 
garded as  the  spirits  of  which  the  objects  from 
which  they  are  derived  are  the  bodies.  In 
other  words,  they  are,  figuratively  speaking, 
'the  disembodied  spirits  of  material  things.'  " 
The  cultivation  of  the  faculty  of  Abstrac- 


Absthaction  91 

tion  depends  very  materially,  in  the  first  place, 
upon  the  exercise  of  Attention  and  Percep- 
tion. Mill  holds  that  Abstraction  is  primarily 
a  result  of  Attention.  Others  hold  that  it  is 
merely  the  mental  process  by  which  the  at- 
tention is  directed  exclusively  to  the  consider- 
ation of  one  of  several  qualities,  properties, 
attributes,  parts,  etc.  Hamilton  says:  *' At- 
tention and  Abstraction  then  are  only  the 
same  process  viewed  in  different  relations. 
They  are,  as  it  were,  the  positive  and  negative 
poles  of  the  same  act."  The  cultivation  of  At- 
tention is  really  a  part  of  the  process  of  the 
cultivation  of  the  faculty  of  Abstraction.  Un- 
less the  Attention  be  directed  toward  the  ob- 
ject and  its  qualities  we  will  be  unable  to  per- 
ceive, set  aside,  and  separately  consider  the 
abstract  quality  contained  within  it.  In  this 
process,  as  indeed  in  all  other  mental  proc- 
esses. Attention  is  a  prerequisite.  Therefore, 
here,  as  in  many  other  places,  we  say  to 
you ;    *  *  Begin  by  cultivating  Attention. ' ' 

Moreover,  the  cultivation  of  the  faculty  of 
Abstraction  depends  materially  upon  the  cul- 
tivation of  Perception.  Not  only  must  we 
sense  the  existence  of  the  various  qualities  in 


92  Thought  Culture 

an  object,  but  we  must  also  perceive  them  in 
consciousness,  just  as  we  perceive  the  object 
itself.  In  fact,  the  perception  of  the  object  is 
merely  a  perception  of  its  various  qualities, 
attributes  and  properties,  for  the  object  itself 
is  merely  a  composite  of  these  abstract  things, 
at  least  so  far  as  its  perception  in  conscious- 
ness is  concerned.  Try  to  think  of  a  horse, 
without  considering  its  qualities,  attributes 
and  properties,  and  the  result  is  merely  an 
abstract  /i-orse— something  which  belongs  to 
the  realm  of  unreality.  Try  to  think  of  a  rose 
without  considering  its  color,  odor,  shape,  size, 
response  to  touch,  etc.,  and  you  have  simply 
an  ideal  rose  which  when  analyzed  is  seen  to 
be  a  nothing.  Take  away  the  qualities,  prop- 
erties and  attributes  of  anything,  and  you 
have  left  merely  a  name,  or  else  a  transcen- 
dental, idealistic,  something  apart  from  our 
world  of  sense  knowledge.  Thus  it  follows 
that  in  order  to  knoiv  the  qualities  of  a  thing 
in  order  to  classify  it,  or  to  form  a  general  idea 
of  it,  we  must  use  the  Perception  in  order  to 
interpret  or  translate  the  sense-impressions 
we  have  received  regarding  them.  Conse- 
quently the  greater  our  power  of  Perception 


Abstraction  93 

the  greater  must  be  the  possibility  of  our 
power  of  Abstraction. 

Beyond  the  cultivation,  use  and  exercise  of 
the  Attention  and  the  Perception,  there  are 
but  few  practical  methods  for  cultivating  the 
faculty  of  Abstraction.  Of  course,  exercise 
of  the  faculty  will  develop  it ;  and  the  furnish- 
ing of  material  for  its  activities  will  give  it 
the  "nourishment"  of  which  we  have  spoken 
elsewhere.  Practice  in  distinguishing  the 
various  qualities,  attributes  and  properties 
of  objects  will  give  a  valuable  training  to  the 
faculty. 

Let  the  student  take  any  object  and  en- 
deavor to  analyze  it  into  its  abstract  qualities, 
etc.  Let  him  try  to  discover  qualities  hidden 
from  first  sight.  Let  him  make  a  list  of  these 
qualities,  and  write  them  down;  then  try  to 
add  to  the  list.  Two  or  more  students  engag- 
ing in  a  friendly  rivalry  will  stimulate  the  ef- 
forts of  each  other.  In  children  the  exercise 
may  be  treated  as  a  game.  Analysis  of  objects 
into  their  component  qualities,  attributes  and 
qualities — the  effort  to  extract  as  many  ad- 
jectives applicable  to  the  object— this  is  the 
first  step.    The  second  step  consists  in  trans- 


94  Thought  Culture 

forming  these  adjectives  into  their  corre- 
sponding nouns.  As  for  instance,  in  a  rose 
we  perceive  the  qualities  wliich  we  call  ''red- 
ness," "fragrance,"  etc.  "We  speak  of  the 
rose  as  being  *'red"  or  "fragrant"— then  we 
think  of  "redness,"  or  "fragrance"  as  ab- 
stract qualities,  or  things,  which  we  express 
as  nouns.  Exercise  and  practice  along  these 
lines  will  tend  to  cultivate  the  faculty  of  Ab- 
straction. By  knowing  qualities,  we  know  the 
things  possessing  them. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

ASSOCIATION  OF  IDEAS 

Having  formed  general  ideas,  or  Concepts, 
it  is  important  that  we  associate  them  with 
other  general  ideas.  In  order  to  fully  under- 
stand a  general  idea  we  must  know  its  associa- 
tions and  relations.  The  greater  the  known 
associations  or  relations  of  an  idea,  the 
greater  is  our  degree  of  understanding  of  that 
idea.  If  we  simply  know  many  thousands  of 
separated  general  ideas,  without  also  know- 
ing their  associations  and  relations,  we  are  in 
almost  as  difficult  a  position  as  if  we  merely 
knew  thousands  of  individual  percepts  with- 
out being  able  to  classify  them  in  general  con- 
cepts. It  is  necessary  to  develop  the  faculty 
of  associating  ideas  into  groups,  according  to 
their  relations,  just  as  we  group  particular 
ideas  in  classes.  The  difference,  however,  is 
that  these  group-ideas  do  not  form  classes  of 
a  genus,  but  depend  solely  upon  associations 
of  several  kinds,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment. 

Halleck  says : ' '  All  ideas  have  certain  defiii- 

95 


96  Thought  Culture 

ite  associations  with  other  ideas,  and  they 
come  up  in  groups.  There  is  always  an  asso- 
ciation between  our  ideas,  although  there  are 
cases  when  we  cannot  trace  it.  .  .  .  Even 
when  we  find  no  association  between  our  ideas, 
we  may  be  sure  that  it  exists.  .  .  .  An  idea, 
then,  never  appears  in  consciousness  unless 
there  is  a  definite  reason  why  this  idea  should 
appear  in  preference  to  others."  Brooks 
says :  * '  One  idea  or  feeling  in  the  mind  calls  up 
some  other  idea  or  feeling  with  which  it  is  in 
some  way  related.  Our  ideas  seem,  as  it  were, 
to  be  tied  together  by  the  invisible  thread  of 
association,  so  that  as  one  comes  out  of  un- 
consciousness, it  draws  another  with  it. 
Thoughts  seem  to  exist  somewhat  in  clusters 
like  the  grapes  of  a  bunch,  so  that  in  bringing 
out  one,  we  bring  the  entire  cluster  with  it. 
The  law  of  association  is  thus  the  tie,  the 
thread,  the  golden  link  by  which  our  thoughts 
are  united  in  an  act  of  reproduction." 

The  majority  of  writers  confine  their  con- 
sideration of  Association  of  Ideas  to  its  rela- 
tion to  Memory.  It  is  true  that  the  Laws  of 
Association  play  an  important  part  in  Mem- 
ory Culture,  but  Association  of  Ideas  also 


Association  of  Ideas  97 

form  an  important  part  of  the  general  sub- 
ject of  Thought-Culture,  and  especially  in  the 
phase  of  the  latter  devoted  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Understanding.  The  best  author- 
ities agree  upon  this  idea  and  state  it  posi- 
tively. Ribot  says:  ''The  most  fundamental 
law  which  regulates  psychological  phenomena 
is  the  Law  of  Association.  In  its  comprehen- 
sive character  it  is  comparable  to  the  law  of 
attraction  in  the  physical  world."  Mill  says : 
''That  which  the  law  of  gravitation  is  to  as- 
tronomy, that  which  the  elementary  proper- 
ties of  the  tissues  are  to  physiology,  the  Law 
of  Association  of  Ideas  is  to  psychology." 

There  are  two  general  principles,  or  laws, 
operative  in  the  processes  of  Association  of 
Ideas,  known  as  (1)  Association  by  Contigu- 
ity; and  (2)  Association  by  Similarity,  re- 
spectively. 

Association  by  Contiguity  manifests  par- 
ticularly in  the  processes  of  memory.  In  its 
two  phases  of  (1)  Contiguity  of  Time;  and 
(2)  Contiguity  of  Space,  respectively,  it 
brings  together  before  the  field  of  conscious- 
ness ideas  associated  with  each  by  reason  of 
their  time  or  space  relations.    Thus,  if  we  re- 


98  Thought  Culture 

member  a  certain  thing,  we  find  it  easy  to  re- 
member things  which  occurred  immediately 
before,  or  immediately  after  that  particular 
thing.  Verbal  memory  depends  largely  upon 
the  contigTiity  of  time,  as  for  instance,  our 
ability  to  repeat  a  poem,  or  passage  from  a 
book,  if  we  can  recall  the  first  words  thereof. 
Children  often  possess  this  form  of  memory 
to  a  surprising  degree ;  and  adults  with  only 
a  limited  degree  of  understanding  may  repeat 
freely  long  extracts  from  speeches  they  have 
heard,  or  even  arbitrary  jumbles  of  words. 
Visual  memory  depends  largely  upon  conti- 
guity of  space,  as  for  instance  our  ability  to 
recall  the  details  of  scenes,  when  starting 
from  a  given  point.  In  both  of  these  forms  of 
association  by  contiguity  the  mental  opera- 
tion is  akin  to  that  of  unwinding  a  ball  of  yarn, 
the  ideas,  thus  associated  in  the  sequence  of 
time  or  place,  following  each  other  into  the 
field  of  consciousness.  Association  by  Conti- 
guity, while  important  in  itself,  properly  be- 
longs to  the  general  subject  of  Memory,  and 
as  we  have  considered  it  in  the  volume  of  this 
series  devoted  to  the  last  mentioned  subject, 
we  shall  not  speak  of  it  further  here. 


Association  of  Ideas  99 

Association  by  Similarity,  however,  posses- 
ses a  special  interest  to  students  of  the  partic- 
ular subject  of  the  culture  of  the  Understand- 
ing. If  we  were  compelled  to  rely  upon  the 
association  of  contiguity  for  our  understand- 
ing of  things,  we  would  understand  a  thing 
merely  in  its  relations  to  that  which  went  be- 
fore or  came  after  it ;  or  by  the  things  which 
were  near  it  in  space— we  would  have  to  un- 
wind the  mental  ball  of  time  and  space  rela- 
tions in  order  to  bring  into  consciousness  the 
associated  relations  of  anything.  The  Asso- 
ciation of  Similarity,  however,  remedies  this 
defect,  and  gives  us  a  higher  and  broader  asso- 
ciation. Speaking  of  Association  of  Similar- 
ity, Kay  says:  "It  is  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance to  us  in  forming  a  judgment  of  things, 
or  in  determining  upon  a  particular  line  of 
conduct,  to  be  able  to  bring  together  before 
the  mind  a  number  of  instances  of  a  similar 
kind,  recent  or  long  past,  which  may  aid  us  in 
coming  to  a  right  determination.  Thus,  we 
may  judge  of  the  nature  or  quality  of  an  arti- 
cle, and  obtain  light  and  leading  in  regard  to 
any  subject  that  may  be  before  us.  In  this 
way  we  arrange  and  classify  and  reason  by 


100  Thought  Culture 

induction.  This  is  knoivn  as  rational  or  philo- 
sophical association." 

Halleck  says:  ''An  eminent  philosopher 
has  said  that  man  is  completely  at  the  mercy 
of  the  association  of  his  ideas.  Every  new  ob- 
ject is  seen  in  the  light  of  its  associated  ideas. 
.  .  .  It  is  not  the  business  of  the  psycholo- 
gist to  state  what  power  the  association  of 
ideas  ought  to  have.  It  is  for  him  to  ascertain 
what  power  it  does  have.  When  we  think  of 
the  bigotry  of  past  ages,  of  the  stake  for  the 
martyr  and  the  stoning  of  witches,  we  can 
realize  the  force  of  Prof.  Ziehen's  statement: 
'  We  cannot  think  as  we  ivill,  but  we  must  think 
as  just  those  associations  which  happen  to  be 
present  prescribe.'  While  this  is  not  literally 
true,  it  may  serve  to  emphasize  a  deflecting 
factor  which  is  usually  underestimated. ' ' 

Locke  says :  ' '  The  connection  in  our  minds 
of  ideas,  in  themselves  loose  and  independent 
of  one  another,  has  such  an  influence,  and  is 
of  so  great  force,  to  set  us  awry  in  our  actions, 
as  well  moral  as  natural,  passions,  reason- 
ings, and  notions  themselves,  that,  perhaps, 
there  is  not  any  one  thing  that  deserves  more 
to  be  looked  after."     Stewart  says:  ''The 


Association  of  Ideas  101 

bulk  of  mankind,  being  but  little  accustomed 
to  reflect  and  to  generalize,  associate  their 
ideas  chiefly  according  to  their  more  obvious 
relations,  and  above  all  to  the  casual  relations 
arising  from  contiguity  in  time  and  place; 
whereas,  in  the  mind  of  a  philosopher  ideas 
are  commonly  associated  according  to  those 
relations  which  are  brought  to  light  in  conse- 
quence of  particular  efforts  of  attention,  such 
as  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect,  or  of 
premises  and  conclusion.  Hence,  it  must  nec- 
essarily happen  that  when  he  has  occasion  to 
apply  to  use  his  acquired  knowledge,  time  and 
reflection  will  be  requisite  to  enable  him  to 
recollect  it. ' ' 

This  Association  by  Similarity,  or  the 
''rational  and  philosophical  association  of 
ideas,"  may  be  developed  and  cultivated  by  a 
little  care  and  work.  The  first  principle  is 
that  of  learning  the  true  relations  of  an  idea 
—its  various  logical  associations.  Perhaps 
the  easiest  and  best  method  is  that  adopted 
and  practiced  by  Socrates,  the  old  Greek 
philosopher,  often  called  ''the  Socratic 
method"— the  Method  of  Questioning.  By 
questioning  oneself,  or  others,  regarding  a 


102  Thought  Culture 

thing,  the  mind  of  the  person  answering  tends 
to  unfold  its  stores  of  information,  and  to 
make  new  and  true  associations.  Kays  says : 
''Socrates,  Plato,  and  others  among  the  an- 
cients and  some  moderns,  have  been  masters 
of  this  art.  The  principle  of  asking  questions 
and  obtaining  answers  to  them  may  be  said 
to  characterize  all  intellectual  effort.  .  .  . 
The  great  thing  is  to  ask  the  right  questions, 
and  to  obtain  the  right  answers."  Meikle- 
john  says : ' '  This  art  of  questioning  possessed 
by  Dr.  Hodgson  was  something  wonderful  and 
unique,  and  was  to  the  minds  of  most  of  his 
pupils  a  truly  obstetric  art.  He  told  them  little 
or  nothing,  but  showed  them  how  to  find  out 
for  themselves.  'The  Socratic  method,'  he 
said,  'is  the  true  one,  especially  with  the 
young.'  " 

But  this  questioning  must  be  done  logically, 
and  orderly,  and  not  in  a  haphazard  way.  As 
Fitch  says :  "In  proposing  questions  it  is  very 
necessary  to  keep  in  view  the  importance  of 
arranging  them  in  the  exact  order  in  which 
the  subject  would  naturally  develop  itself  in 
the  mind  of  a  logical  and  systematic  thinker." 
"A  number  of  systems  have  been  formulated 


Association  of  Ideas  103 

by  different  writers  on  tlie  subject,  all  of 
which  have  much  merit.  The  following  Sys- 
tem of  Analysis,  designed  for  the  use  of  stu- 
dents desiring  to  acquire  correct  associations, 
was  given  in  the  volume  of  this  series,  en- 
titled * '  Memory, ' '  and  is  reproduced  here  be- 
cause it  is  peculiarly  adapted  to  the  culti- 
vation and  development  of  the  faculty  of  dis- 
covering and  forming  correct  associations 
and  relations  between  ideas: 

SYSTEM   OF  ANALYSIS 

When  you  wish  to  discover  what  you  really 
know  regarding  a  thing,  ask  yourself  the  fol- 
lowing questions  about  it,  examining  each 
point  in  detail,  and  endeavoring  to  bring  be- 
fore the  mind  your  full  knotvledge  regarding 
that  particular  point.  Fill  in  the  deficiencies 
by  reading  some  good  work  of  reference,  an 
encyclopedia  for  instance;  or  consulting  a 
good  dictionary,  or  both : 

I.    Where  did  it  come  from,  or  orig- 
inate I 
II.     What  caused  it? 
III.     What  history  or  record  has  it? 


104  Thought  Culture 

IV.    What  are  its  attributes,  qualities 

or  characteristics? 
V.    What  things  can  I  most  readily  as- 
sociate with  it?    What  is  it  most 
like? 

VI.    What  is  it  good  for— how  may  it  be 
used— what  can  I  do  with  it? 

VII.    What  does  it  prove— what  can  be 

deduced  from  it? 
VIII.    What  are  its  natural  results— what 
happens  because  of  it? 

IX.    What  is  its  future;  and  its  natural 
or  probable  end  or  finish? 
X.    What  do  I  think  of  it,  on  the  whole 
—what  are  my  general   impres- 
sions regarding  it? 

XI.  What  do  I  know  about  it,  in  the  way 

of  general  information? 

XII.  What  have  I  heard  about  it,  and 

from  whom,  and  when? 
The  following  ''Query  Table,"  from  the 
same  volume,  may  be  found  useful  in  the  same 
direction.  It  is  simpler  and  less  complicated 
than  the  system  given  above.  It  has  well  been 
called  a  "Magic  Key  of  Knowledge,"  and  it 
opens  many  a  mental  door : 


Association  of  Ideas  105 

» 

QUEflY    TABLE 

Ask  yourself  the  following  questions  re- 
garding the  thing  under  consideration.     It 
will  draw  out  many  bits  of  information  and 
associated  knowledge  in  your  mind : 
I.  .What?  IV.    WhenI 

11.    Whence?  V,.     How? 

III.    Where?  VI.    Why? 

VII.    Whither? 

Eemember,  always,  that  the  greater  the 
number  of  associated  and  related  ideas  that 
you  are  able  to  group  around  a  concept,  the 
richer,  fuller  and  truer  does  that  concept  be- 
come to  you.  The  concept  is  a  general  idea, 
and  its  attributes  of  "generality"  depend 
upon  the  associated  facts  and  ideas  related  to 
it.  The  greater  the  number  of  the  view  points 
from  which  a  concept  may  be  examined  and 
considered,  the  greater  is  the  degree  of  knowl- 
edge concerning  that  concept.  It  is  held  that 
everything  in  the  universe  is  related  to  every 
other  thing,  so  that  if  we  knew  all  the  asso- 
ciated ideas  and  facts  concerning  a  thing,  we 
would  not  only  know  that  particular  thing  ab- 
solutely, but  would,  besides,  know  everything 
in  the  universe.  The  chain  of  Association  is 
infinite  in  extent. 


CHAPTER  X. 

GENEEALIZATION 

We  have  seen  that  Sensation  is  translated 
or  interpreted  into  Perception ;  and  that  from 
the  Percepts  so  created  we  may  '  *  draw  off, ' ' 
or  separate,  various  qualities,  attributes  and 
properties  by  the  analytical  process  we  call 
Abstraction.  Abstraction,  we  have  seen,  thus 
constitutes  the  first  step  in  the  process  of  what 
is  called  Understanding.  The  second  step  is 
called  Generalization  or  Conception. 

Generalization,  or  Conception,  is  that  fac- 
ulty of  the  mind  by  which  we  are  able  to  com- 
bine and  group  together  several  particular 
ideas  into  one  general  idea.  Thus  when  we 
find  a  number  of  particular  objects  possessing 
the  same  general  qualities,  attributes  or  prop- 
erties, we  proceed  to  classify  them  by  the 
process  of  Generalization.  For  instance,  in  a 
number  of  animals  possessing  certain  general 
and  common  qualities  we  form  a  concept  of  a 
class  comprising  those  particular  animals. 
Thus  in  the  concept  of  cow,  we  include  all  cows 

106 


Generalization  107 

—we  know  them  to  be  cows  because  of  their 
possession  of  certain  general  class  qualities 
which  we  include  in  our  concept  of  coiv.  The 
particular  cows  may  vary  greatly  in  size, 
color  and  general  appearance,  but  they  pos- 
sess the  common  general  qualities  which  we 
group  together  in  our  general  concept  of  cow. 
Likewise  by  reason  of  certain  common  and 
general  qualities  we  include  in  our  concept  of 
''Man,"  all  men,  black,  white,  brown,  red  or 
yellow,  of  all  races  and  degrees  of  physical 
and  mental  development.  From  this  generic 
concept  we  may  make  race  concepts,  dividing 
men  into  Indians,  Caucasians,  Malays,  Ne- 
groes, Mongolians,  etc.  These  concepts  in  turn 
may  be  divided  into  sub-races.  These  sub-divi- 
sions result  from  an  analysis  of  the  great  con- 
cept. The  great  concept  is  built  up  by  synthe- 
sis from  the  individuals,  through  the  sub-di- 
visions of  minor  concepts.  Or,  again,  we  may 
form  a  concept  of  ''Napoleon  Bonaparte" 
from  the  various  qualities  and  characteristics 
which  went  to  make  up  that  celebrated  man. 
The  product  of  Generalization  or  Concep- 
tion is  called  a  Concept.  A  Concept  is  ex- 
pressed in  a  word,  or  words,  called ' '  A  Term. ' ' 


108  Thought  Culture 

A  Concept  is  more  than  a  mere  word— it  is  a 
general  idea.  And  a  Term  is  more  than  a 
mere  word— it  is  the  expression  of  a  general 
idea. 

A  Concept  is  built  up  from  the  processes  of 
Perception,  Abstraction,  Comparison  and 
Generalization.  We  must  first  perceive ;  then 
analyze  or  abstract  qualities;  then  compare 
qualities ;  then  synthesize  or  classify  accord- 
ing to  the  result  of  the  comparison  of  quali- 
ties. By  perceiving  and  comparing  the  quali- 
ties of  various  individual  things,  we  notice 
their  points  of  resemblance  and  difference— 
the  points  wherein  they  agree  or  disagTee— 
wherein  they  are  alike  or  unlike.  Eliminating 
by  abstraction  the  points  in  which  they  differ 
and  are  unlike ;  and,  again  by  abstraction,  re- 
taining in  consideration  the  points  in  which 
they  resemble  and  are  alike;  we  are  able  to 
group,  arrange  or  classify  these  ''alike 
things"  into  a  class-idea  large  enough  to  em- 
brace them  all.  This  class-idea  is  what  is 
known  as  a  General  Idea  or  a  Concept.  This 
Concept  we  give  a  general  name,  which  is 
called  a  Term.  In  grammar  our  particular 
ideas  arising  from  Percepts  are  usually  de- 


GENERALlziATION  109 

noted  by  proper  nouns— our  general  ideas 
arising  from  Concepts  are  usually  denoted 
by  common  nouns.  Thus ' '  John  Smith ' '  ( par- 
ticular; proper  noun)  and  ''Man"  (general; 
common  noun).  Or  "horse"  (general;  com- 
mon), and  ''Dobbin"  (particular;  proper). 

It  will  be  seen  readily  that  there  must  be 
lower  and  higher  concepts.  Every  class  con- 
tains within  itself  lower  classes.  And  every 
class  is,  itself,  but  a  lower  class  in  a  higher 
one.  Thus  the  high  concept  of ' '  animal ' '  may 
be  analyzed  into  "mammal,"  which  in  turn 
is  found  to  contain  "horse,"  which  in  turn 
may  be  sub-divided  into  special  kinds  of 
horses.  The  concept  "plant"  may  be  sub- 
divided many  times  before  the  concept ' '  rose" 
is  obtained,  and  the  latter  is  capable  of  sub- 
division into  varieties  and  sub-varieties,  until 
at  last  a  particular  flower  is  reached.  Jevons 
says;  "We  classify  things  together  whenever 
we  observe  that  they  are  like  each  other  in  any 
respect  and,  therefore,  think  of  them  together. 
...  In  classifying  a  collection  of  objects, 
we  do  not  merely  put  together  into  groups 
those  which  resemble  each  other,  but  we  also 
divide  each  class  into  smaller  ones  in  which 


110  Thought  Culture 

the  resemblance  is  more  complete.  Thus  the 
class  of  white  substances  may  be  divided  into 
those  which  are  solid  and  those  which  are 
fluid,  so  that  we  get  the  two  minor  classes  of 
solid-white,  and  fluid-white  substances.  It  is 
desirable  to  have  names  by  which  to  show  that 
one  class  is  contained  in  another  and,  accord- 
ingly, we  call  the  class  which  is  divided  into 
two  or  more  smaller  ones,  the  Genus;  and  the 
smaller  ones  into  which  it  is  divided,  the 
Species/' 

Every  Genus  is  a  Species  of  the  ciass  next 
higher  than  itself;  and  every  Species  is  a 
Genus  of  the  classes  lower  than  itself.  Thus 
it  would  seem  that  the  extension  in  either  di- 
rection would  be  infinite.  But,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  finite  thought,  the  authorities  teach 
that  there  must  be  a  Highest  Genus,  which 
cannot  be  the  Species  of  a  higher  class,  and 
which  is  called  the  Summum  Genus.  The 
Sumrymm  Genus  is  expressed  by  terms  such 
as  the  following:  "Being;"  ''Existence;" 
''The  Absolute;"  "Something;"  "Thing;" 
' '  The  Ultimate  Reality, ' '  or  some  similar  term 
denoting  the  state  of  being  ultimate.  Like- 
wise, at  the  lowest  end  of  the  scale  we  find 


Generalization  111 

what  are  called  the  Lowest  Species,  or  Infima 
Species.  The  Infima  Species  are  always  in- 
dividuals. Thus  we  have  the  individual  at  one 
end  of  the  scale;  and  The  Absolute  at  the 
other.  Beyond  these  limits  the  mind  of  man 
cannot  travel. 

There  has  been  much  confusion  in  making 
classifications  and  some  ingenious  plans  have 
been  evolved  for  simplifying  the  process. 
That  of  Jevons  is  perhaps  the  simplest,  when 
understood.  This  authority  says:  "All  these 
difficulties  are  avoided  in  the  perfect  logical 
method  of  dividing  each  Genus  into  tivo  Spe- 
cies, and  not  more  than  tivo,  so  that  one  species 
possesses  a  particular  quality,  and  the  other 
does  not.  Thus  if  I  divide  dwelling-houses 
into  those  which  are  made  of  brick  and  those 
which  are  not  made  of  brick,  I  am  perfectly 
safe  and  nobody  can  find  fault  with  me.  .  .  . 
Suppose,  for  instance,  that  I  divide  dwelling- 
houses  as  below: 

Dwelling-House 


\ r 

Brick  Stone  Earth  Iron  Wood 

' '  The  evident  objection  will  at  once  be  made, 
that  houses  may  be  built  of  other  materials 


112  Thought  Culture 

than  those  here  specified.  In  Australia, 
houses  are  sometimes  made  of  the  bark  of 
gum-trees;  the  Esquimaux  live  in  snow 
houses;  tents  may  be  considered  as  canvas 
houses,  and  it  is  easy  to  conceive  of  houses 
made  of  terra-cotta,  paper,  straw,  etc.  All 
logical  difficulties  will,  however,  be  avoided  if 
I  never  make  more  than  two  species  at  each 
step,  in  the  following  way  :— 

Dwelling-House 


Brick  Not-Brick 


Stone  Not-Stone 


Wooden  Not-Wooden 


Iron  Not-Iron 


''It  is  quite  certain  that  I  must  in  this  di- 
vision have  left  a  place  for  every  possible  kind 
of  house ;  for  if  a  house  is  not  made  of  brick, 
nor  stone,  nor  wood,  nor  iron,  it  yet  comes  un- 
der the  species  at  the  right  hand,  which  is  not- 
iron,   not-wooden,   not-stone,   and   not-brick. 


Generalization  113 

.  .  .  This  manner  of  classifying  things  may 
seem  to  be  inconvenient,  but  it  is  in  reality  the 
only  logical  way. ' ' 

The  student  will  see  that  the  process  of 
Classification  is  two-fold.  The  first  is  by 
Analysis,  in  which  the  Genus  is  divided  into 
Species  by  reason  of  differences.  The  second 
is  by  Synthesis,  in  which  individuals  are 
grouped  into  Species,  and  Species  into  the 
Genus,  by  reason  of  resemblances.  Moreover, 
in  building  up  general  classes,  which  is  known 
as  Generalization,  we  must  first  analyze  the 
individual  in  order  to  ascertain  its  qualities, 
attributes  and  properties,  and  then  synthesize 
the  individual  with  other  individuals  posses- 
sing like  qualities,  properties  or  attributes. 

Brooks  says  of  Generalization:  ''The  mind 
now  takes  the  materials  that  have  been  fur- 
nished and  fashioned  by  comparison  and 
analysis  and  unites  them  into  one  single  men- 
tal product,  giving  us  the  general  notion  or 
concept.  The  mind,  as  it  were,  brings  to- 
gether these  several  attributes  into  a  bunch  or 
package  and  then  ties  a  mental  string  around 
it,  as  we  would  bunch  a  lot  of  roses  or  cigars. 
.    .    .    Generalization  is  an  ascending  process. 


114  Thought  Culture 

The  broader  concept  is  regarded  as  higher 
than  the  narrower  concept ;  a  concept  is  con- 
sidered as  higher  than  percept;  a  general 
idea  stands  above  a  particular  idea.  We  thus 
go  up  from  particulars  to  generals ;  from  per- 
cepts to  concepts;  from  lower  concepts  to 
higher  concepts.  Beginning  down  with  par- 
ticular objects,  we  rise  from  them  to  the  gen- 
eral idea  of  their  class.  Having  formed  a 
number  of  lower  classes,  we  compare  them  as 
we  did  individuals  and  generalize  them  into 
higher  classes.  We  perform  the  same  process 
with  these  higher  classes  and  thus  proceed  un- 
til we  are  at  last  arrested  in  the  highest  class, 
that  of  Being.  Having  reached  the  pinnacle 
of  Generalization,  we  may  descend  the  ladder 
by  reversing  the  process  through  which  we 
ascend. ' ' 

A  Concept,  then,  is  seen  to  be  a  general  idea. 
It  is  a  general  thought  that  embraces  all  the 
individuals  of  its  own  class  and  has  in  it  all 
that  is  common  to  its  own  class,  while  it  re- 
sembles no  particular  individual  of  its  class 
in  all  respects.  Thus,  a  concept  of  animal  con- 
tains within  itself  the  minor  concepts  of  all 
animals  and  the  animal-quality  of  all  animals 


Generalization  115 

—yet  it  differs  from  the  percept  of  any  one 
particular  animal  and  the  minor  concepts  of 
minor  classes  of  animals.  Consequently  a 
concejot  or  general  idea  cannot  be  imaged  or 
mentally  pictured.  We  may  picture  a  percept 
of  any  particular  thing,  but  we  cannot  picture 
a  general  idea  or  concept  because  the  latter 
does  not  partake  of  the  particular  qualities  of 
any  of  its  class,  but  embraces  all  the  general 
qualities  of  the  class.  Try  to  picture  the  gen- 
eral idea,  or  concept,  of  Man.  You  will  find 
that  any  attempt  to  do  so  will  result  in  the 
production  of  merely  a  man—&ovae  particular 
man.  If  you  give  the  picture  dark  hair,  it  will 
fail  to  include  the  light-haired  men;  if  you 
give  it  white  skin,  it  will  slight  the  darker- 
skinned  races.  If  you  picture  a  stout  man, 
the  thin  ones  are  neglected.  And  so  on  in 
every  feature.  It  is  impossible  to  form  a  cor- 
rect general  class  picture  unless  we  include 
every  individual  in  it.  The  best  we  can  do  is 
to  form  a  sort  of  composite  image,  which  at 
the  best  is  in  the  nature  of  a  sjanbol  repre- 
sentative of  the  class— an  ideal  image  to  make 
easier  the  idea  of  the  general  class  or  term. 
From  the  above  we  may  see  the  fundamen- 


116  Thought  Culture 

tal  differences  between  a  Percept  and  a  Con- 
cept. The  Percept  is  the  mental  image  of  a 
real  object— a  particular  thing.  The  Concept 
is  merely  a  general  idea,  or  general  notion,  of 
the  common  attributes  of  a  class  of  objects  or 
things.  A  Percept  arises  directly  from  sense- 
impressions,  while  a  Concept  is,  in  a  sense,  a 
pure  thought— an  abstract  thing— a  mental 
creation— an  ideal. 

A  Concrete  Concept  is  a  concept  embodying 
the  common  qualities  of  a  class  of  objects,  as 
for  instance,  the  concrete  concept  of  lion,  in 
which  the  general  class  qualities  of  all  lions 
are  embodied.  An  Abstract  Concept  is  a  con- 
cept embodying  merely  some  one  quality  gen- 
erally diffused,  as  for  instance,  the  quality  of 
fierceness  in  the  general  class  of  lions.  Rose 
is  a  concrete  concept;  red,  or  redness,  is  an 
abstract  concept.  It  will  aid  you  in  remember- 
ing this  distinction  to  memorize  Jevons'  rule: 
"A  Concrete  Term  is  the  name  of  a  Thing;  an 
Abstract  Term  is  the  name  of  a  Quality  of  a 

Thing." 

A  Concrete  Concept,  including  all  the  par- 
ticular individuals  of  a  class,  must  also  con- 
tain all  the  common  qualities  of  those  Individ- 


Generalization  117 

uals.  Thus,  such  a  concept  is  composed  of  the 
ideas  of  the  particular  individuals  and  of  their 
common  qualities,  in  combination  and  union. 
From  this  arises  the  distinctive  terms  known 
as  the  content,  extension  and  intension  of  con- 
cepts, respectively. 

The  content  of  a  concept  is  oil  that  it  in- 
cludes—its full  meaning.  The  extension  of  a 
concept  depends  upon  its  quantity  aspect— it 
is  its  property  of  including  numbers  of  indi- 
vidual objects  within  its  content.  The  inten- 
sion of  a  concept  depends  upon  its  quality  as- 
pect—it is  its  property  of  including  class  or 
common  qualities,  properties  or  attributes 
within  its  content. 

Thus,  the  extension  of  the  concept  horse 
covers  all  individual  horses;  while  its  inten- 
sion includes  all  qualities,  attributes,  and 
properties  common  to  all  horses— class  quali- 
ties possessed  by  all  horses  in  common,  and 
which  qualities,  etc.,  make  the  particular  ani- 
mals horses,  as  distinguished  from  other  ani- 
mals. 

It  follows  that  the  larger  the  number  of  par- 
ticular objects  in  a  class,  the  smaller  must  be 
the  number  of  general  class  qualities— quali- 


118  Thought  Culture 

ties  common  to  all  in  the  class.  And,  that  the 
larger  the  nmnber  of  common  class  qualities, 
the  smaller  must  be  the  number  of  individuals 
in  the  class.  As  the  logicians  express  it,  *Hhe 
greater  the  extension,  the  less  the  intension; 
the  greater  the  intension,  the  loss  the  exten- 
sion." Thus,  animal  is  narrow  in  intension, 
but  very  broad  in  extension;  for  while  there 
are  many  animals  there  are  but  very  few  qual- 
ities common  to  all  animals.  And,  horse  is 
narrower  in  extension,  but  broader  in  inten- 
sion; for  while  there  are  comparatively  few 
horses,  the  qualities  common  to  all  horses  are 
greater. 

The  cultivation  of  the  faculty  of  Generali- 
zation, or  Conception,  of  course,  depends 
largely  upon  exercise  and  material,  as  does 
the  cultivation  of  every  mental  faculty,  as  we 
have  seen.  But  there  are  certain  rules,  meth- 
ods and  ideas  which  may  be  used  to  advantage 
in  developing  this  faculty  in  the  direction  of 
clear  and  capable  work.  This  faculty  is  de- 
veloped by  all  of  the  general  processes  of 
thought,  for  it  forms  an  important  part  of  all 
thought.  But  the  logical  processes  known  as 
Analysis  and  Synthesis  give  to  this  faculty 


Generalization  119 

exercise  and  employment  particularly  adapted 
to  its  development  and  cultivation.  Let  us 
briefly  consider  these  processes. 

Logical  Analysis  is  the  process  by  which  we 
examine  and  unfold  the  meaning  of  Terms.  A 
Term,  you  remember,  is  the  verbal  expression 
of  a  Concept.  In  such  analysis  we  endeavor 
to  unfold  and  discover  the  quality -aspect  and 
the  quantity -aspect  of  the  content  of  the  con- 
cept. We  seek,  thereby,  to  discover  the  par- 
ticular general  idea  expressed ;  the  number  of 
particular  individuals  included  therein;  and 
the  properties  of  the  class  or  generalization. 
Analysis  depends  upon  division  and  separa- 
tion. Development  in  the  process  of  Logical 
Analysis  tends  toward  clearness,  distinctness, 
and  exactness  in  thought  and  expression. 
Logical  Analysis  has  two  aspects  or  phases, 
as  follows:  (1)  Division,  or  the  separation  of 
a  concept  according  to  its  extension,  as  for  in- 
stance the  analysis  of  a  genus  into  its  various 
species;  and  (2)  Partition,  or  the  separation 
of  a  concept  into  its  component  qualities,  prop- 
erties and  attributes,  as  for  instance,  the  anal- 
ysis of  the  concept  iron  into  its  several  qual- 


120  Thought  Culture 

ities  of  color,  weight,  hardness,  malleability, 
tenacity,  utility,  etc. 

There  are  certain  rules  of  Division  which 
should  be  observed,  the  following  being  a  sim- 
ple statement  of  the  same : 

I.  The  division  should  he  governed  hy  a  uni- 
form principle.  For  instance  it  would  be  il- 
logical to  first  divide  men  into  Caucasians, 
Mongolians,  etc.,  and  then  further  sub-divide 
them  into  Christians,  Pagans,  etc.,  for  the  first 
division  would  be  according  to  the  principle  of 
race,  and  the  second  according  to  the  principle 
of  religion.  Observing  the  rule  of  the  ''uni- 
form principle ' '  we  may  divide  men  into  races, 
and  sub-races,  and  so  on,  without  regard  to 
religion ;  and  we  may  likewise  divide  men  ac- 
cording to  their  respective  religions,  and  then 
into  minor  denominations  and  sects,  without 
regard  to  race  or  nationality.  The  above  rule 
is  frequently  violated  by  careless  thinkers  and 
speakers. 

II.  The  division  should  he  complete  and 
exhaustive.  For  instance,  the  analysis  of  a 
genus  should  extend  to  every  known  species 
of  it,  upon  the  principle  that  the  genus  is 
merely  the  sum  of  its  several  species.    A  text- 


Generalization  121 

book  illustration  of  a  violation  of  this  rule  is 
given  in  the  case  of  the  concept  actions,  when 
divided  into  good-actions  and  bad-actions,  but 
omitting  the  very  important  species  of  indif- 
ferent-actions. Carelessness  in  observance 
of  this  rule  leads  to  fallacious  reasoning  and 
cloudy  thinking. 

III.  The  division  shoidd  be  in  logical  se- 
quence. It  is  illogical  to  skip  or  pass  over  in- 
termediate divisions,  as  for  instance,  when  we 
divide  animals  into  horses,  trout  and  swal- 
lows, omitting  the  intermediate  division  into 
mammals,  fish  and  birds.  The  more  perfect 
the  sequence,  the  clearer  the  analysis  and  the 
thought  resulting  therefrom. 

IV.  The  division  should  be  exclusive. 
That  is,  the  various  species  divided  from  a 
genus,  should  be  reciprocally  exclusive— 
should  exclude  one  another.  Thus  to  divide 
mankind  into  male,  men  and  ivomen,  would  be 
illogical,  because  the  class  male  includes  men. 
The  division  should  be  either:  "male  and  fe- 
male;" or  else:  ''men,  women,  boys,  girls." 

The  exercise  of  Division  along  these  lines, 
and  according  to  these  rules,  will  tend  to  im- 
prove one's  powers  of  conception  and  analy- 


122  Thought  Culture 

sis.  Any  class  of  objects— any  general  con- 
cept—may be  used  for  practice.  A  trial  will 
show  you  the  great  powers  of  unf oldment  con- 
tained within  this  simple  process.  It  tends  to 
broaden  and  widen  one 's  conception  of  almost 
any  class  of  objects. 

There  are  also  several  rules  for  Partition 
which  should  be  observed,  as  follows : 

I.  The  partition  should  be  complete  and 
exhaustive.  That  is,  it  should  unfold  the  full 
meaning  of  the  term  or  concept,  so  far  as  is 
concerned  its  several  general  qualities,  prop- 
erties and  attributes.  But  this  applies  only 
to  the  qualities,  properties  and  attributes 
which  are  common  to  the  class  or  concept,  and 
not  to  the  minor  qualities  which  belong  solely 
to  the  various  sub-divisions  composing  the 
class ;  nor  to  the  accidental  or  individual  qual- 
ities belonging  to  the  separate  individuals  in 
any  sub-class.  The  qualities  should  be  essen- 
tial and  not  accidental— geneval,  not  particu- 
lar. A  famous  violation  of  this  rule  was  had 
in  the  case  of  the  ancient  Platonic  definition 
of  ''Man"  as:  "A  two-legged  animal  without 
feathers,"  which  Diogenes  rendered  absurd 
by  offering  a  plucked  chicken  as  a  "man"  ac- 


Generalization  123 

cording  to  the  definition.  Clearness  in 
thought  requires  the  recognition  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  general  qualities  and  the 
individual,  particular  or  accidental  qualities. 
Red-hair  is  an  accidental  quality  of  a  particu- 
lar man  and  not  a  general  quality  of  the  class 
man. 

11.  The  partition  should  consider  the  qual- 
ities, properties  and  attributes,  according  to 
the  classification  of  logical  division.  That  is, 
the  various  qualities,  properties  and  attri- 
butes should  be  considered  in  the  form  of 
genus  and  species,  as  in  Division.  In  this 
classification,  the  rules  of  Division  apply. 

It  will  be  seen  that  there  is  a  close  relation- 
ship existing  between  Partition  and  Defini- 
tion. Definition  is  really  a  statement  of  the 
various  qualities,  attributes,  and  properties  of 
a  concept,  either  stated  in  particular  or  else 
in  concepts  of  other  and  larger  classes.  There 
is  perhaps  no  better  exercise  for  the  cultiva- 
tion of  clear  thought  and  conception  than  Defi- 
nition. In  order  to  define,  one  must  exercise 
his  power  of  analysis  to  a  considerable  extent. 
Brooks  says:  ''Exercises  in  logical  definition 
are   valuable   in   unfolding   our   conception. 


124  Thought  Culture 

Logical  definition,  including  both  the  genns 
and  the  specific  difference,  gives  clearness, 
definiteness  and  adequacy  to  our  conceptions. 
It  separates  a  conception  from  all  other  con- 
ceptions by  fixing  upon  and  presenting  the  es- 
sential and  distinctive  property  or  properties 
of  the  conception  defined.  The  value  of  exer- 
cises in  logical  definition  is  thus  readily 
apparent. ' ' 

If  the  student  will  select  some  familiar  term 
and  endeavor  to  define  it  correctly,  writing 
down  the  result,  and  will  then  compare  the 
latter  with  the  definition  given  in  some  stand- 
ard dictionary,  he  will  see  a  new  light  regard- 
ing logical  definition.  Practice  in  definition, 
conducted  along  these  lines,  will  cultivate  the 
powers  of  analysis  and  conception  and  will, 
at  the  same  time,  tend  toward  the  acquiring  of 
correct  and  scientific  methods  of  thought  and 
clear  expression. 

Hyslop  gives  the  following  excellent  Rules 
of  Logical  Definition,  which  should  be  fol- 
lowed by  the  student  in  his  exercises : 

"I.  A  definition  should  state  the  essential 
attributes  of  the  species  defined. 

' '  II.  A  definition  must  not  contain  the  name 


Generalization  125 

or  word  defined.  Otherwise  the  definition  is 
called  a  circulus  in  definiendo  (defining  in  a 
circle). 

'  *  III.  The  definition  must  be  exactly  equiva- 
lent to  the  species  defined. 

'*IV.  A  definition  should  not  be  expressed 
in  obscure,  figurative  or  ambiguous  language. 

*'V.  A  definition  must  not  be  negative 
when  it  can  be  affirmative." 

Logical  Synthesis  is  the  exact  opposite  of 
Logical  Analysis.  In  the  latter  we  strive  to 
separate  and  take  apart;  in  the  former  we 
strive  to  bind  together  and  combine  the  par- 
ticulars into  the  general.  Beginning  with  in- 
dividual things  and  comparing  them  with  each 
other  according  to  observed  points  of  resem- 
blance, we  proceed  to  group  them  into  species 
or  narrow  classes.  These  classes,  or  species, 
we  then  combine  with  similar  ones,  into  a 
larger  class  or  genus ;  and  then,  according  to 
the  same  process,  into  broader  classes  as  we 
have  shown  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter. 

The  process  of  Synthesis  is  calculated  to 
develop  and  cultivate  the  mind  in  several  di- 
rections and  exercises  along  these  lines  will 
give  a  new  habit  and  sense  of  orderly  arrange- 


126  Thought  Culture 

ment,  which  will  be  most  useful  to  the  student 
in  his  every-day  life.  Halleck  says :  ' '  When- 
ever a  person  is  comparing  a  specimen  to  see 
whether  it  may  be  put  in  the  same  class  with 
other  specimens,  he  is  thinking.  Comparison 
is  an  absolutely  essential  factor  of  thought, 
and  classification  demands  comparison.  The 
man  who  has  not  properly  classified  the  myr- 
iad individual  objects  with  which  he  has  to 
deal,  must  advance  like  a  cripple.  He,  only, 
can  travel  with  seven-league  boots,  who  has 
thought  out  the  relations  existing  between 
these  stray  individuals  and  put  them  into  their 
proper  classes.  In  a  minute  a  business  man 
may  put  his  hand  on  any  one  of  ten  thousand 
letters  if  they  are  properly  classified.  In  the 
same  way,  the  student  of  history,  sociology  or 
any  other  branch,  can,  if  he  studies  the  sub- 
jects aright,  have  all  his  knowledge  classified 
and  speedily  available  for  use.  ...  In  this 
way,  we  may  make  our  knowledge  of  the  world 
more  minutely  exact.  We  cannot  classify 
without  seeing  things  under  a  new  aspect." 

The  study  of  Natural  History,  in  any  or  all 
of  its  branches,  will  do  much  to  cultivate  the 
power  of  Classification.    But  one  may  prac- 


Generalization  127 

tice  classification  with  the  objects  around  him 
in  his  every-day  life.  Arranging  things  men- 
tally, into  small  classes,  and  these  into  larger, 
one  will  soon  be  able  to  form  a  logical  connec- 
tion between  particular  ideas  and  general 
ideas;  particular  objects  and  general  classes. 
The  practice  of  classification  gives  to  the  mind 
a  constructive  turn— a  *' building-up "  tend- 
ency, which  is  most  desirable  in  these  days  of 
construction  and  development.  Regarding 
some  of  the  pitfalls  of  classification,  Jevons 
says: 

*'In  classifying  things,  we  must  take  great 
care  not  to  be  misled  by  outward  resemblances. 
Things  may  seem  to  be  very  much  like  each 
other  which  are  not  so.  Whales,  porpoises, 
seals  and  several  other  animals  live  in  the  sea 
exactly  like  fish;  they  have  a  similar  shape 
and  are  usually  classed  among  fish.  People 
are  said  to  go  whale-fishing.  Yet  these  ani- 
mals are  not  really  fish  at  all,  but  are  much 
more  like  dogs  and  horses  and  other  quadru- 
peds than  they  are  like  fish.  They  cannot  live 
entirely  under  water  and  breathe  the  air  con- 
tained in  the  water  like  fish,  but  they  have  to 
come  up  to  the  surface  at  intervals  to  take 


128  Thought  Culture 

breath.  Similarly,  we  must  not  class  bats 
with  birds  because  they  fly  about,  although 
they  have  what  would  be  called  wings ;  these 
wings  are  not  like  those  of  birds  and  in  truth 
bats  are  much  more  like  rats  and  mice  than 
they  are  like  birds.  Botanists  used  at  one 
time  to  classify  plants  according  to  their  size, 
as  trees,  shrubs  or  herbs,  but  we  now  know 
that  a  great  tree  is  often  more  similar  in  its 
character  to  a  tiny  herb  than  it  is  to  other 
great  trees.  A  daisy  has  little  resemblance 
to  a  great  Scotch  thistle ;  yet  the  botanist  re- 
gards them  as  very  similar.  The  lofty  grow- 
ing bamboo  is  a  kind  of  grass,  and  the  sugar- 
cane also  belongs  to  the  same  class  with  wheat 
andoa?ts." 

Remember  that  analysis  of  a  genus  into  its 
component  species  is  accomplished  by  a  sep- 
aration according  to  differences;  and  species 
are  built  up  by  synthesis  into  a  genus  because 
of  resemblances.  The  same  is  true  regarding 
individual  and  species,  building  up  in  accord- 
ance to  points  of  resemblance,  while  analysis 
or  separation  is  according  to  points  of  differ- 
ence. 

The  use  of  a  good  dictionary  will  be  advan- 


Generalization  129 

tageous  to  the  student  in  developing  the  power 
of  Generalization  or  Conception.  Starting 
with  a  species,  he  may  build  up  to  higher  and 
still  higher  classes  by  consulting  the  diction- 
ary; likewise,  starting  with  a  large  class,  he 
may  work  down  to  the  several  species  compos- 
ing it.  An  encyclopedia,  of  course,  is  still 
better  for  the  purpose  in  many  cases.  Re- 
member that  Generalization  is  a  prime  requis- 
ite for  clear,  logical  thinking.  Moreover,  it 
is  a  great  developer  of  Thought. 


CHAPTER  XL 

JUDGMENT 

We  have  seen  that  in  the  several  mental 
processes  which  are  grouped  together  under 
the  general  head  of  Understanding,  the  stage 
or  step  of  Abstraction  is  first ;  following  which 
is  the  second  step  or  phase,  called  Generaliza- 
tion or  Conception.  The  third  step  or  phase 
is  that  which  is  called  Judgment.  In  the  exer- 
cise of  the  faculty  of  Judginent,  we  determine 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  between  two 
concepts,  ideas,  or  objects  of  thought,  by  com- 
paring them  one  with  another.  From  this 
process  of  comparison  arises  the  Judgment, 
which  is  expressed  in  the  shape  of  a  logical 
Proposition.  A  certain  form  of  Judgment 
must  be  used,  however,  in  the  actual  forma- 
tion of  a  Concept,  for  we  must  first  comiDare 
qualities,  and  make  a  judgment  thereon,  in 
order  to  form  a  general  idea.  In  this  place, 
however,  we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  faculty  of  Judgment  in  the 

130 


Judgment  131 

strictly  logical  usage  of  the  term,  as  previous- 
ly stated. 

We  have  seen  that  the  expression  of  a  con- 
cept is  called  a  Term,  which  is  the  name  of 
the  concept.  In  the  same  way  when  we  com- 
pare two  tenns  (expressions  of  concepts)  and 
pass  Judgment  thereon,  the  expression  of 
that  Judgment  is  called  a  Proposition.  In 
every  Judgment  and  Propositon  there  must 
be  two  Terms  or  Concepts,  connected  by  a 
little  word  "is"  or  "are,"  or  some  form  of 
the  verb  "to  be,"  in  the  present  tense  indic- 
ative. This  connecting  word  is  called  the 
Copula.  For  instance,  we  may  compare  the 
two  terms  horse  and  animal,  as  follows:  "A 
horse  is  an  animal,"  the  word  is  being  the 
Copula  or  sjTnbol  of  the  affirmative  Judg- 
ment, which  connects  the  two  terms.  In  the 
same  way  we  may  form  a  negative  Judgment 
as  follows:  "A  horse  is  not  a  cow."  In  a 
Proposition,  the  term  of  which  something  is 
affirmed  is  called  the  Subject;  and  the  term 
expressing  that  ivhich  is  affirmed  of  the  sub- 
ject is  called  the  Predicate. 

Besides  the  distinction  between  affirmative 
Judgments,  or  Propositions,  there  is  a  dis- 


132  Thought  Culture 

tinction  arising  from  quantity,  which  sepa- 
rates them  into  the  respective  classes  of  par- 
ticular and  universal.  Thus,  ' '  all  horses  are 
animals,"  is  a  universal  Judgment;  while 
**some  horses  are  black"  is  a  particular  Judg- 
ment. Thus  all  Judgments  must  be  either  af- 
firmative or  negative ;  and  also  either  particu- 
lar or  universal.  This  gives  us  four  possible 
classes  of  Judgments,  as  follows,  and  illus- 
trated symbolically: 

1.  Universal  Affirmative,  as  ''All  A  is  B." 

2.  Universal  Negative,  as  ' '  No  A  is  B. " 

3.  Particular  Affirmative,  as  "Some  A  is 

B." 

4.  Particular  Negative,  as  ''Some  A  is  not 

B." 
The  Term  or  Judgment  is  said  to  be  ^^dis- 
tributed" (that  is,  extended  universally) 
when  it  is  used  in  its  fullest  sense,  in  which 
it  is  used  in  the  sense  of  "each  and  every"  of 
its  kind  or  class.  Thus  in  the  proposition 
"Horses  are  animals"  the  meaning  is  that 
*'each  and  every"  horse  is  an  animal— in  this 
case  the  subject  is  "distributed"  or  made 
universal.  But  the  predicate  is  not  "distrib- 
uted" or  made  universal,  but  remains  partic- 


Judgment  133 

Tilar  or  restricted  and  implies  merely  ''some." 
For  the  proposition  does  not  mean  that  the 
class  ''horses"  includes  all  animals.  For  we 
may  say  that : ' '  Some  animals  are  not  horses. ' ' 
So  you  see  we  have  several  instances  in  which 
the  "distribution"  varies,  both  as  regards  the 
subject  and  also  the  predicate.  The  rule  ot 
logic  apiDlying  in  this  case  is  as  follows : 

1.  In  universal  propositions,  the  subject  is 

distributed. 

2.  In  particular  propositions,  the  subject  is 

not  distributed. 

3.  In  negative  propositions,  the  predicate 

is  distributed. 

4.  In  affirmative  propositions,  the  predicate 

is  not  distributed. 

A  little  time  devoted  to  the  analysis  and  un- 
derstanding of  the  above  rules  will  repay  the 
student  for  his  trouble,  inasmuch  as  it  will 
train  his  mind  in  the  direction  of  logical  dis- 
tinction and  judgment.  The  importance  of 
these  rules  will  appear  later. 

Halleck  says:  ''Judgment  is  the  power 
revolutionizing  the  world.  The  revolution  is 
slow  because  nature's  forces  are  so  complex, 
so  hard  to  be  reduced  to  their  simplest  forms, 


134  Thought  Culture 

and  so  disguised  and  neutralized  by  the  pres- 
ence of  other  forces.  The  progress  of  the  next 
hundred  years  will  join  many  concepts,  which 
now  seem  to  have  no  common  qualities.  If 
the  vast  amount  of  energy  latent  in  the  sun- 
beams, in  the  rays  of  the  stars,  in  the  winds, 
in  the  rising  and  falling  of  the  tides,  is  treas- 
ured up  and  applied  to  human  purposes,  it 
will  be  a  fresh  triumph  for  judgment.  This 
world  is  rolling  around  in  a  universe  of  en- 
ergy, of  which  judgment  has  as  yet  harnessed 
only  the  smallest  appreciable  fraction.  For- 
tunately, judgment  is  ever  working  and 
silently  comparing  things  that,  to  past  ages, 
have  seemed  dissimilar;  and  it  is  constantly 
abstracting  and  leaving  out  of  the  field  of  view 
those  qualities  which  have  simply  served  to 
obscure  the  point  at  issue."  Brooks  says: 
"The  power  of  judgment  is  of  great  value  to 
its  products.  It  is  involved  in  or  accompanies 
every  act  of  the  intellect,  and  thus  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  all  intellectual  activity.  It  op- 
erates directly  in  every  act  of  the  understand- 
ing; and  even  aids  the  other  faculties  of  the 
mind  in  completing  their  activities  and 
products." 


Judgment  135 

The  best  method  of  cultivating  the  power 
of  Judgment  is  the  exercise  of  the  faculty  in 
the  direction  of  making  comparisons,  of 
weighing  differences  and  resemblances,  and 
in  generally  training  the  mind  along  the  lines 
of  Logical  Thinking.  Another  volume  of  this 
series  is  devoted  to  the  latter  subject,  and 
should  aid  the  student  who  wishes  to  cultivate 
the  habit  of  logical  and  scientific  thought. 
The  study  of  mathematics  is  calculated  to 
develop  the  faculty  of  Judgment,  because  it 
necessitates  the  use  of  the  powers  of  compar- 
ison and  decision.  Mental  arithmetic,  espe- 
cially, will  tend  to  strengthen,  and  exercise 
this  faculty  of  the  mind. 

Geometry  and  Logic  will  give  the  very  best 
exercise  along  these  lines  to  those  who  care 
to  devote  the  time,  attention  and  work  to  the 
task.  Games,  such  as  chess,  and  checkers  or 
draughts,  tend  to  develop  the  powers  of  Judg- 
ment. The  study  of  the  definitions  of  words 
in  a  good  dictionary  will  also  tend  to  give  ex- 
cellent exercise  along  the  same  lines.  The  ex- 
ercises given  in  this  book  for  the  cultivation 
and  development  of  the  several  faculties,  will 
tend  to  develop  this  particular  faculty  in  a 


136  Thought  Culture 

general  way,  for  the  exercise  of  Judgment  is 
required  at  each  step  of  the  way,  and  in  each 
exercise. 

Brooks  says :  "It  should  be  one  of  the  lead- 
ing objects  of  the  culture  of  young  people  to 
lead  them  to  acquire  the  habit  of  forming 
judgments.  They  should  not  only  be  led  to  see 
things,  but  to  have  opinions  about  things. 
They  should  be  trained  to  see  things  in  their 
relations,  and  to  put  these  relations  into  def- 
inite propositions.  Their  ideas  of  objects 
should  be  worked  up  into  thoughts  concern- 
ing the  objects.  Those  methods  of  teaching 
are  best  which  tend  to  excite  a  thoughtful  habit 
of  mind  that  notices  the  similitudes  and  diver- 
sities of  objects,  and  endeavors  to  read  the 
thoughts  which  they  embody  and  of  which  they 
are  the  symbols." 

The  exercises  given  at  the  close  of  the  next 
chapter,  entitled  "Derived  Judgments,"  will 
give  to  the  mind  a  decided  trend  in  the  direc- 
tion of  logical  judgment.  We  heartily  recom- 
mend them  to  the  student. 

The  student  will  find  that  he  will  tend  to 
acquire  the  habit  of  clear  logical  comparison 
and  judgment,  if  he  will  memorize  and  apply 


Judgment  137 

in  his  thinking  the  following  excellent  Primary 
Rules  of  Thought,  stated  by  Jevons : 

''I.  Law  of  Identity:  The  same  quality  or 
thing  is  always  the  same  quality  or  thing,  no 
matter  how  different  the  conditions  in  which 
it  occurs. 

* '  11.  Law  of  Contradiction :  Nothing  can  at 
the  same  time  and  place  both  be  and  not  be. 

* '  III.  Law  of  Excluded  Middle :  Everything 
must  either  be,  or  not  be;  there  is  no  other 
alternative  or  middle  course." 

Jevons  says  of  these  laws:  "Students  are 
seldom  able  to  see  at  first  their  full  meaning 
and  importance.  All  arguments  may  be  ex- 
plained when  these  self-evident  laws  are 
granted;  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
the  whole  of  logic  will  he  plain  to  those  who 
will  constantly  use  these  laws  as  their  key." 


CHAPTER  XII. 

DERIVED   JUDGMENTS 

As  we  have  seen,  a  Judgment  is  obtained  by 
comparing  two  objects  of  thought  according 
to  their  agreement  or  difference.  The  next 
higher  step,  that  of  logical  Reasoning,  con- 
sists of  the  comparing  of  two  ideas  through 
their  relation  to  a  third.  This  form  of  reason- 
ing is  called  mediate,  because  it  is  effected 
through  the  medium  of  the  third  idea.  There 
is,  however,  a  certain  process  of  Understand- 
ing which  comes  in  between  this  mediate  rea- 
soning on  the  one  hand,  and  the  formation  of 
a  plain  judgment  on  the  other.  Some  authori- 
ties treat  it  as  a  form  of  reasoning,  calling  it 
Immediate  Reasoning  or  Immediate  Infer- 
ence, while  others  treat  it  as  a  higher  form 
of  Judgment,  calling  it  Derived  Judgment. 
We  shall  follow  the  latter  classification,  as 
best  adapted  for  the  particular  purposes  of 
this  book. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  Derived 
Judgment  is   that   ordinary  Judgments   are 

138 


Derived  Judgments  139 

often  so  related  to  each  other  that  one  Judg- 
ment may  be  derived  directly  and  immediately 
from  another.  The  two  particular  forms  of 
the  general  method  of  Derived  Judgment  are 
known  as  those  of  (1)  Opposition;  and  (2) 
Conversion ;  respectively. 

In  order  to  more  clearly  understand  the 
logical  processes  involved  in  Derived  Judg- 
ment, we  should  acquaint  ourselves  with  the 
general  relations  of  Judgments,  and  with  the 
symbolic  letters  used  by  logicians  as  a  means 
of  simplifying  the  processes  of  thought.  Logi- 
cians denote  each  of  the  four  classes  of  Judg- 
ments or  Propositions  by  a  certain  letter,  the 
first  four  vowels— A,  E,  I  and  0,  being  used 
for  the  purpose.  It  has  been  found  very  con- 
venient to  use  these  symbols  in  denoting  the 
various  forms  of  Propositions  and  Judg- 
ments. The  following  table  should  be  memor- 
ized for  this  purpose : 

Universal  Affirmative,  symbolized  by  **  A." 
Universal  Negative,  symbolized  by  *'E." 
Particular  Affirmative,  symbolized  by  "I." 
Particular  Negative,  symbolized  by  "0.'* 
It  will  be  seen  that  these  four  forms  of 
Judgments   bear    certain   relations    to    each 


140 


Thought  Culture 


other,  from  wliich  arises  what  is  called  oppo- 
sition. This  may  be  better  understood  by  ref- 
erence to  the  following  table  called  the  Square 
of  Opposition : 


CONTRARIES 


E 


Thus,  A  and  E  are  contraries ;  I  and  0  are 
sub-contraries ;  A  and  I,  and  also  E  and  0  are 
subalterns;  A  and  0,  and  also  E  and  I  are 
contradictories. 

The  following  will  give  a  symbolic  table  of 
each  of  the  four  Judgments  or  Propositions 
with  the  logical  symbols  attached : 

(A)     ''All  A  is  B." 

(E)     ''No  A  is  B." 


Derived  Judgments  141 

(I)     '^Some  AisB." 
(0)     "Some  A  is  not  B." 
The  following  are  the  rules  governing  and 
expressing  the  relations  above  indicated : 

I.  Of  the  Contradictories:  One  must  be 
true,  and  the  other  must  he  false.  As  for 
instance,  (A)  "All  A  is  B;"  and  (0)  "Some 
A  is  not  B ; "  cannot  both  be  true  at  the  same 
time.  Neither  can  (E)  "No  A  is  B;"  and  (I) 
'  *  Some  A  is  B ; "  both  be  true  at  the  same  time. 
They  are  contradictory  by  nature,— and  if  one 
is  true,  the  other  must  be  false ;  if  one  is  false, 
the  other  must  be  true. 

II.  Of  the  Contraries :  //  one  is  true  the 
other  must  be  false;  but,  both  may  be  false. 
As  for  instance,  (A)  "All  A  is  B;"  and  (E) 
"  No  A  is  B ; "  cannot  both  be  true  at  the  same 
time.  If  one  is  true  the  other  must  be  false. 
But,  both  may  be  false,  as  we  may  see  when 
we  find  we  may  state  that  (I)  '^Some  A  is  B." 
So  while  these  two  propositions  are  contrary, 
they  are  not  contradictory.  While,  if  one  of 
them  is  true  the  other  must  be  false,  it  does 
not  follow  that  if  one  is  false  the  other  must 
be  true,  for  both  may  be  false,  leaving  the 
truth  to  be  found  in  a  third  proposition. 


142  Thought  Culture 

III.  Of  the  Subcontraries :  If  one  is  false 
the  other  must  be  true;  hut  both  may  be  true. 
As  for  instance,  (I)  ''Some  A  is  B;"  and  (0) 
''Some  A  is  not  B;"  may  both  be  true,  for 
they  do  not  contradict  each  other.  But  one 
or  the  other  must  be  true— they  can  not  both 
be  false. 

IV.  Of  the  Subalterns :  If  the  Universal 
{A  or  E)  be  true  the  Particular  {I  or  0) 
must  be  true.  As  for  instance,  if  (A)  "All  A 
is  B"  is  true,  then  (I)  "Some  A  is  B"  must 
also  be  true ;  also,  if  ( E )  "  No  A  is  B  "  is  true, 
then  "Some  A  is  not  B"  must  also  be  true. 
The  Universal  carries  the  particular  within 
its  truth  and  meaning.  But ;  If  the  Universal 
is  false,  the  particular  may  be  true  or  it  may 
be  false.  As  for  instance  (A)  "All  A  is  B" 
may  be  false,  and  yet  (I)  "Some  A  is  B"  may 
be  either  true  or  false,  without  being  deter- 
mined by  the  (A)  proposition.  And,  likewise, 
(E)  "No  A  is  B"  may  be  false  without  de- 
termining the  truth  or  falsity  of  (0)  "Some 
A  is  not  B." 

But:  //  the  Particular  be  false,  the  Uni- 
versal also  must  be  false.  As  for  instance, 
if  (I)  "Some  A  is  B"  is  false,  then  it  must 


Derived  Judgments  143 

follow  that  (A)  ^'AIl  A  is  B"  must  also  be 
false;  or  if  (0)  ''Some  A  is  not  B"  is  false, 
then  (E)  "No  A  is  B"  must  also  be  false. 
But :  The  Particular  may  he  true,  without  ren- 
dering the  Universal  true.  As  for  instance: 
(I)  ''Some  A  is  B"  may  be  true  without  mak- 
ing true  (A)  "^?/ AisB;"or  (0)  "Some  A 
is  not  B"  may  be  true  without  making  true 
(E)"NoAisB." 

The  above  rules  may  be  worked  out  not  only 
with  the  symbols,  as  "All  A  is  B,"  but  also 
with  any  Judgments  or  Propositions,  such  as 
"All  horses  are  animals;"  "All  men  are 
mortal;"  "Some  men  are  artists;"  etc.  The 
principle  involved  is  identical  in  each  and 
every  case.  The  "All  A  is  B"  symbology  is 
merely  adopted  for  simplicity,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  rendering  the  logical  process  akin 
to  that  of  mathematics.  The  letters  play  the 
same  part  that  the  numerals  or  figures  do  in 
arithmetic  or  the  a,  h,  c;  x,  y,  z,  in  algebra. 
Thinking  in  symbols  tends  toward  clearness 
of  thought  and  reasoning. 

Exercise :  Let  the  student  apply  the  prin- 
ciples of  Opposition  by  using  any  of  the  above 
judgments  mentioned  in  the  preceding  para- 


144  Thought  Culture 

graph,  in  the  direction  of  erecting  a  Square  of 
Opposition  of  them,  after  having  attached 
the  symbolic  letters  A,  E,  I  and  0,  to  the  ap- 
propriate foiTus  of  the  propositions. 

Then  let  him  work  out  the  following  prob- 
lems from  the  Tables  and  Square  given  in  this 
chapter. 

1.  If  '*  A"  is  true;  show  what  follows  for  E, 
I  and  0.    Also  what  follows  if  ''A"  be  false. 

2.  If '  *  E  "  is  true ;  show  what  follows  for  A, 
I  and  0.    Also  what  follows  if  E"  be  false, 

3.  If  ' '  I "  is  true ;  show  what  follows  for  A, 
E  and  0.    Also  what  follows  if  E  "  be  false. 

4.  If '  *  0  "  is  true ;  show  what  follows  for  A, 
E  and  I.    Also  what  happens  if  * '  0  "  be  false. 

CONVERSION   OF   JUDGMENTS 

Judgments  are  capable  of  the  process  of 
Conversion,  or  the  change  of  place  of  subject 
and  predicate.  Hyslop  says:  ''Conversion 
is  the  transposition  of  subject  and  predicate, 
or  the  process  of  immediate  inference  by 
which  we  can  infer  from  a  given  preposition 
another  having  the  predicate  of  the  original 
for  its  subject,  and  the  subject  of  the  original 
for  its  predicate."  The  process  of  convert- 
ing a  proposition  seems  simple  at  first  thought 


Derived  Judgments  145 

but  a  little  consideration  will  show  that  there 
are  many  difficul  ties  in  the  way.  For  instance, 
while  it  is  a  true  judgment  that  **A11  horses 
are  animals,^ ^  it  is  not  a  correct  Derived  Judg- 
ment or  Inference  that  *'A11  animals  are 
horses.  The  same  is  true  of  the  possible  con- 
version of  the  judgment  ''AH  biscuit  is 
bread"  into  that  of  ''All  bread  is  biscuit." 
There  are  certain  rules  to  be  observed  in  Con- 
version, as  we  shall  see  in  a  moment. 

The  Subject  of  a  judgment  is,  of  course,  the 
term  of  which  something  is  affirmed ;  and  the 
Predicate  is  the  term  expressing  that  ivhich  is 
affirmed  of  the  Subject.  The  Predicate  is 
really  an  expression  of  an  attribute  of  the 
Subject.  Thus  when  we  say  *'A11  horses  are 
animals"  we  express  the  idea  that  all  horses 
possess  the  attribute  of  "  animality ; "  or  when 
we  say  that  "Some  men  are  artists,"  we  ex- 
press the  idea  that  some  men  possess  the  at- 
tributes or  qualities  included  in  the  concept 
"artist."  In  Conversion,  the  original  judg- 
ment is  called  the  Convertend;  and  the  new 
form  of  judgment,  resulting  from  the  conver- 
sion, is  called  the  Converse.  Remember  these 
terms,  please. 


146  Thought  Culture 

The  two  Rules  of  Conversion,  stated  in 
simple  form,  are  as  follows : 

I.  Do  not  change  the  quality  of  a  judgment. 
The  quality  of  the  converse  must  remain  the 
same  as  that  of  the  convertend. 

II.  Do  not  distribute  an  undistributed 
term.  No  term  must  be  distributed  in  the  con- 
verse which  is  not  distributed  in  the  con- 
vertend. 

The  reason  of  these  rules  is  that  it  would 
be  contrary  to  truth  and  logic  to  give  to  a 
converted  judgment  a  higher  degree  of  qual- 
ity and  quantity  than  is  found  in  the  original 
judgment.  To  do  so  would  be  to  attempt  to 
make  ''twice  2"  more  than  ''2  plus  2." 

There  are  three  methods  or  kinds  of  Con- 
version, as  follows:  (1)  Simple  Conversion; 
(2)  Limited  Conversion;  and  (3)  Conversion 
by  Contraposition. 

In  Simple  Conversion,  there  is  no  change  in 
either  quality  or  quantity.  For  instance,  by 
Simple  Conversion  we  may  convert  a  propo- 
sition by  changing  the  places  of  its  subject  and 
predicate,  respectively.  But  as  Jevons  says: 
*'It  does  not  follow  that  the  new  one  will  al- 
ways be  true  if  the  old  one  was  t.rue.    Some- 


Derived  Judgments  147 

times  this  is  the  case,  and  sometimes  it  is  not. 
If  I  say,  'some  churches  are  wooden-build- 
ings, '  I  may  turn  it  around  and  get  '  some 
wooden-buildings  are  churches;'  the  meaning 
is  exactly  the  same  as  before.  This  kind  of 
change  is  called  Simple  Conversion,  because 
we  need  do  nothing  but  simply  change  the  sub- 
-^ects  and  predicates  in  order  to  get  a  new 
proposition.  We  see  that  the  Particular  Af- 
firmative proposition  can  be  simply  converted. 
Such  is  the  case  also  with  the  Universal  Nega- 
tive proposition.  'No  large  flowers  are  green 
things'  may  be  converted  simply  into  'no 
green  things  are  large  flowers.'  " 

In  Limited  Conversion,  the  quantity  is 
changed  from  Universal  to  Particular.  Of  this, 
Jevons  continues:  "But  it  is  a  more  trouble- 
some matter,  however,  to  convert  a  Universal 
Affirmative  proposition.  The  statement  that 
'all  jelly  fish  are  animals,'  is  true;  but,  if  we 
convert  it,  getting  'all  animals  are  jelly  fish,' 
the  result  is  absurd.  This  is  because  the  pred- 
icate of  a  universal  proposition  is  really  par- 
ticular. We  do  not  mean  that  jelly  fish  are 
'air  the  animals  which  exist,  but  only  'some' 
of  the  animals.    The  proposition  ought  really 


148  Thought  Culture 

to  be  'all  jelly  fish  are  S07ne  animals,'  and  if 
we  converted  this  simply,  we  should  get, '  some 
animals  are  all  jelly  fish. '  But  we  almost  al- 
ways leave  out  the  little  adjectives  some  and 
all  when  they  would  occur  in  the  predicate, 
so  that  the  proposition,  when  converted,  be- 
comes 'some  animals  are  jelly  fish.'  This 
kind  of  change  is  called  Limited  Conversion, 
and  we  see  that  a  Universal  Affirmative  prop- 
osition, when  so  converted,  gives  a  Particular 
Affirmative  one." 

In  Conversion  by  Contraposition,  there  is 
a  change  in  the  position  of  the  negative  copula, 
which  shifts  the  expression  of  the  quality. 
As  for  instance,  in  the  Particular  Negative 
''Some  animals  are  not  horses,"  we  cannot 
say  "Some  horses  are  not  animals,"  for  that 
would  be  a  violation  of  the  rule  that  "no  term 
must  be  distributed  in  the  converse  which  is 
not  distributed  in  the  convertend,"  for  as 
we  have  seen  in  the  preceding  chapter:  "In 
Particular  propositions  the  subject  is  not  dis- 
tributed." And  in  the  original  proposition, 
or  convertend,  "animals"  is  the  subject  of  a 
Particular  proposition.  Avoiding  this,  and 
proceeding  by  Conversion  by  Contraposition, 


Derived  Judgments  149 

we  convert  the  Convertend  (0)  into  a  Partic- 
ular Affirmative  (I),  saying:  ''Some  animals 
are  not-horses;"  or  ''Some  animals  are 
things  not  horses;"  and  then  proceeding  by 
Simple  Conversion  we  get  the  converse, 
"Some  things  not  horses  are  animals,"  or 
"Some  not-horses  are  animals." 

The  following  gives  the  application  of  the 
ai^propriate  form  of  Conversion  to  each  of 
the  several  four  kind  of  Judgments  or  Propo- 
sitions :  ''^ 

(A)  Universal  Affirmative:  This  form  of 
proposition  is  converted  by  Limited  Conver- 
sion. The  predicate  not  being  distributed  in 
the  convertend,  it  cannot  be  distributed  in  the 
converse,  by  saying  "all."  ("In  affirmative 
propositions  the  predicate  is  not  distrib- 
uted. ")  Thus  by  this  form  of  Conversion,  we 
convert  "All  horses  are  animals"  into  "Some 
animals  are  horses."  The  Universal  Affirm- 
ative (A)  is  converted  by  limitation  into  a 
Particular  Affirmative  (I). 

(E)  Universal  Negative:  This  form  of 
proposition  is  converted  by  Simple  Conver- 
sion. In  a  Universal  Negative  both  terms  are 
distributed.    ("In  universal  propositions,  the 


150  Thought  Culture 

subject  is  distributed ; "  '  *  In  negative  propo- 
sitions, the  predicate  is  distributed.")  So 
we  may  say  ''No  cows  are  liorses,"  and  then 
convert  the  proposition  into  *'No  horses  are 
cows."  We  simjDly  convert  one  Universal 
Negative  (E)  into  another  Universal  Nega- 
tive (E). 

(I)  Particular  Affirmative:  This  form  of 
proposition  is  converted  by  Simple  Conver- 
sion. For  neither  term  is  distributed  in  a 
Particular  Affirmative^  ("In  particular  prop- 
ositions, the  subject  is  not  distributed.  In  af- 
firmative propositions,  the  predicate  is  not 
distributed.")  And  neither  term  being  dis- 
tributed in  the  convertend,  it  must  not  be  dis- 
tributed in  the  converse.  So  from  ''Some 
horses  are  males"  we  may  by  Simple  Con- 
version derive ' '  Some  males  are  horses. ' '  We 
simply  convert  one  Particular  Affirmative  (I), 
into  another  Particular  Affirmative  (I).        ■ 

(0)  Particular  Negative:  This  form  of 
proposition  is  converted  by  Contraposition  or 
Negation.  We  have  given  examples  and  il- 
lustrations in  the  paragraph  describing  Con- 
version by  Contraposition.  The  Particular 
Negative  (I)  is  converted  by  contraposition 


Derived  Judgments  151 

into  a  Particular  Affirmative  (I)  which  is  then 
simply  converted  into  another  Particular  Af- 
firmative (I). 

There  are  several  minor  processes  or  meth- 
ods of  deriving  judgments  from  each  other, 
or  of  making  immediate  inferences,  but  the 
above  will  give  the  student  a  very  fair  idea 
of  the  minor  or  more  complete  methods. 

Exercise :  The  following  will  give  the  stu- 
dent good  practice  and  exercise  in  the  methods 
of  Conversion.  It  affords  a  valuable  mental 
drill,  and  tends  to  develop  the  logical  facul- 
ties, particularly  that  of  Judgment.  The  stu- 
dent should  convert  the  following  proposi- 
tions, according  to  the  rules  and  examples 
given  in  this  chapter : 

1    All  men  are  reasoning  beings. 

2.  Some  men  are  blacksmiths. 

3.  No  men  are  quadrupeds, 

4.  Some  birds  are  sparrows. 

5.  Some  horses  are  vicious. 

6.  No  brute  is  rational. 

7.  Some  men  are  not  sane. 

8.  All  biscuit  is  bread. 

9.  Some  bread  is  biscuit. 
10.    Not  all  bread  is  biscuit. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

REASONING 

In  the  preceding  chapters  we  have  seen  that 
in  the  group  of  mental  processes  involved  in 
the  general  process  of  Understanding,  there 
are  several  stages  or  steps,  three  of  which  we 
have  considered  in  turn,  namely:  (1)  Ab- 
straction; (2)  Generalization  or  Conception ; 
(3)  Judgment.  The  fourth  step,  or  stage,  and 
the  one  which  we  are  now  about  to  consider, 
is  that  called  Reasoning. 

Reasoning  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  where- 
by we  compare  two  Judgments,  one  with  the 
other,  and  from  which  comparison  we  are  en- 
abled to  form  a  third  judgment.  It  is  a  form 
of  indirect  or  mediate  comparison,  whereas, 
the  ordinary  Judgment  is  a  form  of  immediate 
or  direct  comparison.  As,  when  we  form  a 
Judgment,  we  compare  two  concepts  and  de- 
cide upon  their  agreement  or  difference;  so 
in  Reasoning  we  compare  two  Judgments  and 
from  the  comparison  we  draw  or  produce  a 
new  Judgment.    Thus,  we  may  reason  that  the 

152 


Reasoning  153 

particular  dog  ''Carlo"  is  an  animal,  by  the 
following  process : 

(1)  All  dogs  are  animals;  (2)  Carlo  is  a 
dog;  therefore,  (3)  Carlo  is  an  animal.  Or, 
in  the  same  way,  we  may  reason  that  a  whale 
is  not  a  fish,  as  follows : 

(1)  All  fish  are  cold-blooded  animals;  (2) 
A  whale  is  not  a  cold-blooded  animal ;  there- 
fore, (3)  A  whale  is  not  a  fish. 

In  the  above  processes  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  third  and  final  Judgment  is  derived  from  a 
comparison  of  the  first  two  Judgments. 
Brooks  states  the  process  as  follows:  ''Look- 
ing at  the  process  more  closely,  it  will  be  seen 
that  in  inference  in  Reasoning  involves  a 
comparison  of  relations.  We  infer  the  rela- 
tion of  two  objects  from  their  relation  to  a 
third  object.  We  must  thus  grasp  in  the  mind 
two  relations  and  from  the  comparison  of 
these  two  relations  we  infer  a  third  relation. 
The  two  relations  from  which  we  infer  a  third, 
are  judgments ;  hence,  Reasoning  may  also  be 
defined  as  the  process  of  deriving  one  judg- 
ment from  two  other  judgments.  We  com- 
pare the  two  given  judgments  and  from  this 
comparison  derive  the  third  judgment.    This 


154  Thought  Culture 

constitutes  a  single  step  in  Reasoning,  and  an 
argument  so  expressed  is  called  a  Syllogism." 

The  Syllogism  consists  of  three  proposi- 
tions, the  first  two  of  which  express  the 
grounds  or  basis  of  the  argument  and  are 
called  the  premdses;  the  third  expresses  the 
inference  derived  from  a  comparison  of  the 
other  two  and  is  called  the  conclusion.  We 
shall  not  enter  into  a  technical  consideration 
of  the  Syllogism  in  this  book,  as  the  subject  is 
considered  in  detail  in  the  volume  of  this  series 
devoted  to  the  subject  of  ''Logic."  Our  con- 
cern here  is  to  point  out  the  natural  process 
and  course  of  Reasoning,  rather  than  to  con- 
sider the  technical  features  of  the  process. 

Reasoning    is    divided    into    two    general 

* 

classes,  known  respectively  as  (1)  Inductive 
Reasoning ;  (2)  Deductive  Reasoning. 

Inductive  Reasoning  is  the  process  of  arriv- 
ing at  a  general  truth,  law  or  principle  from  a 
consideration  of  many  particular  facts  and 
truths.  Thus,  if  we  find  that  a  certain  thing  is 
true  of  a  great  number  of  particular  objects, 
we  may  infer  that  the  same  thing  is  true  of  all 
objects  of  this  particular  kind.  In  one  of  the 
examples  given  above,  one  of  the  judgments 


Reasoning  155 

was  that  "all  fish  are  cold-blooded  animals," 
which  general  truth  was  arrived  at  by  Induc- 
tive Reasoning  based  upon  the  examination  of 
a  great  number  of  fish,  and  from  thence  as- 
suming that  all  fish  are  true  to  this  general  law 
of  truth. 

Deductive  Reasoning  is  the  reverse  of  In- 
ductive Reasoning,  and  is  a  process  of  arriv- 
ing at  a  particular  truth  from  the  assumption 
of  a  general  truth.  Thus,  from  the  assump- 
tion that  ''all  fish  are  cold-blooded  animals," 
we,  by  Deductive  Reasoning,  arrive  at  the  con- 
clusion that  the  particular  fish  before  us  must 
be  cold-blooded. 

Inductive  Reasoning  proceeds  upon  the 
basic  principle  that ' '  What  is  true  of  the  many 
is  true  of  the  whole,"  while  Deductive  Reason- 
ing proceeds  upon  the  basic  principle  that 
"What  is  true  of  the  ivhole  is  true  of  its 
parts." 

Regarding  the  principle  of  Inductive  Rea- 
soning, Halleck  says:  ''Man  has  to  find  out 
through  his  own  experience,  or  that  of  others, 
the  major  premises  from  which  he  argues  or 
draws  his  conclusions.  By  induction,  we  ex- 
amine what  seems  to  us  a  sufficient  number  of 


156  Thought  Culture 

individual  cases.  We  then  conclude  that  the 
rest  of  these  cases,  which  we  have  not  exam- 
ined, will  obey  the  same  general  law.  The 
judgment  'All  men  are  mortal'  was  reached 
by  induction.  It  was  observed  that  all  past 
generations  of  men  had  died,  and  this  fact 
warranted  the  conclusion  that  all  men  living 
will  die.  We  make  that  assertion  as  boldly  as 
if  we  had  seen  them  all  die.  The  premise,  *  All 
cows  chew  the  cud,'  was  laid  down  after  a  cer- 
tain number  of  cows  had  been  examined.  If 
we  were  to  see  a  cow  twenty  years  hence,  we 
should  expect  to  find  that  she  chewed  the  cud. 
It  was  noticed  by  astronomers  that,  after  a 
certain  number  of  days,  the  earth  regularly 
returned  to  the  same  position  in  its  orbit,  the 
sun  rose  in  the  same  place,  and  the  day  was  of 
the  same  length.  Hence,  the  length  of  the  year 
and  of  each  succeeding  day  was  determined, 
and  the  almanac  maker  now  infers  that  the 
same  will  be  true  of  future  years.  He  tells  us 
that  the  sun  on  the  first  of  next  December  will 
rise  at  a  given  time,  although  he  cannot  throw 
himself  into  the  future  to  verify  the  con- 
clusion." 
Brooks  says  regarding  this  principle : ' '  This 


Reasoning  157 

proposition  is  founded  on  our  faith  in  the  uni- 
formity of  nature ;  take  away  this  belief,  and 
all  reasoning  by  induction  fails.  The  basis  of 
induction  is  thus  often  stated  to  be  man's  faith 
in  the  uniformity  of  nature.  Induction  has 
been  compared  to  a  ladder  upon  which  we  as- 
cend from  facts  to  laws.  This  ladder  cannot 
stand  unless  it  has  something  to  rest  upon; 
and  this  something  is  our  faith  in  the  con- 
stancy of  nature's  laws." 

There  are  two  general  ways  of  obtaining 
our  basis  for  the  process  of  Inductive  Reason- 
ing. One  of  these  is  called  Perfect  Induction 
and  the  other  Imperfect  Induction.  Perfect 
Induction  is  possible  only  when  we  have  had 
the  opportunity  of  examining  every  particular 
object  or  thing  of  which  the  general  idea  is 
expressed.  For  instance,  if  we  could  examine 
every  fish  in  the  universe  we  would  have  the 
basis  of  Perfect  Induction  for  asserting  the 
general  truth  that  *'all  fishes  are  cold- 
blooded." But  this  is  practically  impossible 
in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  and  so  we  must 
fall  back  upon  more  or  less  Imperfect  Induc- 
tion. We  must  assume  the  general  law  from 
the  fact  that  it  is  seen  to  exist  in  a  very  great 


158  Thought  Culture 

number  of  particular  cases ;  upon  the  princi- 
ple that  "What  is  true  of  the  many  is  true  of 
the  whole. ' '  As  Halleck  says  regarding  this : 
' '  Whenever  we  make  a  statement  such  as, '  All 
men  are  mortal,'  without  having  tested  each 
individual  case  or,  in  other  words,  without 
having  seen  every  man  die,  we  are  reasoning 
from  imperfect  induction.  Every  time  a  man 
buys  a  piece  of  beef,  a  bushel  of  potatoes  or  a 
loaf  of  bread,  he  is  basing  his  action  on  infer- 
ence from  imperfect  induction.  He  believes 
that  beef,  potatoes  and  bread  will  prove  nutri- 
tious food,  although  he  has  not  actually  tested 
those  special  edibles  before  purchasing  them. 
They  have  hitherto  been  found  to  be  nutritious 
on  trial  and  he  argues  that  the  same  will  prove 
true  of  those  special  instances.  Whenever 
a  man  takes  stock  in  a  new  national  bank,  a 
manufactory  or  a  bridge,  he  is  arguing  from 
past  cases  that  this  special  investment  will 
prove  profitable.  We  instinctively  believe  in 
the  uniformity  of  nature;  if  we  did  not  we 
should  not  consult  our  almanacs.  If  sufficient 
heat  will  cause  phosphorus  to  burn  to-day,  we 
conclude  that  the  same  result  will  follow  to- 
morrow if  the  circumstances  are  the  same." 


Reasoning  159 

But,  it  will  be  seen,  much  care  must  be  exer- 
cised in  making  observations,  experiments  and 
comparisons,  and  in  making  generalizations. 
The  following  general  principles  will  give  the 
views  of  the  authorities  regarding  this : 

Atwater  gives  the  two  general  rules : 

Rule  of  Agreement:  "If,  whenever  a  given 
.  object  or  agency  is  present,  without  counter- 
acting forces,  a  given  effect  is  produced,  there 
is  a  strong  evidence  that  the  object  or  agency 
is  the  cause  of  the  effect. ' ' 

Rule  of  Disagreement:  *'If  when  the  sup- 
posed cause  is  present  the  effect  is  present, 
and  when  the  supposed  cause  is  absent  the  ef- 
fect is  wanting,  there  being  in  neither  case  any 
other  agents  present  to  effect  the  result,  we 
may  reasonably  infer  that  the  supposed  cause 
is  the  real  one." 

Rule  of  Residue:  "When  in  any  phenomena 
we  tind  a  result  remaining  after  the  effects  of 
all  known  causes  are  estimated,  we  may  attrib- 
ute it  to  a  residual  agent  not  yet  reckoned. ' ' 

Rule  of  Concomitant  Variations:  "When  a 
variation  in  a  given  antecedent  is  accompan- 
ied by  a  variation  of  a  given  consequent,  they 


160  Thought  Culture 

are  in  some  manner  related  as  cause  and 
effect." 

Atwater  says,  of  the  above  rules,  that 
"whenever  either  of  these  criteria  is  found, 
free  from  conflicting  evidence,  and  especially 
when  several  of  them  concur,  the  evidence  is 
clear  that  the  cases  observed  are  fair  repre- 
sentatives of  the  whole  class,  and  warrant  a 
valid  universal  inductive  conclusion. ' ' 

We  now  come  to  what  is  known  as  Hypothe- 
sis or  Theory,  which  is  an  assumed  gen- 
eral principle— a  conjecture  or  supposition 
founded  upon  observed  and  tested  facts. 
Some  authorities  use  the  term ''theory"  in  the 
sense  of  "a  verified  hypothesis,"  but  the  two 
terms  are  employed  loosely  and  the  usage 
varies  with  different  authorities.  What  is 
known  as  "the  probability  of  a  hypothesis" 
is  the  proportion  of  the  number  of  facts  it  will 
explain.  The  greater  the  number  of  facts  it 
will  explain,  the  greater  is  its  "probability." 
A  Hypothesis  is  said  to  be  "verified"  when 
it  will  account  for  all  the  facts  which  are  prop- 
erly to  be  referred  to  it.  Some  very  critical 
authorities  hold  that  verification  should  also 
depend  upon  there  being  no  other  possible 


Reasoning  161 

hypotheses  which  will  account  for  the  facts, 
but  this  is  generally  considered  an  extreme 
position. 

A  Hypothesis  is  the  result  of  a  peculiar 
mental  process  which  seems  to  act  in  the  direc- 
tion of  making  a  sudden  anticipatory  leap  to- 
ward a  theory,  after  the  mind  has  been  satu- 
rated with  a  great  body  of  particular  facts. 
Some  have  spoken  of  the  process  as  almost 
intuitive  and,  indeed,  the  testimony  of  many 
discoverers  of  great  natural  laws  would  lead 
us  to  believe  that  the  Subconscious  region  of 
the  mind  most  active  in  making  what  La  Place 
has  called  ''the  great  guess"  of  discovery 
of  principle.  As  Brooks  says:  ''The  forming 
of  hypotheses  requires  a  suggestive  mind,  a 
lively  fancy,  a  philosophic  imagination,  that 
catches  a  glimpse  of  the  idea  through  the 
form,  or  sees  the  law  standing  behind  the 
fact." 

Thomson  says:  "The  system  of  anatomy 
which  has  immortalized  the  name  of  Oken,  is 
the  consequence  of  a  flash  of  anticipation 
which  glanced  through  his  mind  when  he 
picked  up  in  a  chance  walk  the  skull  of  a  deer, 
bleached  and  disintegrated  by  the  weather. 


162  Thought  Culture 

and  exclaimed,  after  a  glance,  '  It  is  part  of  a 
vertebral  column.'  When  Newton  saw  the 
apple  fall,  the  anticipatory  question  flashed 
through  his  mind,  'Why  do  not  the  heavenly 
bodies  fall  like  this  apple?'  In  neither  case 
had  accident  any  important  share;  Newton 
and  Oken  were  prepared  by  the  deepest  pre- 
vious study  to  seize  upon  the  unimportant  fact 
offered  to  them,  and  show  how  important  it 
might  become ;  and  if  the  apple  and  the  deer- 
skull  had  been  wanting,  some  other  falling 
body,  or  some  other  skull,  would  have  touched 
the  string  so  ready  to  vibrate.  But  in  each 
case  there  was  a  great  step  of  anticipation ; 
Oken  thought  he  saw  the  type  of  the  whole 
skeleton  in  a  single  vertebra,  whilst  Newton 
conceived  at  once  that  the  whole  universe  was 
full  of  bodies  tending  to  fall." 

Passing  from  the  consideration  of  Inductive 
Reasoning  to  that  of  Deductive  Reasoning  we 
find  ourselves  confronted  with  an  entirely  op- 
posite condition.  As  Brooks  says:  ''The  two 
methods  of  reasoning  are  the  reverse  of  each 
other.  One  goes  from  particulars  to  generals ; 
the  other  from  generals  to  particulars.  One  is 
a  process  of  analysis ;  the  other  is  a  process  of 


Reasoning  163 

synthesis.  One  rises  from  facts  to  laws ;  the 
other  descends  from  laws  to  facts.  Each  is 
independent  of  the  other ;  and  each  is  a  valid 
and  essential  method  of  inference." 

Deductive  Reasoning  is,  as  we  have  seen,  de- 
pendent upon  the  process  of  deriving  a  par- 
ticular truth  from  a  general  law,  principle  or 
truth,  upon  the  fundamental  axiom  that: 
''What  is  true  of  the  whole  is  true  of  its 
parts."  It  is  an  analytical  process,  just  as 
Inductive  Reasoning  is  synthetical.  It  is  a 
descending  process,  just  as  Inductive  Reason- 
ing is  ascending. 

Halleck  says  of  Deductive  Reasoning:  ''Af- 
ter induction  has  classified  certain  phenomena 
and  thus  given  us  a  major  premise,  we  pro- 
ceed deductively  to  apply  the  inference  to  any 
new  specimen  that  can  be  shown  to  belong  to 
that  class.  Induction  hands  over  to  deduction 
a  ready-made  major  premise,  e.  g.  'All  scorp- 
ions are  dangerous,'  Deduction  takes  this  as 
a  fact,  making  no  inquiry  about  its  truth. 
When  a  new  object  is  presented,  say  a  possible 
scorpion,  the  only  troublesome  step  is  to  de- 
cide whether  the  object  is  really  a  scorpion. 
This  may  be  a  severe  task  on  judgment.    The 


164  Thought  Culture 

average  inhabitant  of  the  temperate  zone 
would  probably  not  care  to  risk  a  hundred  dol- 
lars on  his  ability  to  distinguish  a  scorpion 
from  a  centipede,  or  from  twenty  or  thirty 
other  creatures  bearing  some  resemblance  to 
a  scorpion.  Here  there  must  be  accurately 
formed  concepts  and  sound  judgment  must  be 
used  in  comparing  them.  As  soon  as  we  de- 
cide that  the  object  is  really  a  scorpion,  we 
complete  the  deduction  in  this  way:— MZ^ 
scorpions  are  dangerous;  this  creature  is  a 
scorpion;  this  creature  is  dangerous.'  The 
reasoning  of  early  life  must  be  necessarily  in- 
ductive. The  mind  is  then  forming  general 
conclusions  from  the  examination  of  individ- 
ual phenomena.  Only  after  general  laws  have 
been  laid  down,  after  objects  have  been  clas- 
sified, after  major  premises  have  been  formed, 
can  deduction  be  employed." 

What  is  called  Reasoning  hy  Analogy  is 
really  but  a  higher  degree  of  Generalization. 
It  is  based  upon  the  idea  that  if  two  or  more 
things  resemble  each  other  in  many  particu- 
lars, they  are  apt  to  resemble  each  other  in 
other  particulars.  Some  have  expressed  the 
principle  as  follows : ' '  Things  that  have  some 


Reasoning  165 

things  in  common  have  other  things  in  com- 
mon." Or  as  Jevons  states  it:  *'The  rule 
for  reasoning  by  analog}^  is  that  if  two  or  more 
things  resemble  each  other  in  many  points, 
they  will  jorobably  resemble  each  other  also  in 
more  points." 

This  form  of  reasoning,  while  quite  common 
and  quite  convenient,  is  also  very  dangerous. 
It  affords  many  opportunities  for  making 
false  inferences.  As  Jevons  says:  ''In  many 
cases  Reasoning  by  Analogy  is  found  to  be  a 
very  uncertain  guide.  In  some  cases  unfortu- 
nate mistakes  are  committed.  Children  are 
sometimes  killed  by  gathering  and  eating  poi- 
sonous berries,  wrongly  inferring  that  they 
can  be  eaten,  because  other  berries,  of  a  some- 
what similar  appearance,  have  been  found 
agreeable  and  harmless.  Poisonous  toad- 
stools are  occasionally  mistaken  for  mush- 
rooms, especially  by  people  not  accustomed  to 
gather  them.  .  .  .  There  is  no  way  in  which 
we  can  really  assure  ourselves  that  we  are 
arguing  safely  by  analogy.  The  only  rule  that 
can  be  given  is  this,  that  the  more  things  re- 
semble each  other,  the  more  likely  is  it  that 
they  are  the  same  in  other  respects,  especially 


166  Thought  Culture 

in  points  closely  connected  ivith  those  ob- 
served." 

Halleck  says:  ''In  argmnent  or  reasoning 
we  are  much  aided  by  the  hahit  of  searching 
for  hidden  resemblances.  We  may  here  use 
the  term  analogy  in  the  narrower  sense  as  a  re- 
semblance of  ratios.  There  is  analogical  re- 
lation between  autumnal  frosts  and  vegetation 
on  the  one  hand,  and  death  and  human  life  on 
the  other.  Frosts  stand  in  the  same  relation 
to  vegetation  that  death  does  to  life.  The  de- 
tection of  such  a  relation  cultivates  thought. 
If  we  are  to  succeed  in  argument,  we  must  de- 
velop what  some  call  a  sixth  sense  for  the  de- 
tection of  such  relations.  .  .  .  Many  false 
analogies  are  manufactured  and  it  is  excel- 
lent thought  training  to  expose  them.  The 
majority  of  people  think  so  little  that  they 
swallow  false  analogies  just  as  newly-fledged 
robins  swallow  small  stones  dropped  into  their 
open  mouths.  .  .  .  The  study  of  poetry  may 
be  made  very  serviceable  in  detecting  anal- 
ogies and  cultivating  the  reasoning  powers. 
When  the  poet  brings  clearly  to  mind  the 
change  due  to  death,  using  as  an  illustration 
the  caterpillar  body  transformed  into  the  but- 


Reasoning  167 

terfl}^  spirit,  moving  with  winged  ease  over 
flowing  meadows,  lie  is  cultivating  our  appre- 
hension of  relations,  none  the  less  valuable 
because  they  are  beautiful. " 

There  are  certain  studies  which  tend  to  de- 
velop the  power  or  faculty  of  Inductive  Rea- 
soning. Any  study  which  leads  the  mind  to 
consider  classification  and  general  principles, 
laws  or  truth,  will  tend  to  develop  the  faculty 
of  deduction.  Physics,  Chemistry,  Astron- 
omy, Biology  and  Natural  History  are  partic- 
ularly adapted  to  develop  the  mind  in  this  par- 
ticular direction.  Moreover,  the  mind  should 
be  directed  to  an  inquiry  into  the  causes  of 
things.  Facts  and  phenomena  should  be  ob- 
served and  an  attempt  should  be  made  not 
only  to  classify  them,  but  also  to  discover  gen- 
eral principles  moving  them.  Tentative  or 
provisional  hypotheses  should  be  erected  and 
then  the  facts  re-examined  in  order  to  see 
whether  they  support  the  hypotheses  or  the- 
ory. Study  of  the  processes  whereby  the  great 
scientific  theories  were  erected,  and  the  proofs 
then  adduced  in  support  of  them,  will  give  the 
mind  the  habit  of  thinking  along  the  lines  of 
logical  induction.     The  question  ever  in  the 


168  Thought  Cultuke 

mind  in  Inductive  Reasoning  is  '"Why?"  The 
dominant  idea  in  Inductive  Reasoning  is  the 
Search  for  Causes. 

In  regard  to  the  pitfalls  of  Inductive  Rea- 
soning—the fallacies,  so-called,  Hyslop  says: 
*'It  is  not  easy  to  indicate  the  inductive  fal- 
lacies, if  it  be  even  possible,  in  the  formal 
process  of  induction.  ...  It  is  certain,  how- 
ever, that  in  respect  to  the  subject-matter  of 
the  conclusion  in  inductive  reasoning  there  are 
some  very  definite  limitations  upon  the  right- 
to  transcend  the  premises.  We  cannot  infer 
anything  we  please  from  any  premises  we 
please.  We  must  conform  to  certain  definite 
rules  or  principles.  Any  violation  of  them 
will  be  a  fallacy.  These  rules  are  the  same  as 
those  for  material  fallacies  in  deduction,  so 
that  the  fallacies  of  induction,  whether  they 
are  ever  formal  or  not,  are  at  least  material ; 
that  is  they  occur  whenever  equivocation  and 
presumption  are  committed.  There  are,  then, 
two  simple  rules  which  should  not  be  violated. 
(1)  The  subject-matter  in  the  conclusion 
should  be  of  the  same  general  kind  as  in  the 
premises.     (2)     The  facts  constituting  thi^ 


Reasoning  169 

premises  must  be  accepted  and  must  not  be 
fictitious. ' ' 

One  may  develop  his  faculty  or  power  of 
Deductive  Reasoning  by  pursuing  certain  lines 
of  study.  The  study  of  Mathematics,  partic- 
ularly in  its  branch  of  Mental  Arithmetic  is 
especially  valuable  in  this  direction.  Algebra 
and  Geometry  have  long  been  known  to  exer- 
cise an  influence  over  the  mind  which  gives  to 
it  a  logical  trend  and  cast.  The  processes  in- 
volved in  Geometry  are  akin  to  those  em- 
ployed in  Logical  reasoning,  and  must  neces- 
sarily train  the  mind  in  this  special  direction. 
As  Brooks  says:  "So  valuable  is  geometry  as 
a  discipline  that  many  lawyers  and  others  re- 
view their  geometry  every  year  in  order  to 
keep  the  mind  drilled  to  logical  habits  of  think- 
ing." The  study  of  Grammar,  Rhetoric  and 
the  Languages,  are  also  valuable  in  the  culture 
and  development  of  the  faculty  of  Deductive 
Reasoning.  The  study  of  Psychology  and 
Philosophy  have  value  in  this  connection.  The 
study  of  Law  is  very  valuable  in  creating  logi- 
cal habits  of  thinking  deductively. 

But  in  the  study  of  Logic  we  have  possibly 
the  best  exercise  in  the  development  and  cul- 


170  Thought  Culture 

ture  of  this  particular  faculty.  As  Brooks 
well  says :  * '  The  study  of  Logic  will  aid  in  the 
development  of  the  power  of  deductive  reason- 
ing. It  does  this  first  by  showing  the  method 
by  which  we  reason.  To  know  how  we  reason, 
to  see  the  laws  which  govern  the  reasoning 
process,  to  analyze  the  syllogism  and  see  its 
conformity  to  the  laws  of  thought,  is  not  only 
an  exercise  of  reasoning,  but  gives  that  knowl- 
edge of  the  process  that  will  be  both  a  stimulus 
and  a  guide  to  thought.  No  one  can  trace  the 
principles  and  processes  of  thought  without 
receiving  thereby  an  impetus  to  thought.  In 
the  second  place,  the  study  of  logic  is  probably 
even  more  valuable  because  it  gives  practice 
in  deductive  thinking.  This,  perhaps,  is  its 
principal  value,  since  the  mind  reasons  in- 
stinctively ivithout  knowing  hoiv  it  reasons. 
One  can  think  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
science  of  thinking,  just  as  one  can  use 
language  correctly  without  a  knowledge  of 
grammar;  yet  as  the  study  of  grammar  im- 
proves one's  speech,  so  the  study  of  logic  can- 
not but  improve  one's  thought." 

The  study  of  the  common  fallacies,  such  as 
^'Begging  the  Question,"  ''Reasoning  in  a 


Keasoning  171 

Circle,"  etc.,  is  particularly  important  to  the 
student,  for  when  one  realizes  that  such  fal- 
lacies exist,  and  is  able  to  detect  and  recognize 
them,  he  will  avoid  their  use  in  framing  his 
own  arguments,  and  will  be  able  to  expose 
them  when  they  appear  in  the  arguments  of 
others. 

The  fallacy  of ''Begging  the  Question"  con- 
sists in  assmning  as  a  proven  fact  something 
that  has  not  been  proven,  or  is  not  accepted  as 
proven  by  the  other  party  to  the  argument.  It 
is  a  common  trick  in  debate.  The  fact  assumed 
may  be  either  the  particular  point  to  be 
proved,  or  the  premise  necessary  to  prove  it. 
Hyslop  gives  the  following  illustration  of  this 
fallacy:  "Good  institutions  should  he  united; 
Church  and  State  are  good  institutions ;  there- 
fore, Church  and  State  should  be  united." 
The  above  syllogism  seems  reasonable  at  first 
thought,  but  analysis  will  show  that  the  major 
premise  ''Good  institutions  should  be  united" 
is  a  mere  assumption  without  proof.  Destroy 
this  premise  and  the  whole  reasoning  fails. 

Another  form  of  fallacy,  quite  common,'  is 
that  called  "Reasoning  in  a  Circle,"  which 
consists  in  assuming  as  proof  of  a  proposition 


172  Thought  Culture 

the  proposition  itself,  as  for  instance,  ''This 
man  is  a  rascal,  because  he  is  a  rogue;  he  is  a 
rogue,  because  he  is  a  rascaV^  "We  see 
through  glass,  because  it  is.  transparent.'* 
"The  child  is  dumb,  because  it  has  lost  the 
power  of  speech."  "He  is  untruthful,  because 
he  is  a  liar."  ' '  The  weather  is  warm,  because 
it  is  summer;  it  is  smnmer,  because  the 
weather  is  warm." 

These  and  other  fallacies  may  be  detected 
by  a  knowledge  of  Logic,  and  the  perception 
and  detection  of  them  strengthens  one  in  his 
faculty  of  Deductive  Reasoning.  The  study 
of  the  Laws  of  the  Syllogism,  in  Logic,  will 
give  to  one  a  certain  habitual  sense  of  stating 
the  terms  of  his  argument  according  to  these 
laws,  which  when  acquired  will  be  a  long  step 
in  the  direction  of  logical  thinking,  and  the  cul- 
ture of  the  faculties  of  deductive  reasoning. 

In  concluding  this  chapter,  we  wish  to  call 
your  attention  to  a  fact  often  overlooked  by 
the  majority  of  people.  Halleck  well  ex- 
presses it  as  follows : ' '  Belief  is  a  mental  state 
which  might  as  well  be  classed  under  emotion 
as  under  thinking,  for  it  combines  both  ele- 
ments.   Belief  is  a  part  inference  from  the 


Reasoning  173 

known  to  the  unknown,  and  part  feeling  and 
emotion. ' '  Others  have  gone  so  far  as  to  say 
that  the  majority  of  people  employ  their  in- 
tellects merely  to  prove  to  themselves  and  oth- 
ers that  which  they  feel  to  he  true,  or  wish  to 
he  true,  rather  than  to  ascertain  what  is  actu- 
ally true  by  logical  methods.  Others  have  said 
that  "men  do  not  require  arguments  to  con- 
vince them ;  they  want  only  excuses  to  justify 
them  in  their  feelings,  desires  or  actions." 
Cynical  though  this  may  seem,  there  is  suffici- 
ent truth  in  it  to  warn  one  to  guard  against 
the  tendency. 

Jevons  says,  regarding  the  question  of  the 
culture  of  logical  processes  of  thought :  "Mon- 
sieur Jourdain,  an  amusing  person  in  one  of 
Moliere's  plays,  expressed  much  surprise  on 
learning  that  he  had  been  talking  prose  for 
more  than  forty  years  without  knowing  it. 
Ninety-nine  people  out  of  a  hundred  might  be 
equally  surprised  on  hearing  that  they  had 
long  been  converting  propositions,  syllogiz- 
ing, falling  into  paralogisms,  framing  hy- 
potheses and  making  classifications  with  gen- 
era and  species.  If  asked  if  they  were  logi- 
cians, they  would  probably  answer.  No.    They 


174  Thought  Cultuee 

would  be  partly  right;  for  I  believe  that  a 
large  number  even  of  educated  persons  have 
no  clear  idea  of  what  logic  is.  Yet,  in  a  certain 
way,  every  one  must  have  been  a  logician  since 
he  began  to  speak.  It  may  be  asked:— If  we 
cannot  help  being  logicians,  why  do  we  need 
logic  books  at  all?  The  answer  is  that  there 
are  logicians,  and  logicians.  All  persons  are 
logicians  in  some  manner  or  degree;  but  un- 
fortunately many  people  are  bad  ones  and 
suffer  harm  in  consequence.  It  is  just  the 
same  in  other  matters.  Even  if  we  do  not 
know  the  meaning  of  the  name,  we  are  all 
athletes  in  some  manner  or  degree.  No  one 
can  climb  a  tree  or  get  over  a  gate  without  be- 
ing more  or  less  an  athlete.  Nevertheless, 
he  who  wishes  to  do  these  actions  really  well, 
to  have  a  strong  muscular  frame  and  thereby 
to  secure  good  health  and  personal  safety, 
as  far  as  possible,  should  learn  athletic 
exercises." 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONSTRUCTIVE   IMAGINATION" 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  old  psychology, 
a  chapter  bearing  the  above  title  would  be  con- 
sidered quite  out  of  place  in  a  book  on 
Thought-Culture,  the  Imagination  being  con- 
sidered as  outside  the  realm  of  practical 
psychology,  and  as  belonging  entirely  to  the 
idealistic  phase  of  mental  activities.  The  pop- 
ular idea  concerning  the  Imagination  also  is 
opposed  to  the  ' '  practical ' '  side  of  its  use.  In 
the  public  mind  the  Imagination  is  regarded 
as  something  connected  with  idle  dreaming 
and  fanciful  mental  imaging.  Imagination 
is  considered  as  almost  synonomous  with 
''Fancy." 

But  the  New  Psychology  sees  beyond  this 
negative  phase  of  the  Imagination  and  recog- 
nizes the  positive  side  which  is  essentially  con- 
structive when  backed  up  with  a  determined 
will.  It  recognizes  that  while  the  Imagination 
is  by  its  very  nature  idealistic,  yet  these  ideals 
may  be  made  real— these  subjective  pictures 

175 


176 '  Thought  Culture 

may  be  materialized  objectively.  The  positive 
phase  of  the  Imagination  manifests  in  plan- 
ning, designing,  projecting,  mapping  out,  and 
in  general  in  erecting  the  mental  framework 
which  is  afterward  clothed  with  the  material 
structure  of  actual  accomplishment.  And,  ac- 
cordingly, it  has  seemed  to  us  that  a  chapter 
on  ''Constructive  Imagination"  might  well 
conclude  this  book  on  Thought-Culture. 

Halleck  says :  "  It  was  once  thought  that  the 
imagination  should  be  repressed,  not  culti- 
vated, that  it  was  in  the  human  mind  like 
weeds  in  a  garden.  .  .  In  this  age  there  is  no 
mental  power  that  stands  more  in  need  of  cul- 
tivation than  the  imagination.  So  practical 
are  its  results  that  a  man  without  it  cannot 
possibly  be  a  good  plumber.  He  must  image 
short  cuts  for  placing  his  pipe.  The  image  of 
the  direction  to  take  to  elude  an  obstacle  must 
precede  the  actual  laying  of  the  pipe.  If  he 
fixes  it  before  traversing  the  way  with  his 
imagination,  he  frequently  gets  into  trouble 
and  has  to  tear  down  his  work.  Some  one  has 
said  that  the  more  imagination  a  blacksmith 
has,  the  better  will  he  shoe  a  horse.  Every 
time  he  strikes  the  red-hot  iron,  he  makes  it 


Constructive  Imagination  177 

approximate  to  the  image  in  his  mind.  Nor  is 
this  image  a  literal  copy  of  the  horse's  foot. 
If  there  is  a  depression  in  that,  the  imagina- 
tion must  build  out  a  corresponding  elevation 
in  the  image,  and  the  blows  must  make  the  iron 
fit  the  image." 

Brodie  says : '' Physical  investigation,  more 
than  anything  else,  helps  to  teach  us  the  actual 
value  and  right  use  of  the  imagination— of 
that  wondrous  faculty,  which,  when  left  to 
ramble  uncontrolled,  leads  us  astray  into  a 
wilderness  of  perplexities  and  errors,  a  land 
of  mists  and  shadows;  but  which,  properly 
controlled  by  experience  and  reflection,  be- 
comes the  noblest  attribute  of  man,  the  source 
of  poetic  genius,  the  instrument  of  discovery 
in  science,  without  the  aid  of  which  Newton 
would  never  have  invented  fluxions  nor  Davy 
have  decomposed  the  earths  and  alkalies, 
nor  would  Columbus  have  found  another 
continent. 

The  Imagination  is  more  than  Memory,  for 
the  latter  merely  reproduces  the  impressions 
made  upon  it,  while  the  Imagination  gathers 
up  the  material  of  impression  and  weaves  new 
fabrics  from  them  or  builds  new  structures 


178  Thought  Culture 

from  their  separated  units.  As  Tyndall  well 
said :  ''Philosophers  may  be  right  in  affirming 
that  we  cannot  transcend  experience ;  but  we 
can  at  all  events  carry  it  a  long  way  from  its 
origin.  We  can  also  magnify,  diminish,  qual- 
ify and  combine  experiences,  so  as  to  render 
them  fit  for  purposes  entirely  new.  "We  are 
gifted  with  the  power  of  imagination  and  by 
this  power  we  can  lighten  the  darkness  which 
surrounds  the  world  of  the  senses.  There  are 
tories,  even  in  science,  who  regard  imagina- 
tion as  a  faculty  to  be  feared  and  avoided 
rather  than  employed.  But  bounded  and  con- 
ditioned by  eooperant  reason,  imagination  be- 
comes the  mightiest  instrument  of  the  physi- 
cal discoverer.  Newton's  passage  from  a  fall- 
ing apple  to  a  falling  moon  was,  at  the  outset, 
a  leap  of  the  imagination. ' ' 

Brooks  says:  ''The  imagination  is  a  crea- 
tive as  well  as  a  combining  power.  .  .  .  The 
Imagination  can  combine  objects  of  sense  into 
new  forms,  but  it  can  do  more  than  this.  The 
objects  of  sense  are,  in  most  cases,  merely  the 
materials  with  which  it  works.  The  imagina- 
tion is  a  plastic  power,  moulding  the  things  of 
sense  into  new  forms  to  express  its  ideals ;  and 


Constructive  Imagination  179 

it  is  these  ideals  that  constitute  the  real  prod- 
ucts of  the  imagination.  The  objects  of  the 
material  world  are  to  it  like  clay  in  the  hands 
of  the  potter;  it  shapes  them  into  forms  ac- 
cording to  its  own  ideals  of  grace  and  beauty. 
.  .  .  He,  who  sees  no  more  than  a  mere  com- 
bination in  these  creations  of  the  imagination, 
misses  the  essential  element  and  elevates  into 
significance  that  which  is  merely  incidental." 
Imagination,  in  some  degree  or  phase,  must 
come  before  voluntary  physical  action  and 
conscious  material  creation.  Everything  that 
has  been  created  by  the  hand  of  man  has  first 
been  created  in  the  mind  of  man  by  the  exer- 
cise of  the  Imagination.  Everything  that  man 
has  wrought  has  first  existed  in  his  mind  as  an 
ideal,  before  his  hands,  or  the  hands  of  others, 
wrought  it  into  material  reality.  As  Maudsley 
says:  ''It  is  certain  that  in  order  to  execute 
consciously  a  voluntary  act  we  must  have  in 
the  mind  a  conception  of  the  aim  and  purpose 
of  the  act. ' '  Kay  says :"  It  is  as  serving  to 
guide  and  direct  our  various  activities  that 
mental  images  derive  their  chief  value  and  im- 
portance. In  anything  that  we  purpose  or  in- 
tend to  do,  we  must  first  of  all  have  an  idea 


180  Thought  Culture 

or  image  of  it  in  the  mind,  and  the  more  clear 
and  correct  the  image,  the  more  accurately 
and  efficiently  will  the  purpose  be  carried  out. 
We  cannot  exert  an  act  of  volition  without 
having  in  the  mind  an  idea  or  image  of  what 
we  will  to  effect." 

Upon  the  importance  of  a  scientific  use  of 
the  Imagination  in  every-day  life,  the  best  au- 
thorities agree.  Maudsley  says:  ''We  cannot 
do  an  act  voluntarily  unless  we  know  what  we 
are  going  to  do,  and  we  cannot  know  exactly 
what  we  are  going  to  do  until  we  have  taught 
ourselves  to  do  it. ' '  Bain  says : ' '  By  aiming  at 
a  new  construction,  we  must  clearly  conceive 
what  is  aimed  at.  Where  we  have  a  very  dis- 
tinct and  intelligible  model  before  us,  we  are 
in  a  fair  way  to  succeed ;  in  proportion  as  the 
ideal  is  dim  and  wavering  we  stagger  and  mis- 
carry.'* Kay  says:  "A  clear  and  accurate 
idea  of  what  we  wish  to  do,  and  how  it  is  to  be 
effected,  is  of  the  utmost  value  and  importance 
in  all  the  affairs  of  life.  A  man's  conduct 
naturally  shapes  itself  according  to  the  ideas 
in  his  mind,  and  nothing  contributes  more  to 
his  success  in  life  than  having  a  high  ideal  and 
keeping  it  constantly  in  view.    Where  such  is 


Constructive  Imagination  181 

the  case  one  can  hardly  fail  in  attaining  it. 
Numerous  unexpected  circumstances  will  be 
found  to  conspire  to  bring  it  about,  and  even 
what  seemed  at  first  hostile  may  be  converted 
into  means  for  its  furtherance ;  while  by  hav- 
ing it  constantly  before  the  mind  he  will  be 
ever  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  favoring 
circumstances  that  may  present  themselves." 
Simpson  says:  "A passionate  desire  and  an 
unwearied  will  can  perform  impossibilities,  or 
what  seem  to  be  such,  to  the  cold  and  feeble. ' ' 
Lytton  says:  ^' Dream,  0  youth,  dream  man- 
fully and  nobly,  and  thy  dreams  shall  be 
prophets."  Foster  says:  "It  is  wonderful 
how  even  the  casualities  of  life  seem  to  bow  to 
a  spirit  that  will  not  bow  to  them,  and  yield  to 
subserve  a  design  which  they  may,  in  their 
first  apparent  tendency,  threaten  to  frustrate. 
When  a  firm  decisive  spirit  is  recognized  it  is 
curious  to  see  how  space  clears  around  a  man 
and  leaves  him  room  and  freedom."  Tanner 
says : ' '  To  believe  firmly  is  almost  tantamount 
,  in  the  end  to  accomplishment."  Maudsley 
says:  ''Aspirations  are  often  prophecies,  the 
harbingers  of  what  a  man  shall  be  in  a  con- 
dition to  perform."     Macaulay  says:  *'It  is 


182  Thought  Culture 

related  of  Warren  Hastings  that  when  only 
seven  years  old  there  arose  in  his  mind  a 
scheme  which  through  all  the  turns  of  his 
eventful  life  was  never  abandoned."  Kay 
says :  ' '  When  one  is  engaged  in  seeking  for  a 
thing,  if  he  keep  the  image  of  it  clearly  before 
the  mind,  he  will  be  very  likely  to  find  it,  and 
that  too,  probably,  where  it  would  otherwise 
have  escaped  his  notice."  Burroughs  says: 
*  *  No  one  ever  found  the  walking  fern  who  did 
not  have  the  walking  fern  in  his  mind.  A  per- 
son whose  eye  is  full  of  Indian  relics  picks 
them  up  in  every  field  he  walks  through.  They 
are  quickly  recognized  because  the  eye  has 
been  commissioned  to  find  them." 

Constructive  Imagination  differs  from  the 
phases  of  the  faculty  of  Imagination  which  are 
akin  to  "Fancy,"  in  a  number  of  ways,  the 
chief  points  of  difference  being  as  follows : 

The  Constructive  Imagination  is  always  ex- 
ercised in  the  pursuance  of  a  definite  intent 
and  purpose.  The  person  so  using  the  faculty 
starts  out  with  the  idea  of  accomplishing  cer- 
tain purposes,  and  with  the  direct  intent  of 
thinking  and  planning  in  that  particular  di- 
rection.   The  fanciful  phase  of  the  Imagina- 


Constructive  Imagination  183 

tion,  on  the  contrary,  starts  with  no  definite 
intent  or  purpose,  but  proceeds  along  the  line 
of  mere  idle  phantasy  or  day-dreaming. 

The  Constructive  Imagination  selects  its 
material.  The  person  using  the  faculty  in  this 
manner  abstracts  from  his  general  stock  of 
mental  images  and  impressions  those  particu- 
lar materials  which  fit  in  with  his  general  in- 
tent and  purpose.  Instead  of  allowing  his 
imagination  to  wander  around  the  entire  field 
of  memory,  or  representation,  he  deliberately 
and  voluntarily  selects  and  sets  apart  only 
such  objects  as  seem  to  be  conducive  to  his 
general  design  or  plan,  and  which  are  logically 
associated  with  the  same. 

The  Constructive  Imagination  operates 
upon  the  lines  of  logical  thought.  One  so 
using  the  faculty  subjects  his  mental  images, 
or  ideas,  to  his  thinking  faculties,  and  pro- 
ceeds with  his  imaginative  constructive  work 
along  the  lines  of  Logical  Thought.  He  goes 
through  the  processes  of  Abstraction,  Gen- 
eralization or  Conception,  Judgment  and  the 
higher  phases  of  Reasoning,  in  connection 
with  his  general  work  of  Constructive  Imagi- 
nation.    Instead   of  having   the   objects   of 


184  Thought  Culture 

thought  before  him  in  material  form,  he  has 
them  represented  to  his  mind  in  ideal  form, 
and  he  works  upon  his  material  in  that  shape. 

The  Constructive  Imagination  is  voluntary 
— under  the  control  and  direction  of  the  will. 
Instead  of  being  in  the  nature  of  a  dream  de- 
pending not  upon  the  will  or  reason,  it  is  di- 
rectly controlled  not  only  by  reason  but  also 
by  the  will. 

The  Constructive  Imagination,  like  every 
other  faculty  of  the  mind,  may  be  developed 
and  cultivated  by  Use  and  Nourishment.  It 
must  be  exercised  in  order  to  develop  its  men- 
tal muscle ;  and  it  must  be  supplied  with  nour- 
ishment upon  which  it  may  grow.  Drawing^ 
Composing,  Designing  and  Planning  along 
any  line  is  calculated  to  give  to  this  faculty  the 
exercise  that  it  requires.  The  reading  of  the 
right  kind  of  literature  is  also  likely  to  lead  the 
faculty  into  activity  by  inspiring  it  with  ideals 
and  inciting  it  by  example. 

The  mind  should  be  supplied  with  the 
proper  material  for  the  exercise  of  this  fac- 
ulty. As  Halleck  says:  "Since  the  imagina- 
tion has  not  the  miraculous  power  necessary 
to  create  something  out  of  nothing,  the  first 


Constructive  Imagination  185 

essential  thing  is  to  get  the  proper  percep- 
tional material  in  proper  quantity.  If  a  child 
has  enough  blocks,  he  can  build  a  castle  or  a 
l^alace.  Give  him  but  three  blocks,  and  his 
power  of  combination  is  painfully  limited. 
Some  persons  wonder  why  their  imaginative 
power  is  no  greater,  when  they  have  only  a  few 
accurate  ideas. ' '  It  thus  follows  that  the  ac- 
tive use  of  the  Perceptive  faculties  will  result 
in  storing  away  a  quantity  of  material,  which, 
when  represented  or  reproduced  by  the  Mem- 
ory, will  give  to  the  Constructive  Imagination 
the  material  it  requires  with  which  to  build. 
The  greater  the  general  knowledge  of  the  per- 
son, the  greater  will  be  his  store  of  material 
for  this  use.  This  knowledge  need  not  neces- 
sarily be  acquired  at  first  hand  from  personal 
observation,  but  may  also  be  in  the  nature  of 
information  acquired  from  the  experience  of 
others  and  known  through  their  conversation, 
writings,  etc. 

The  necessity  of  forming  clear  concepts  is 
very  apparent  when  we  come  to  exercise  the 
Constructive  Imaginative.  Unless  we  have 
clear-cut  ideas  of  the  various  things  concerned 
with  the  subject  before  us,  we  cannot  focus  the 


186  Thought  Culture 

imagination  clearly  upon  its  task.  The  gen- 
eral ideas  should  be  clearly  understood  and 
the  classification  should  be  intelligent.  Par- 
ticular things  should  be  clearly  seen  in  'Hhe 
mind's  eye;"  that  is,  the  power  of  visualiza- 
tion or  forming  mental  images  should  be  cul- 
tivated in  this  connection.  One  may  improve 
this  particular  faculty  by  either  writing  a  de- 
scription of  scenes  or  particular  things  we 
have  seen,  or  else  by  verbally  describing  them 
to  others.  As  Halleck  says :  "An  attempt  at  a 
clear-cut  oral  description  of  something  to  an- 
other person  will  often  impress  ourselves  and 
him  with  the  fact  that  our  mental  images  are 
hazy,  and  that  the  first  step  toward  better  de- 
scription consists  in  improving  them. " 

Tyndall  has  aptly  stated  the  importance  of 
visualizing  one's  ideas  and  particular  con- 
cepts, as  follows :  * '  How,  for  example,  are  we 
to  lay  hold  of  the  physical  basis  of  light  since, 
like  that  of  life  itself,  it  lies  entirely  without 
the  domain  of  the  senses  ?  .  .  .  Bring  your 
imaginations  once  more  into  play  and  figure 
a  series  of  sound-waves  passing  through  air. 
Follow  them  up  to  their  origin,  and  what  do 
you  there  find?    A  definite,  tangible,  vibrating 


Constructive  Imagination  187 

body.  It  may  be  the  vocal  chords  of  a  human 
being,  it  may  be  an  organ-pipe,  or  it  may  be  a 
stretched  string.  Follow  in  the  same  manner 
a  train  of  ether  waves  to  their  source,  remem- 
bering at  the  same  time  that  your  ether  is  mat- 
ter, dense,  elastic  and  capable  of  motions  sub- 
ject to  and  determined  by  mechanical  laws. 
What  then  do  you  expect  to  find  as  the  source 
of  a  series  of  ether  waves"?  Ask  your  imagi- 
nation if  it  will  accept  a  vibrating  multiple 
proportion— a  numerical  ratio  in  a  state  of 
oscillation?  I  do  not  think  it  will.  You  can- 
not crown  the  edifice  by  this  abstraction.  The 
scientific  imagination  which  is  here  authori- 
tative, demands  as  the  origin  and  cause  of  a 
series  of  ether  waves  a  particle  of  vibrating 
matter  quite  as  definite,  though  it  may  be 
excessively  minute,  as  that  which  gives  origin 
to  a  musical  sound.  Such  a  particle  we  name 
an  atom  or  a  molecule.  I  thinl<L  the  seeking  in- 
tellect, when  focused  so  as  to  give  definition 
without  penumbral  haze,  is  sure  to  realize  this 
image  at  the  last." 

By  repeatedly  exercising  the  faculty  of 
Imagination  upon  a  particular  idea,  we  aQci 
power  and  clearness  to  that  idea.    This  is  but 


188  Thought  Culture 

another  example  of  the  familar  psychological 
principle  expressed  by  Carpenter  as  follows : 
''The  continued  concentration  of  attention 
■upon  a  certain  idea  gives  it  a  dominant 
power. ' '  Kay  says :  *  *  Clearness  and  accuracy 
of  image  is  only  to  be  obtained  by  repeatedly 
having  it  in  the  mind,  or  by  repeated  action  of 
the  faculty.  Each  repeated  act  of  any  of  the 
faculties  renders  the  mental  image  of  it  more 
clear  and  accurate  than  the  preceding,  and  in 
proportion  to  the  clearness  and  accuracy  of 
the  image  will  the  act  itself  be  performed  eas- 
ily, readily,  skillfully.  The  course  to  be  pur- 
sued, the  point  to  be  gained,  the  amount  of 
effort  to  be  put  forth,  become  more  and  more 
clear  to  the  mind.  It  is  only  from  what  we 
have  done  that  we  are  able  to  judge  what  we 
can  do,  and  understand  how  it  is  to  be  effected. 
When  our  ideas  or  conceptions  of  what  we  can 
do  are  not  based  on  experience,  they  become 
fruitful  sources  of  error." 

Galton  says:  ''There  is  no  doubt  as  to  the 
utility  of  the  visualizing  faculty  where  it  is 
duly  subordinated  to  the  higher  intellectual 
operations.  A  visual  image  is  the  most  per- 
fect form  of  mental  representation  wherever 


Constructive  Imagination  189 

the  shape,  position  and  relation  of  objects  in 
space  are  concerned.  It  is  of  importance  in 
every  handicraft  and  profession  where  design 
is  required.  The  best  workmen  are  those  who 
visualize  the  whole  of  what  they  propose  to  do 
before  they  take  a  tool  in  their  hands. ' ' 

Kay  says :  '  ^  If  we  bear  in  mind  that  every 
sensation  or  idea  must  form  an  image  in  the 
mind  before  it  can  be  perceived  or  understood, 
and  that  every  act  of  volition  is  preceded  by 
its  image,  it  will  be  seen  that  images  play  an 
important  part  in  all  our  mental  operations. 
According  to  the  nature  of  the  ideas  or  images 
which  he  entertains  will  be  the  character  and 
conduct  of  the  man.  The  man  tenacious  of 
purpose  is  the  man  who  holds  tenaciously  cer- 
tain ideas ;  the  flighty  man  is  he  who  cannot 
keep  one  idea  before  him  for  any  length  of 
time,  but  constantly  flits  from  one  to  another ; 
the  insane  man  is  he  who  entertains  insane 
ideas  often,  it  may  be,  on  only  one  or  two  sub- 
jects. We  may  distinguish  two  great  classes 
of  individuals  according  to  the  prevailing 
character  of  their  images.  There  are  those 
in  whose  mind  sensory  images  predominate, 
and  those  whose  images  are  chiefly  such  as 


190  Thought  Culture 

tend  to  action.  Those  of  the  former  class  are 
observant,  often  thoughtful,  men  of  judgment 
and,  it  may  be,  of  learning;  but  if  they  have 
not  also  the  active  faculty  in  due  force,  they 
will  fail  in  giving  forth  or  in  turning  to  proper 
account  their  knowledge  or  learning,  and  in- 
stances of  this  kind  are  by  no  means  uncom- 
mon. The  man,  on  the  other  hand,  who  has 
ever  in  his  mind  images  of  things  to  be  done, 
is  the  man  of  action  and  enterprise.  If  he  is 
not  also  an  observant  and  thoughtful  man,  if 
his  mind  is  backward  in  forming  images  of 
what  is  presented  to  it  from  without,  he  will 
be  constantly  liable  to  make  mistakes. ' ' 

Galton  says  of  the  faculty  of  visualization : 
''Our  bookish  and  wordy  education  tends  to 
repress  this  valuable  gift  of  nature.  A  fac- 
ulty that  is  of  importance  in  all  technical  and 
artistic  occupations,  that  gives  accuracy  to 
our  perceptions  and  justness  to  our  generali- 
zations, is  starved  by  lazy  disuse,  instead  of 
being  cultivated  judiciously  in  such  a  way  as 
will,  on  the  whole,  bring  the  best  return.  I  be- 
lieve that  a  serious  study  of  the  best  method 
of  developing  and  using  this  faculty  without 
prejudice  to  the  practice  of  abstract  thought  in 


Constructive  Imagination  191 

sjTubols,  is  one  of  the  many  pressing  desider- 
ata in  the  yet  unformed  science  of  education." 
This  consideration  of  the  faculty  of,  and 
culture  of,  the  Imagination,  may  appro^Dri- 
ately  be  concluded  by  the  following  quotation 
from  Prof.  Halleck,  which  shows  the  danger 
of  misuse  and  abuse  of  this  important  faculty. 
The  aforesaid  well-known  authority  says: 
''From  its  very  nature,  the  imagination  is 
peculiarly  liable  to  abuse.  The  common  prac- 
tices of  day-dreaming  or  castle-building  are 
both  morally  and  physically  unhealthful.  We 
reach  actual  success  in  life  by  slow,  weary 
steps.  The  day-dreamer  attains  eminence 
with  one  bound.  He  is  without  trouble  a  vic- 
torious general  on  a  vast  battlefield,  an  orator 
swaying  thousands,  a  millionaire  with  every 
amusement  at  his  command,  a  learned  man 
confounding  the  wisest,  a  president,  an  em- 
peror or  a  czar.  After  reveling  in  these  imag- 
inative sweets,  the  dry  bread  of  actual  toil 
becomes  exceedingly  distasteful.  It  is  so 
much  easier  to  live  in  regions  where  every- 
thing comes  at  the  magic  wand  of  fancy.  Not 
infrequently  these  castle-builders  abandon  ef- 
fort in  an  actual  world.     Success  comes  too 


192  Thought  Cultuke 

slow  for  tliem.  They  become  speculators  or 
gamblers,  and  in  spite  of  all  their  grand 
castles,  gradually  sink  into  utter  nonentities 
in  the  world  of  action.  .  .  .  The  young 
should  never  allow  themselves  to  build  any 
imaginative  castle,  unless  they  are  willing  by 
hard  effort  to  try  to  make  that  castle  a  reality. 
They  must  be  willing  to  take  off  their  coats, 
go  into  the  quarries  of  life,  chisel  out  the 
blocks  of  the  stone,  and  build  them  with  much 
toil  into  the  castle  walls.  If  castle-building 
is  merely  the  formation  of  an  ideal,  which  we 
show  by  our  effort  that  we  are  determined  to 
attain,  then  all  will  be  well." 

It  will  be  seen  that,  in  reality,  the  Cultiva- 
tion of  the  Imagination  is  rather  the  training 
and  intelligent  direction  of  that  faculty,  in- 
stead of  the  development  of  its  power.  The 
majority  of  people  have  the  faculty  of  Imagi- 
,  nation  well  developed,  but  to  them  it  is  largely 
an  untrained,  fanciful  self-willed  faculty.  Cul- 
tivation is  needed  in  the  direction  of  bringing 
it  under  the  guidance  of  the  reason,  and  con- 
trol by  the  will.  Thought-Culture  in  general 
will  do  much  for  the  Imagination,  for  the  very 
processes  employed  in  the  development  and 


Constructive  Imagination  193 

cultivation  of  the  various  other  faculties  of 
the  mind  will  also  tend  to  bring  the  Imagina- 
tion into  subjection  and  under  control,  instead 
of  allowing  it  to  remain  the  wild,  fanciful  irre- 
sponsible faculty  that  it  is  in  the  majority  of 
cases.  Use  the  faculty  of  Imagination  as  a 
faculty  of  Thought,  instead  of  a  thing  of 
Fancy.  Attach  it  to  the  Intellect  instead  of  to 
the  Emotions.  Harness  it  up  with  the  other 
faculties  of  Thought,  and  your  chariot  of  Un- 
derstanding and  Attainment  will  reach  the 
goal  far  sooner  than  under  the  old  arrange- 
ment. Establish  harmony  between  Intellect 
and  Imagination,  and  you  largely  increase  the 
power  and  achievements  of  both. 


FINIS. 


THE 

Pathway  of  Roses 

By   CHRISTIAN    D.  LARSON 


WHO  would  so  live  that  the  dreams  of  the  night 
shall  rise  with  the  morning  but  shall  not  de- 
part with  the  setting  sun — it  is  to  men  and 
women    such    as  these   that   we   recommend   THE 
PATHWAY  OF  ROSES. 

The  thinking  world  of  today  is  being  filled  with  a 
phase  of  thought  that  has  exceptional  value.  True, 
some  of  it  is  in  a  somewhat  chaotic  condition,  but 
most  of  it  is  rich,  containing  within  itself  the  very 
life  of  that  truth  that  is  making  the  world  free.  But 
in  the  finding  of  this  truth,  and  in  the  application  of 
its  principles,  where  are  we  to  begin?  What  are  we 
to  do  first?  And  after  we  have  begun,  and  find  our- 
selves in  the  midst  of  a  life  so  large,  so  immense  and 
so  marvelous  that  it  will  require  eternity  to  live  it  all, 
what  are  the  great  essentials  that  we  should  ever 
remember  and  apply?  What  are  the  great  centers  of 
life  about  which  we  may  build  a  greater  and  a  greater 
life?  These  are  questions  that  thousands  are  asking 
today,  and  the  answer  may  be  found  in  THE  PATH- 
WAY OF  ROSES. 

Beautifully  and  substantially  bound  in  silk  cloth 
Contains  about  400  pages 

Price,  postpaid,  $1.50 
THE  PROGRESS   COMPANY        -       CHICAGO 


u<iifS  BOOK  STORE,  PORTLAND,  OREGON. 
284  OAK  ST. 


AUG    3W82 

1 

DATE  DUE 

1 

- 

( 

CAYLORO 

PRINTED  IN  USA 

3  1970  00684  3194 


Va    000  664  536    0 


